All Content Related to Syria

Syria

Fri, 07 Aug 2009 10:58:04 -0400

Background

In Syria, the media is primarily owned and controlled by the government and the ruling Baath party. Criticism of the president and his family is not allowed, journalists practice self-censorship, and foreign reporters rarely get accreditation.1 Though there have been improvements in Syrian press freedom since President Bashar al-Assad became president in 2000,2 the state continues to use the ongoing state of emergency to arrest media workers.3 Journalists and political activists risk arrest at any time for virtually any reason and are “up against a whimsical and vengeful state apparatus which continually adds to the list of things banned or forbidden to be mentioned.”4 Syrian journalists have been arrested for interviewing exiled regime opponents, participating in conferences abroad and for criticizing government policies.5

In 2006, Reporters Without Borders ranked Syria among the thirteen “enemies of the Internet,”6 and in 2007 it described Syria as the biggest prison for cyber-dissidents in the Middle East because of the number of arrests and mistreatments of online activists.7 In 2009, the Committee to Protect Journalists named Syria number three in a list of the ten worst countries in which to be a blogger, given the arrests, harassments and restrictions which online writers in Syria have faced.8

The government admits to censoring “pro-Israel and hyper-Islamist” Web sites, such as those run by the illegal Muslim Brotherhood, and those calling for autonomy for Syrian Kurds.9 In defense of these practices, former Minister of Technology and Communications Amr Salem has said that “Syria is currently under attack … and if somebody writes, or publishes or whatever, something that supports the attack, they will be tried.”10

Internet in Syria

The telecommunications market is Syria is the most regulated in the Middle East and is among the least developed. State-owned Syrian Telecom (STE) owns all telecommunications infrastructure and has made some substantial investment to bring services to rural areas, but limited competition exists with private ISPs competing with STE in the Internet provision market.11

STE, a government body that is part of the Ministry of Telecommunications and Technology, is also the regulator of telecommunications in Syria, and in addition to being an ISP, it enjoys a monopoly over wired and wireless services provided anywhere in Syria.12 Telecom providers in Syria include Syriatel,13 MTN,14 Aya,15 and SCS-net, which is the ISP arm of the Syrian Computer Society.16 Additionally, MTN and Syriatel now offer 3G mobile broadband in four major cities, as well as EDGE and GPRS connectivity (WAP) across the country.17 3G, however, is prohibitively expensive for most Syrians at nearly USD 50 per month.

The Internet was introduced to the general public in Syria in 2000 as part of the modernizing reforms of President Bashar al-Assad. In the subsequent seven years, Internet use soared by 4,900 percent, far exceeding the global growth rate of 249 percent. The Internet penetration rate as of 2008 was 16.8 percent.18 The vast majority of Syrian users get online at Syria’s ubiquitous Internet cafés, and from houses using dial-up connections via landlines.19 Syrian users continue to access blocked Web sites using proxies and circumvention tools, and prefer to use Internet cafés to browse banned content because, they believe, government can monitor Web surfing through home Internet connections.20

Legal and regulatory frameworks

The constitution of Syria provides for freedom of speech and of the press, but the Syrian government restricts press freedom with repressive laws such as the Emergency Law which was put in place December 1962 and broadly mandates the censorship of various forms of communication; the 2001 Press Law which sets out sweeping controls over publications printed in Syria; articles 286 and 287 of the penal code which criminalize spreading news abroad; and Decree No. 6 of 1965 criminalizes “publishing news aimed at shaking the people’s confidence in the revolution.”21

The Syrian authorities extended their censorship of Internet activities and monitoring of Internet users in March 2008 by ordering Internet café users to provide their names, identification cards, and the times they use the Internet café to Internet café owners, who will subsequently present them to the authorities.22 The head of the Syrian Media Center told Reuters, “These steps are designed to terrorize Internet users and spread fear and self-censorship in violation of the right to privacy and free expression.”23 Government officials said these measures were necessary to guard against what they described as attempts to spread sectarian divisions and "penetration by Israel."24

On the other hand, an increasing number of Syrians have faced trials or have been jailed for their online writings, and the Syrian authorities continue judicial persecution of cyber-dissidents. For example, Habib Saleh was tried in December 2008 for publishing articles calling for democracy in Syria on the Web site Elaph.com, a Web site that is censored in Syria, and was given a three-year prison sentence in March 2009. Saleh was convicted under article 285 of the criminal code of “weakening national sentiment,” a charge that is applicable only in wartime, said his lawyer.25 In the same vein, blogger Tariq Biasi received a three-year sentence for "weakening national sentiment" as well as "publishing false information” on his blog.26

In addition, owners of opposition Web sites face harassment by the authorities. For example, lawyer and Web site editor Abdallah Souleiman Ali was detained for 12 days for “persisting in publishing legal and political articles criticizing the role of the government” in his Web site Al Nazaha (alnazaha.org) in July 2008.27

