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Asia

evan — Mon, 15 Jun 2009 10:51:34 -0400

Note: a previous version of this profile is available at Asia, 2006-2007.

Overview

The dynamism and creativity driving the development of networked spheres in Asia showed no signs of abating through the early months of 2009. As more citizens began to utilize Internet tools for disseminating and producing information, online expression, activism, and networking have begun to permeate the national political and cultural fabric across the spectrum of Asian countries.

In 2008-2009, ONI conducted in-country testing in Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Laos, South Korea, Malaysia, Burma, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam, and Thailand. Testing results found filtering practices to be largely consistent with 2006 results.

China, Burma, and Vietnam continued to rely on pervasive filtering practices to shape public knowledge and expression by targeting primarily content specific to politically sensitive topics in their own countries, especially Web sites in local languages. China, Burma, and Vietnam also continued to block with the greatest breadth and depth, spanning human rights issues, reform and opposition activities, independent media and news, and discrimination against ethnic and religious minorities. On the opposite end of the spectrum, Singapore continued to block a nominal amount of adult content and pornographic Web sites.

South Korea increased its filtering across content categories to include a selective number of the Korean-language pornography Web sites, but otherwise remained consistent with its 2006 filtering practices, specifically targeting Web sites containing North Korean propaganda or promoting the reunification of North and South Korea, as well as a handful of gambling Web sites. In contrast to 2006, ONI in 2007-2008 found no evidence of filtering of pornography and religious conversion sites in Pakistan. Otherwise, Pakistan continued to engage in security and conflict filtering as well as social filtering of Web sites containing “blasphemous” content.

ONI found no evidence of national filtering in Indonesia, Laos, Nepal, or the Philippines. During ONI testing periods, Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Malaysia were not filtering the Internet, but media reported that these countries also began blocking selectively for brief periods in 2007-2008.

Internet in Asia

Asia continues to be home to some of the most and least connected countries in the world, while a large middle tier of countries are witnessing rapid and steady growth. In 2008, Thailand and Vietnam reached penetration rates of a quarter of their population.1 China trailed at 22.6 percent, though in 2008 it became the country with the most Internet users in the world, at 298 million.2 China, where the number of Internet users increased 42 percent from 2007,3 also saw remarkable growth in broadband usage. Over 90 percent of Internet users in China had broadband access by the end of 2008, a spike of over 100 million.4 In contrast, concerns about a saturated market were prominent in South Korea, which by early 2008 had become the most penetrated broadband market in the world at 90 percent of households.5 While Malaysia, with a penetration rate of 61 percent, trailed behind only Singapore in Southeast Asia and has strongly encouraged adoption of broadband Internet throughout the country,6 broadband penetration only surpassed 17 percent in the third quarter of 2008, from 7 percent in 2005.7 8

On the opposite end of the spectrum, countries including India, Nepal, and the Philippines with less than 10 percent Internet penetration rate have been actively promoting and investing in infrastructure and access, particularly in rural areas that have been affected most profoundly by the digital divide. About 80 percent of Bangladesh’s fixed line connections are installed in or around its four largest cities, yet about 80 percent of all Bangladeshis live outside these cities.9 In Nepal, with an Internet penetration rate of only 1.4 percent,10 the Nepal Wireless Project wirelessly con¬nected twenty-two remote mountain villages to the Internet in five years, allowing villagers to exchange information about commodity prices, local goods and markets, and implemented telemedicine facilities.11

The exception to the general embrace of ICT development has consistently been Burma. The country’s largest ICT development at Yadanabon City, supported by foreign investment and set to serve as the national backbone connecting to China, India and Thailand, is currently under construction near Mandalay.12 However, the military government under the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) was responsible for one of most severe crackdowns on the Internet documented. On September 29, 2007, in order to cut off the stream of footage and images of its violent response to stopping protests led by monks and civilians, the SPDC made use of its complete control over the country’s Internet gateways to completely shut down Internet access (with intermittent periods of connectivity) for approximately two weeks.13 The government also restricts upload speeds to half the download speeds for Internet subscribers and frequently implements slowdowns in Internet access speeds, which many critics claim are attempts to restrict Internet usage and enhance monitoring capabilities.14