Access to the social networking Web site Facebook was blocked in November 2007 as part of a crackdown on political activism on the Internet because, as a women’s rights advocate believes, it helped Syrian civil society form civic groups outside government control.28 The government however, said Facebook was blocked because it could become a conduit for Israeli penetration of Syrian youth.29 According to advocacy group the Syrian Media Center, at least 153 Internet sites have been blocked, among which are Blogger (owned by Google), the Arabic blogging host service Maktoob, YouTube, and Web sites of opposition parties, Lebanese newspapers and Lebanese groups opposed to “Syrian interference in Lebanon.”30 In September 2008, the Public Institution for Telecommunication ordered the blocking of the entire Web site of the Cairo-based Arabic Network for Human Rights Information (ANHRI) as well as their blogs (www.katib.org). Prior to that, only a page on ANHRI’s site containing information about human rights violations in Syria was blocked. ANHRI believes this blocking was ordered by the security forces, “which have a louder voice than the law and the Constitution in Syria.”31

Internet cafés in Syria are subject to tough measures which make opening one very difficult. To start an Internet café, one needs to get a license from the Syrian Telecommunications Institution and a security license from the Interior Ministry that sets security instructions, including requiring each café visitor to provide his/her name, ID, and the names of his or her mother and father.32 The café owner must show visitors which religious and political websites they are banned from using.33 Failure to follow the rules can result in closure of the café, large fines, and in extreme cases, jail time.34

Surveillance

STE states on its Web site that the telecommunications it provides remain private and shall not be shared except by law and regulations at an official request.35 However, café operators have reported that the authorities ask them to spy on the customers and that they believe everything is monitored.36 A young cyber-dissident who was arrested at an Internet café in Damascus in late 2006 for his critical online writings said security services often ask café owners to spy on clients, providing them with software programs for the task.37 And, as mentioned above, Internet café operators must keep a record of their clients’ names and IDs as well as when they use the Internet, to present to the authorities on request. Furthermore, Syria-based Web sites were ordered by the government in 2007 to reveal the identity and name of those behind any article or comment they publish.38

The Interior Ministry and the Syrian Telecommunications Institution have banned the sale of mobile phones that have global positioning systems (GPS) and have wireless application protocol (WAP) services that are not being properly monitored by the service providers.39

Technical censorship in Syria is implemented using software from a Canadian company called Platinum Inc.40 The company uses ThunderCache solution for URL filtering and, as the product’s Web page suggests, the system is capable of monitoring and controlling a user’s dynamic Web-based activities as well as conducting deep packet inspection.41

ONI testing results

Testing was conducted on two ISPs in Syria, SCS-Net (also known as Aloola) and Aya. ONI testing results indicate that Syria’s Internet filtering regime has increased the scope and depth of targeted content. Censorship has been extended to include high profile sites such as the video sharing Web site YouTube, the social networking Web site Facebook, and the online shop Amazon.com.

Political filtering continues to be pervasive. For example, Web sites of the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood such as ikhwansyria.com and jimsyr.com (now defunct) were blocked. Unlike results from 2006-2007, more Web sites affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, including that of the Egyptian branch, were blocked. Examples include www.ikhwanonline.com, www.ikhwanweb.com, and www.ikhwan.net.

Results from 2006-2007 testing indicated that only two Kurdish Web sites were blocked, but results from 2008-2009 testing show that several Kurdish Web sites have been added to the blocked sites. These include www.kurdnas.com, amude.net, www.kurdistanabinxete.com, www.pajk-online.com, www.kurdmedya.com, and www.kurdax.net.

Also blocked were the Web site of the United States Committee for a Free Lebanon (freelebanon.org), which campaigns for an end to Syrian influence in Lebanese politics, the Web site of the Lebanese Forces (www.lebanese-forces.org), and some Lebanese newspapers such as www.annahar.com.

Several political Web sites were also filtered. Among them are the Web site of the Reform Party of Syria (www.reformsyria.org), a Web site of a communist party in Syria (www.syriaalaan.com), the Web site of the Hizb al-Tahrir or Liberation Party (www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org) —an Islamist group that seeks to restore the Caliphate, and various news and oppositional Web sites such as www.thisissyria.net, www.free-syria.com, and www.syriatruth.org.

ONI testing found that a number of Syrian blogs hosted on Google’s popular blogging engine, Blogger (blogspot.com), continue to be blocked, strongly suggesting that ISPs have blocked access to all blogs hosted on this service, including many apolitical blogs. Interestingly enough, Blogger.com (the site from which users of the service write posts) is not blocked, meaning Syrian users can blog, but cannot read blogs (including their own).

Freesyria.wordpress.com, a blog created to campaign for the release of Michel Kilo, a prominent Syrian journalist imprisoned for his writings, was also blocked.

ONI results confirmed that Syria has unblocked access to the popular e-mail site www.hotmail.com as well as the small Web-based e-mail sites address.com and netaddress.com. All three sites were found to be blocked in previous rounds of testing. None of the Arabic-language e-mail sites ONI tested were blocked, though the Arabic-language hosting site www.khayma.com was. Among the few Web sites found unblocked since 2006-2007 testing were the localized Arabic version of Wikipedia and the Web site of the Lebanese Free Patriotic Movement (http://www.tayyar.org).

Though most foreign news sites were accessible, Web sites of some prominent Arabic newspapers and news portals were found to be blocked. Examples include the pan Arab, London-based, Arabic-language newspapers, Al-Quds al-Arabi (www.al-quds.co.uk) and Al-Sharq al-Awsat, (www.asharqalawsat.com), the news portal elaph.com, the Kuwaiti newspaper Al Seyassah (www.alseyassah.com), the U.S.-based Web site of the Arab Times (www.arabtimes.com), and the Islamically oriented news and information portal Islam Online (islamonline.net). These publications frequently run articles critical of the Syrian government.
Web sites of human rights organizations were generally available. Sites associated with the London-based Syrian Human Rights Committee (SHRC) and the Web site of the Syrian Observatory of Human Rights (www.syriahr.com) were notable exceptions. As indicated above, some blogs that criticize the human rights record of Syria were also blocked.

Several Israeli Web sites were tested to confirm whether or not Syria blocks the entire “.il” domain. All tested Web sites within the domain were blocked, suggesting that the entire domain is indeed blocked. URLs containing the keyword “Israel” were also found to be blocked.

Nearly one-third of the anonymizer sites tested were blocked, indicating some measure of effort to preempt circumvention. None of the sites containing pornographic content were found to be blocked, including the select few found blocked in 2006-2007 testing. Additionally, as in 2006-2007 rounds of testing, Web sites that focus on lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered issues were generally available.

The ISPs in Syria offer an optional filtering system to block content deemed immoral, violent, and chatting Web sites. ONI did not test the scope and depth of these optional systems.
Filtering continues to lack transparency; there is no explicit block page and the ISPs and telecom regulators do not publish clear information about what they filter.

Conclusion

In addition to high profile Web sites such as YouTube, Amazon.com, and Facebook, the Web sites blocked in Syria span a range of categories, with the most substantial filtering being of sites that criticize government policies and actions or espouse oppositional political views. Repressive legislation and the imprisonment of journalists and bloggers for their activities online have led many Syrians to engage in self-censorship. Meanwhile, the government continues to promote the growth of the Internet throughout the country.

1. “Country Profile: Syria,” BBC News, March 10, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/country_profiles/801669.stm.
2. Ibid.
3. Reporters Without Borders, “Syria - Annual Report 2007,” http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=20777.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Reporters Without Borders, “List of the 13 Internet enemies,” November 7, 2006, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3id_article=19603.
7. Reporters Without Borders, “Syria - Annual Report 2007,” http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=20777.
8. Committee to Protect Journalists, “10 Worst Countries to be a Blogger,” April 30, 2009, http://www.cpj.org/reports/2009/04/10-worst-countries-to-be-a-blogger.ph....
9. Guy Taylor, “After the Damascus spring: Syrians search for freedom online,” Reason Online: Free Minds and Free Markets, February 2007, http://www.reason.com/news/show/118380.html.
10. Ibid.
11. Paul Budde Communication, Syria – “Telecoms, Mobile & Broadband,” http://www.budde.com.au/buddereports/1168/Syria_-_Telecoms_Market_Overvi....
12. Syrian Telecom, http://www.ste.gov.sy.
13. Syriatel, http://www.syriatel.sy.
14. MTN, http://www.mtnsyria.com.
15. Aya, http://aya.sy/.
16. SCS-net/Aloola Web site, http://www.scs-net.org/.
17. “Syria: MTN and Syriatel Both Launch 3G Services,” Zawya.com, January 21, 2009, http://ae.zawya.com/countries/sy/macrowatch.cfm?eiusection=MTN%20AND%20S....
18. International Telecommunications Union, “ITU Internet Indicators 2008,” http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/icteye/Reporting/ShowReportFrame.aspx?ReportNam....
19. Phil Sands, “Syria tightens control over internet,” The National, September 30, 2008, http://www.thenational.ae/article/20080930/FOREIGN/664681062/1135.
20. “Syrian youth break through internet blocks,” International Relations And Security Network, June 3, 2008, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?ots591....
21. Freedom House, “Map of Press Freedom 2008,” http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&year=2008.
22. Khaled Yacoub Oweis, “Syria expands ‘iron censorship’ over Internet,” Reuters, March 13, 2008, http://uk.reuters.com/article/internetNews/idUKL138353620080313?sp=true.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Reporters Without Borders, “Cyber-dissident Habib Saleh sentenced to three years in jail,” March 16, 2009, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=30591.
26. Gideon Spitzer, “Dissident Watch: Tariq Biasi,” The Middle East Quarterly XVI (2009): 96, http://www.meforum.org/2098/dissident-watch-tariq-biasi#_ftn2.
27. Reporters Without Borders, “Lawyer held for 12 days is latest victim of government harassment of opposition websites,” August 18, 2008, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=28190.
28. Khaled Yacoub Oweis, “Syria blocks Facebook in Internet crackdown,” Reuters, November, 23, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSOWE37285020071123.
29. Ibid.
30. Khaled Yacoub Oweis, “Syria expands ‘iron censorship’ over Internet,” Reuters, March 13, 2008, http://uk.reuters.com/article/internetNews/idUKL138353620080313?sp=true.
31. Arabic Network for Human Rights Information, “Arabic Network for Human Rights Information’s Website is Entirely Blocked in Syria,” September 29, 2008, http://www.anhri.net/en/reports/2008/pr0929.shtml.
32. Omar Abdelatif, “Opening up an Internet café in Syria? Good luck,” Menassat, June 13, 2008, http://www.menassat.com/?q=en/news-articles/3943-opening-internet-caf-sy....
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Syrian Telecom, http://www.ste.gov.sy.
36. Omar Abdelatif, “Opening up an Internet café in Syria? Good luck,” Menassat, June 13, 2008, http://www.menassat.com/?q=en/news-articles/3943-opening-internet-caf-sy....
37. Zeina Karam, “Syria tightens controls on Internet users,” The New York Times, March 25, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/25/technology/25iht-media.4.11415911.html....
38. Khaled Yacoub Oweis, “Syria expands ‘iron censorship’ over Internet,” Reuters, March 13, 2008, http://uk.reuters.com/article/internetNews/idUKL138353620080313?sp=true.
39. Omar Abdelatif, “Opening up an Internet café in Syria? Good luck,” Menassat, June 13, 2008, http://www.menassat.com/?q=en/news-articles/3943-opening-internet-caf-sy....
40. Syrian Observatory Human Rights, Taqrir al-Markez al-Suri lile’lam wahuriyat altabir ‘an halat ‘a’elam walhuriyat alsahafiyah [Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression’s Report on Media and Press Freedom in Syria], May 3, 2009, http://www.syriahr.com/3-5-2009-syrian%20observatory6.htm.
41. Platinum Inc., http://platinum.sy/index.php?m=90; ThunderCache, http://www.thundercache.com/pages/filtering.html.