The increasing popularity of interactive Web sites and social media platforms such as video sharing sites, Web portals, discussion forums, and blogs has enabled them to have a resounding impact in Asia. By facilitating the easy production and sharing of user-generated content, online social media have served as important vehicles for news dissemination and independent expression, especially in countries where mainstream media are state-controlled or closely aligned with ruling interests. For example, bloggers have been named the “fifth estate” in Asian countries such as Vietnam, Thailand, and China, whose governments maintain strict control over most news and media outlets. In Malaysia, independent news sites and blogs were credited with providing opposition parties with a platform to mobilize during the March 2008 general elections, in which the ruling Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition had its worst showing ever and five bloggers were elected to seats for opposition parties.15 Though Internet penetration lags in rural areas (representing 15 percent of households with Internet access16), alternative messages and information available only online reached beyond young, middle class, and urban voters through SMS messages, VCDs made of online television programming, and printed fliers.17 The only media organization to provide live coverage of election results, Malaysiakini.com, has reportedly become the country’s most popular alternative news source and was one of about ten of the first online news sites granted media accreditation in July 2008.18

In November 2007, President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan declared a state of emergency and shut down the country’s independent broadcast media, including news, sports and entertainment television stations.19 In response, these stations went online and offered free broadcasts on their Web sites, while YouTube became the vehicle for lawyers, journalists, and activists to post footage of protests and other news.20

Perhaps the most dramatic demonstration of citizens utilizing online tools to circumvent their governments’ control over information occurred during the so-called Saffron Revolution in Burma. On August 19, 2007, leaders of the 88 Generation student movement organized a rally to protest a sudden sharp increase in fuel prices in Rangoon,21 and over the next month, leadership of the protests passed to Buddhist monks, with participation swelling to an estimated crowd of 150,000 protesters on September 23.22 Throughout these extraordinary demonstrations and the first days of the junta’s violent crackdown on monks, students, and others, citizen video journalists and bloggers fed raw, graphic footage and eyewitness accounts to the outside world via the Internet and through trusted networks. This vital information was posted by overseas Burmese news organizations and international media, and fed back into the country via satellite television and radio, thus achieving a bi-directional flow of information only fully cut off when the government implemented a complete shutdown of the Internet beginning on September 29.23 Despite the Burmese government’s continuous efforts to restrict Internet access and online expression, the use of blogs and social media sites for the independent gathering and dissemination of information appears to have taken hold: in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis in May 2008, which devastated much of the Irrawaddy river delta and left more than 138,000 dead or missing and millions in need of food, water, shelter, and medical care,24 citizens nevertheless set out to record the damage as well as the government’s response.25

In Asia, citizens’ application of the array of Internet tools available to them has often tested societal and cultural boundaries for acceptable behavior. In 2005, a girl in South Korea who allowed her dog to defecate on the subway was filmed, tracked down, publicly exposed, and ultimately quit her university in humiliation.26 As “dog poop girl,” she became emblematic of an online vigilantism that would drive the implementation of real-name registration requirements in South Korea. Known in China as “human flesh search engines,” this phenomenon can thrive across borders. For example, in April 2008, as groups around the world organized actions around the crackdown on unrest in Tibet, a Chinese student was filmed attempting to referee between two opposing groups of protesters at Duke University.27 After the video was posted on YouTube and other Web sites, the online reaction was swift: she was lambasted in Chinese-language discussion forums and portals, and her parents living in China went into hiding after threats were painted on their apartment.28

Since 2006, many Asian governments have quickly realized the potential benefits of exploiting opportunities for conducting propaganda or public relations strategies over the Internet, even while cracking down on independent and critical voices thriving in these online spaces – an example of the evolution towards third generation controls. The Chinese government has carefully orchestrated symbolic engagements with its online citizens as well as mass strategies to boost public relations. On June 20, 2008, President Hu Jintao participated in his first online chat on the People’s Daily Online’s “Strong China” (qiangguo) discussion forum,29 while the so-called Fifty Cent Party, in reference to an estimated 280,000 Web commentators nationwide who zealously support the Chinese Communist Party and were initially rumored to net 50 cents per post, are directly organized by the government to “guide” online public opinion.30 In South Korea, with its credibility badly damaged by protests over the decision to end the ban on imports of American beef that were largely fueled by Internet debate, President Lee Myung-bak’s administration ordered government ministries and organizations to begin blogging in order to inform the public of news and events.31 It took these steps amid attempts to legislate further restrictions on what it saw to be a proliferation of slanderous and malicious commentary online. After Malaysia’s general election in March 2008,32 Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi said that the BN’s “biggest mistake” in the elections was in believing that the “cyberwar” was unimportant.33 Even the Burmese government, which has taken the most draconian measures to keep its citizens offline, reportedly launched its Web portal www.khitlunge.com.mm, run by the government-aligned Union Solidarity and Development Association, to “spread government propaganda and counter media attacks by exiled Burmese media groups.”34