Sex, Social Mores, and Keyword Filtering: Microsoft Bing in the "Arabian Countries"

Helmi Noman — Thu, 04 Mar 2010 13:58:15 -0500

To view this bulletin as a PDF, click here.

Overview

Microsoft recently added a new layer of complexity to the ongoing debate regarding the filtering and censorship practices of U.S. search engines via its own search engine, Bing. ONI testing reveals liberal filtering by Bing in one of the most censored regions in the world: the Arab countries.

Microsoft’s Bing, which tailors its search engine to serve different countries and regions and offers its services in 41 languages, has a filtering system at the keyword level for users in several countries. 1 Users in the Arab countries2—or, as termed by Microsoft—“Arabian countries”—are prevented from conducting certain search queries in both English and Arabic.

ONI testing reveals that Microsoft filters Arabic and English keywords that could yield sex- or LGBT-related images and content.

Methodology and Results

We manually tested the search engine using a set of 100 Arabic keywords and a set of 60 English keywords that would yield results in various content categories, including sex, nudity, dating and escort services, LGBT content, violence and terrorism, politically sensitive content, minority and religious rights, and women’s rights. The Arabic keywords tested included classical Arabic terms and various alternatives from different Arabic dialects.

All testing was conducted using Bing set to the “Arabian countries” setting. We tested the search engine using both the Arabic3 and English4 interfaces.

Testing was conducted in four Arab countries chosen for their different levels of Internet censorship as uncovered by the latest ONI research. These countries are the United Arab Emirates (substantial political filtering and pervasive social filtering),5 Syria (pervasive political filtering and selective social filtering),6 Algeria (no evidence of filtering),7 and Jordan (selective political filtering and no evidence of social filtering).8

All testing was conducted in the period of January 2-15, 2010.

It is important to emphasize that de-listing of results was not probed in this research.

In-country testing has consistently revealed the following:

-Bing filters out Arabic keywords that may return sexually explicit content. Examples of the Arabic keywords found filtered include Arabic terms for “sex,” “porn,” “intercourse,” “breast,” and “nude.”

- Bing filters out Arabic keywords that could yield Web sites containing LGBT content. Arabic keywords found filtered include terms for words such as “gay,” “lesbian,” and “homosexuality.”

- Bing filters out keywords in various sex-related categories. Examples include Arabic terms for “prostitution,” “whore,” and “sadism.”

- Bing filters out English keywords that could yield sexually explicit Web sites. The keywords include “porn,” “sex,” “fuck,” “penis” (but not “vagina”), “sodomy,” “homo,” “sexual,” “sexy,” “clitoris,” and “anal.” The following is a sample list of keywords the OpenNet Initiative tested.

- Bing filters out English keywords such as “gay,” “lesbian,” “homosexual,” and “queer” when searching for images, however, using these words to search for Web sites is permitted.

- Attempts to use any of the filtered keywords generates a message in Arabic or English (depending on the interface used) which reads, “Your country or region requires a strict Bing SafeSearch setting, which filters out results that might return adult content.”

- Similarly, searching for images using any of the filtered keywords generates the alert:

“The search may return explicit adult content and has been filtered by your Bing SafeSearch settings. Your country or region requires a strict Bing SafeSearch setting, which filters out results that might return adult content.”

- Bing does not offer users of the “Arabian countries” version the option to toggle SafeSearch on/off. This option is available for Bing instances tailored to some other countries.

- There is no filtering by keywords if a user chooses another country (e.g., United States, Canada) as their location even if they are physically located in an Arab country.

- One anomaly we found when probing filtering by keywords is that filtering does not work if a filtered Arabic keyword is used together with another non-filtered keyword. For example, a search using the Arabic word for “sex” is banned, but using the Arabic term for “sex stories” is not banned.

This anomaly is not found in the case of English keywords i.e., searching using “sex” and “sex stories” are both banned.

- We found no evidence of filtering of keywords in Arabic or English that could return results in other content categories. We tested keywords that could yield politically sensitive content (e.g., “democracy”, “freedom”, “opposition”), content related to violence and terrorism (e.g., “torture”, terror”, “explosive”), Web sites related to minority and religious rights (e.g., “Shiite”, “Baha’i”, “Christian”, “Jews”), and content related to women’s rights (e.g., “gender”, “equality”). None of the tested keywords were found banned.

Conclusion

Microsoft’s explanation as to why some search keywords return few or no results is that “[s]ometimes websites are deliberately excluded from the results page to remove inappropriate content as determined by local practice, law, or regulation.”9 It is unclear, however, whether Bing’s keyword filtering in the Arab countries is an initiative from Microsoft, or whether any or all of the Arab states have asked Microsoft to comply with local censorship practices or laws.

It is interesting that Microsoft’s implementation of this type of wholesale social content censorship for the entire “Arabian countries” region is in fact not being practiced by many of the Arab government censors themselves. That is, although political filtering is widespread in the MENA region, social filtering, including keyword filtering, is not practiced by all countries in MENA. ONI 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 testing and research found no evidence of social content filtering (e.g., sex, nudity, and homosexuality) at the national level in countries such as Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Libya.10

On the other hand, Microsoft does not seem to apply IP-geolocation restrictions. That is, if a user physically located in an Arab country chooses to use an uncensored version of Bing tailored to another country (e.g., USA or UK), he/she will not experience any keyword filtering even if he/she uses a keywords filtered by Bing for “Arabian countries.” Additionally, in the case of Arabic keywords, users can sidestep the search engine censorship regime by adding another non-filtered Arabic keyword to the filtered one.

Microsoft’s declared aim from this type of censorship is to filter out “results that might return adult content.” However, filtering at the keyword level results in overblocking, as banning the use of certain keywords to search for Web sites, not just images, prevents users from accessing—based on Microsoft’s definition of objectionable content—legitimate content such as sex education and encyclopedic information about homosexuality.

It is difficult to assess the impact of Bing’s filtering policy on access to information and freedom of speech in Arabic-speaking countries. The fact that users can easily switch to another search engine that does not filter its results (e.g., Google) or switch to a different version of Bing (e.g., a U.S. or European version), suggests that the impact may be slight if one assumes that users are making a conscious choice to restrict their search results with the help and guidance of Bing to filter out offensive material. On the other hand, default settings have a profound impact on user decisions; many users will be unaware of the options or be motivated to try alternative searches. As other search engines have done, Bing could offer users the ability to choose their own level of filtering in a way that is transparent and easy to implement. This raises a separate set of questions regarding the motivation and standards for instituting search result filtering in the region. It is unclear still whether Microsoft is acting at the behest of local officials, interpreting local law, seeking to preempt future regulation or attempting to position the company as a good corporate citizen. The fact that they employ a single filtering policy throughout the region implies that they are following one or both of the latter approaches rather than the former. The current approach uses a region-wide standard for filtering content as opposed to the more targeted, granular, and country-specific policy. A more targeted approach—either country-based or preferably, defined by the user—is more generally consistent with minimizing the impact on freedom of speech. Through its involvement in the Global Network Initiative, Microsoft has signaled its willingness to be at the forefront in protecting freedom of expression around the world. It is difficult to reconcile this position with Bing’s current filtering standards.

Authored by Helmi Noman, with contributions from Ronald Deibert, Jillian York, Caroline Nolan, Colin Maclay, and Rob Faris

Notes

1. ONI also tested one word, “sex,” on other countries’ Bing instances. The word “sex” (in English) is filtered by Bing when the country is set to: India, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Turkey, Taiwan,
Hong Kong, and China. When the country is set to Korea, users receive a page requiring them to verify that they are at least 19 years of age. We intend to pursue further research in this area.
2. ONI testing was conducted from four Arab countries; however the Arab League comprises 22
nations. Several other countries list Arabic as an official language. Microsoft does not specify
which countries are included in its list of “Arabian countries.”
3. Bing “Arabian Countries” Arabic user interface: http://www.bing.com/?scope=web&setmkt=ar-XA&setlang=SET_NULL&uid=E847AC76&FORM=W5WA.
4. Bing “Arabian Countries” English user interface: http://www.bing.com/?scope=web&mkt=en-XA&setlang=match&uid=E847AC76&FORM=W0LH.
5. OpenNet Initiative, “Country Profile: United Arab Emirates,” August 7, 2009,
http://opennet.net/research/profiles/uae.
6. OpenNet Initiative, “Country Profile: Syria,” August 7, 2009,
http://opennet.net/research/profiles/syria.
7. OpenNet Initiative, “Country Profile: Algeria,” August 7, 2009,
http://opennet.net/research/profiles/algeria.
8. OpenNet Initiative, “Country Profile: Jordan,” August 7, 2009,
http://opennet.net/research/profiles/jordan.
9. See Microsoft’s Search Engine’s help files at http://help.live.com/help.aspx?project=wl_searchv1&market=en-XA&querytype=keyword&query=hcraesefas&tmt=&domain=.
10. OpenNet Initiative, “Regional Profile: Middle East and North Africa,” August 7, 2009, http://opennet.net/research/profiles/mena.

Internet Filtering in Syria in 2006-2007

Rebekah Heacock — Fri, 07 Aug 2009 10:42:27 -0400

PDF Version
Note: a newer version of this profile is available at Country Profiles: Syria.

Overview

In addition to filtering a range of Web content, the Syrian government monitors Internet use closely and has detained citizens “for expressing their opinions or reporting information online.” Vague and broadly worded laws invite government abuse and have prompted Internet users to engage in self-censoring and self-monitoring to avoid the state’s ambiguous grounds for arrest.

Background

Syria is among the most repressive countries in the world with regard to freedom of expression and information. Criticisms of the president and reports on the problems of religious and ethnic minorities in Syria remain particularly sensitive areas.1 Human rights organizations have reported exhaustively on political arrests and detentions.2

In 2006 Reporters Without Borders ranked Syria among the thirteen “enemies of the Internet.”3 Although the government does recognize the importance of the Internet as a source of economic growth, it also admits to automatically blocking pornographic Web sites4 and to censoring “pro-Israel and hyper-Islamist” Web sites, such as “those run by the illegal Muslim Brotherhood, and those calling for autonomy for Syrian Kurds.”5 In defense of these practices, Minister of Technology and Communications Amr Salem said, “Syria is currently under attack … and if somebody writes, or publishes or whatever, something that supports the attack, they will be tried.”6

Internet in Syria

With a literacy rate of 80 percent,7 Syria’s main barrier to Internet access lies with its affordability. Only 4.2 percent of the population own personal computers, with just 1 percent of Syrians subscribing to Internet services.8 The proliferation of Internet cafés9 has helped raise the Internet penetration rate to approximately 6 percent,10 but many Syrians still find the cost of these cafés prohibitive.11

In recent years, the government has endeavored to expand Internet access by installing hardware and telecommunications capabilities in schools, by subsidizing the cost of personal computers, and, most recently, by fostering competition among Internet service providers (ISPs).12

There are four ISPs that are neither owned nor funded by the government. Still, the two government-affiliated ISPs13—Syria Telecommunication Establishment (STE) and SCS-net (now Aloola)—continue to occupy the majority of the market.14 Aya, one of the privately owned ISPs, has close ties to the government.15

Legal and regulatory frameworks

In addition to maintaining regulatory control over ISPs, the Syrian government imposes financial and technical constraints on Internet users. Syrian Internet subscribers wishing to use ports other than port 80—the port most often used for Web browsing—must apply for a special service and pay a small monthly fee.16 Aya and other ISPs offer plans that allow users to access the Internet with a fixed IP address, which is necessary for hosting sites; to use Virtual Private Networks; and to bypass the ISP’s proxy server. They may also pay for a special plan that allows them to open otherwise blocked ports, such as those used for Voice-over Internet Protocol (VoIP) and video chat.17

Points of Internet access are also strictly regulated and sometimes monitored. To open an Internet café an owner must obtain a license from the Telecommunications Department’s office in the local governorate. To acquire a license, the owner must follow the regulations in the Conditions Manual, which include specifications on the spacing between computers.18 Though users at Internet cafés are not required to show ID or give their names, some Syrians have reported that plainclothes officials watch Internet cafés and take note of the users.19

The Constitution of the Arab Republic of Syria affords every citizen “the right to freely and openly express his views in words, in writing, and through all other means of expression,” while also guaranteeing “the freedom of the press, of printing, and publication in accordance with the law.”20 In actuality, these freedoms are limited by other legislative provisions. Article 4.b of the 1963 Emergency Law authorizes the government to monitor all publications and communications.21 That law also allows the government to arrest those who commit “crimes which constitute an overall hazard” or other vaguely defined offenses.22

The Press Law of 2001 subjects all print media—from newspapers, magazines, and other periodicals to books, pamphlets, and posters—to government control and censorship.23 Printing “falsehoods” or “fabricated reports” is a criminal offense under the Press Law, and writing on topics relevant to “national security [or] national unity” is forbidden.24 Violators may be penalized with hefty monetary fines, lengthy prison terms, or license suspensions or revocations.25 Furthermore, “periodicals that are not licensed as political publications [are prohibited] from publishing ‘political’ articles”—a provision that “amounts to blanket government censorship.”26 Thus, although the Internet has facilitated access to unofficial information, that information is limited by the controls and threats codified in Syrian law.

The government has demonstrated its willingness to punish Syrians for writing and transmitting information online.27 Authorities have detained individuals for e-mailing an image or article produced by another party or for voicing complaints about the government or for posting original photographs of police crackdowns on the Web.28 These incidents have engendered caution and self-censorship across the Syrian Internet as a whole and within the Syrian blogosphere, which nonetheless continues to grow and to become more vibrant.29

ONI testing results

Testing was conducted on one of the main ISPs in Syria, Aloola (formally SCS-Net). Although the tests indicate that Syria now blocks fewer Web sites than it has in the past, many sites remain blocked.

The Web site of the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, jimsyr.com, was blocked, though the Web site of the Egyptian branch, the region’s largest, was available. Two Kurdish Web sites, tirej.net and amude.net, were blocked, as was the Web site of the United States Committee for a Free Lebanon (freelebanon.org), which campaigns for an end to Syrian influence in Lebanese politics. The Arabic- and English-language sites of the unrecognized Reform Party of Syria were filtered, along with the Web sites of the Hizb al-Tahrir (Liberation Party)—an Islamist group that seeks to restore the Caliphate and that remains banned in many countries.

ONI’s tests found that 115 Syrian blogs hosted on Google’s popular blogging engine, blogspot.com, were blocked, strongly suggesting that the ISP had blocked access to all blogs hosted on this service, including many apolitical blogs. Freesyria.wordpress.com, a blog created to campaign for the release of Michel Kilo, a prominent Syrian journalist imprisoned for his writings, was also blocked.

In the past, Syria has reportedly filtered access to popular e-mail sites. ONI testing found www.hotmail.com to be blocked, along with two, relatively small Web-based e-mail sites, address.com and netaddress.com. None of the Arabic-language e-mail sites ONI tested were blocked, though the Arabic-language hosting site www.khayma.com was.

Nearly one-third of the anonymizer sites tested were blocked, indicating some measure of effort to preempt circumvention.

Though most foreign news sites were accessible, Web sites of some important Arabic newspapers and news portals were found to be blocked. Examples include the pan Arab, London-based, Arabic-language newspapers, Al-Quds al-Arabi (www.al-quds.co.uk) and Al-Sharq al-Awsat, (www.asharqalawsat.com), the news portal elaph.com, the Kuwaiti newspaper Al Seyassah (http://www.alseyassah.com), the U.S.-based Web site of the Arab Times (www.arabtimes.com), and the Islamically oriented news and information portal Islam Online (islamonline.net). These publications frequently run articles critical of the Syrian government.

Web sites of human rights organizations were generally available. Sites associated with the London-based Syrian Human Rights Committee (SHRC) marked an important exception; all URLs on the www.shrc.org.uk domain were found blocked in this round of testing. As indicated above, some blogs that criticize the human rights record of Syria were also blocked.

Only three Web sites of the Web sites tested with pornographic content were blocked: playboy.com, sex.com, and netarabic.com/vb (this last is a message board with pornographic content).

Web sites that focus on lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered issues were generally available. One site, gaywired.com, was an exception.

Unfortunately, an insufficient number of Israeli Web sites were tested to confirm whether or not Syria blocks the entire “.il” domain, as past reports have suggested.30 However, the fact that the Institute for Counter Terrorism’s Israeli Web site (ict.org.il) was blocked—while the Institute’s alternate URL (instituteforcounterterrorism.org), lacking the “.il” suffix, was not—lends credence to such reports. Furthermore, the Web site for the World Zionist organization (wzo.org.il) was blocked.

Conclusion

The Web sites blocked in Syria span a range of categories, with the most substantial filtering occurring among sites that criticize government policies and actions or espouse oppositional political views. Repressive legislation and the imprisonment of journalists and online writers for their activities online have led many Syrians to engage in self-censorship. Meanwhile, the government continues to promote the growth of the Internet throughout the country.

NOTES

1. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2005: Syria, March 8, 2006, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61699.htm.
2. See, for example, Syrian Human Rights Committee, Annual Report on Human Rights Situation in Syria 2006 (Covering the period from June 2005 to May 2006), June 2006, http://www.shrc.org.uk/data/pdf/ANNUALREPORT2006.pdf.
3. Reporters Without Borders, “List of the 13 Internet enemies 2006,” November 7, 2006, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=19603.
4. Guy Taylor, “Syrians search for online freedom,” podcast audio of interview with Amr Salem, World Politics Watch, January 13, 2007. Excerpts available at http://www.worldpoliticswatch.com/blog/blog.aspx?id=470.
5. Guy Taylor, “After the Damascus spring: Syrians search for freedom online,” Reason Online: Free Minds and Free Markets, February 2007, http://www.reason.com/news/show/118380.html.
6. Ibid.
7. World Bank, “Syrian Arab Republic Data Profile 2004,” World Development Indicators database (April 2006), http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/cpprofile.asp?ccode=syr&ptype=cp.
8. OneWorld.net, OneWorld Country Guide: Syria, http://us.oneworld.net/guides/syria/development#top.
9. The Arabic Network for Human Rights Information, “Syria Internet under siege,” The Internet in the Arab World: A New Space of Repression? June 2004, http://www.hrinfo.net/en/reports/net2004/syria.shtml.
10. International Telecommunication Union, World Telecommunication Indicators 2006.
11. The Initiative for an Open Arab Internet, Implacable Adversaries: Arab Governments and the Internet: Syria, December 2006, http://www.openarab.net/en/reports/net2006/syria.shtml.
12. Human Rights Watch, False Freedom: Online Censorship in the Middle East and North Africa: Syria, November 2005, http://hrw.org/reports/2005/mena1105/.
13. Jihad Yazigi, “Syrian telecom to be gradually liberalized,” The Syria Report, February 6, 2006, http://www.ameinfo.com/77237.html.
14. The Initiative for an Open Arab Internet, Implacable Adversaries: Arab Governments and the Internet: Syria, December 2006, http://www.openarab.net/en/reports/net2006/syria.shtml.
15. Human Rights Watch, False Freedom: Online Censorship in the Middle East and North Africa: Syria, November 2005, http://hrw.org/reports/2005/mena1105/.
16. OpenNet Initiative interview with a Syrian computer consultant who requested anonymity, November 13, 2006.
17. Aya’s list of “VIP plans,” for example, is available at http://aya.sy/?id=vip.
18. The Initiative for an Open Arab Internet, Implacable Adversaries: Arab Governments and the Internet: Syria, December 2006, http://www.openarab.net/en/reports/net2006/syria.shtml.
19. Human Rights Watch, False Freedom: Online Censorship in the Middle East and North Africa: Syria, November 2005, http://hrw.org/reports/2005/mena1105/.
20. The Constitution of the Arab Republic of Syria, Article 38, http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/sy00000_.html.
21. Syrian Human Rights Committee, Special Report: Repressive Laws in Syria, February 19, 2001, http://www.shrc.org.uk/data/aspx/d4/254.aspx#D3.
22. Ibid.
23. Human Rights Watch, Memorandum to the Syrian Government, Decree No. 51/2001: Human Rights Concerns, January 31, 2002, http://hrw.org/backgrounder/mena/syria/.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Human Rights Watch, False Freedom: Online Censorship in the Middle East and North Africa: Syria, November 2005, http://hrw.org/reports/2005/mena1105/.
28. Ibid.
29. Megan K. Stack, “Arabs take byte at regimes,” Democracy Council, September 12, 2005, http://www.democracycouncil.org/ArabsTakeByte.cfm.
30. The Initiative for an Open Arab Internet, Implacable Adversaries: Arab Governments and the Internet: Syria, December 2006, http://www.openarab.net/en/reports/net2006/syria.shtml.

The Worst Places to be a Blogger

Jillian C. York — Thu, 30 Apr 2009 16:34:30 -0400

The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) has just released a list of the ten worst countries in which to blog. Topping the list is Burma, followed closely by Iran, Syria, Cuba, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, Tunisia, China, Turkmenistan, and Egypt.

In determining the list, CPJ's staff and outside experts looked at a number of variables, including whether or not bloggers have been jailed in the country, whether they face harassment or other reprisals, and whether or not they self-censor.

While the countries represented by CPJ's list are certainly the worst, they are not the only countries in which bloggers face harassment, attacks, or prosecution...by far. Countries as diverse as Morocco, Uzbekistan, and Russia have also detained bloggers and other online journalists for offenses such as "insulting national feeling" and "criticizing police."

By far the saddest case thus far this year has been that of Omidreza Mirsayafi, the Iranian blogger jailed for "insulting national feeling." Mirsayafi died in early March, less than one month after he was imprisoned.

Photo Credit:Pensiero

Arabic-language Wikipedia Reported Unblocked in Syria

Jillian C. York — Tue, 17 Feb 2009 10:53:54 -0500

In May 2008, it was reported by Syrian blogger AN@SONLINE [ar] that the Arabic language version of Wikipedia had been filtered by Syrian authorities. A number of Syrian users confirmed this report.

As recently as February 4, it had been reported to Herdict Web that the site was inaccessible, however, on February 14, AN@SONLINE reported the site to be accessible; reports to Herdict Web on February 16 and today corroborated that fact.

Syria is known to block a number of other sites, including YouTube and the blogspot.com domain.

Syria blocks personal blog of human rights activist

Jillian C. York — Mon, 19 Jan 2009 20:47:07 -0500

This article was originally posted on Global Voices Advocacy by Sami Ben Gharbia

Syrian authorities have blocked access to the personal blog of the 26-year-old Syrian Human rights activist and blogger Mohammad Al-Abdallah who is blogging at Raye7wmishRaj3 (I’m Leaving and I’m Not Coming Back). Syrian Netizens can access the blocked blog via HTTPS or simply by visiting the mirror blog at http://rwmr.wordpress.com/.

Screenshot of the blocked Raye7wmishRaj3 blog in Syria (Source: Raye7wmishRaj3)

Al-Abdallah had twice been arrested for reporting on Syria's human rights situation and for campaigning to free his jailed Father Ali Al-Abdallah - member of Damascus Declaration - by constituting the Committee for Families of Political Prisoners in Syria. Mohammad Abdallah and his father Ali were released from prison on 4 October 2006 after completing a six-month prison sentence for “criticizing the state of emergency laws”.

Photo of blogger Mohammad Al-Abdallah and his father at the Adra prison, Damascus (Source: Raye7wmishRaj3.)

On March 18th, 2006 Mohammad Al-Abdallah's brother, Omar, was arrested by Air Force Intelligence officers for reporting information online on the collective blog Syrian Domari and sentenced to five years in prison by the Syrian authorities. Air Force Intelligence officers have learned the password of Syrian Domari weblog and deleted it completely.

Article on Syria's Blocking and Content Controls

nart — Fri, 22 Apr 2005 14:41:37 -0400

Slate covers how Syrian activists use the Web to push for reform, but are often blocked, censored, or intimidated. The article links to a Syrian blog and also mentions that the site All4Syria has been blocked by the government.