Legal and regulatory frameworks

In 2007-2008, the leadership of many Asian governments facing political threats or crises took measures to further restrict certain forms of expression on the Internet. These measures, which especially targeted acts of cyber-defamation and independent news reporting and criticism on social media platforms such as YouTube, reflected the growing relevance and impact of the Internet as a source of information from independent and diverse sources.

In Thailand, ongoing political turmoil between “red-shirt” and “yellow-shirt” factions, organized around their support of or opposition to former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra and the constituencies he championed, led Thai prime minister Samak Sundaravej to declare a state of emergency on September 2, 2008. Upon his declaration, the Ministry of Information and Communications Technology ordered ISPs to immediately shut down around 400 Web sites and block 1,200 more, all alleged to disturb social order or endanger national security.35 Although these Web sites were reportedly detected between March and August 2008, the blocking order and simultaneous requests for court orders required by law were instituted as the Thai government faced challenges by protesters occupying government buildings and accusations that it committed electoral fraud by buying votes in the December 2007 election.36

Providing an indication of the types of activities that will be targeted under the Computer Crimes Act, in March 2009 police arrested the director and moderator of the political news site Prachathai.com for reportedly allowing a comment referencing the royal family to remain on the site for twenty days.37 Chiranuch Premchaiporn was arrested under Section 15 of the Computer Crimes Act, which extends the liability for illegal activities to service providers that intentionally support or consent to them.38 Illegal activities defined in the framework for regulating Internet content include inputting obscene data, forged or false data likely to cause injury to another person, the public or national security; and data which constitutes a criminal offense relating to national security or terrorism.39 Individuals who either input these illegal data, which includes online messages and information, into computer systems or publish or forward it with the knowledge of these offenses, are subject to a maximum sentence of five years imprisonment and a 100,000 baht fine.40

In the race to curb the “harmful” effects of social media, user generated content, and the unabated growth of online commentary, Asian governments have enacted cybercrimes laws that purport to deter acts of online defamation and vigilantism, but could also potentially be applied to stifle citizen journalism. The Thai cybercrimes law creates civil and criminal liability for individuals who publicly post photographs of others that are “likely to” impair their reputation or expose them to shame, public hatred or contempt.41 In Pakistan, a cybercrimes ordinance taking effect September 2008 made “cyber stalking”--which requires “intent to coerce, intimidate, or harass any person” using computers or networks -- a crime punishable by up to seven years’ imprisonment.42

In April 2008, South Korean President Lee Myung Bak’s administration agreed to resume imports of American beef after a five-year ban,43 sparking about one hundred days of candlelight vigils and some of the largest street protests in twenty years.44 A television program that aired on April 29 claiming that, “Koreans are 94 percent more likely to contract a human form of mad cow disease,” also contributed to stoking online debate, especially on the Agora forum of Korea’s second-largest portal Daum (which saw its daily page view count spike from forty million to 200 million).45 These demonstrations also went interactive: protesters uploaded images to the Internet, sent messages on protest meet-ups and warnings on arrests via SMS, and threw themselves into online debate.46 Ultimately, his entire cabinet resigned and President Lee was forced to call for a “new beginning” for his government.47

In the following months, President Lee’s administration introduced legislation that would attempt to address the increase in reported online defamation, “false rumors” and “malicious postings.” The regulatory body for policing online content, the Korean Communications Standards Commission, would be authorized to force Internet portals and P2P Web sites to delete content or suspend publishing for a minimum of thirty days upon receiving a complaint of articles accused of being “fraudulent” or “slanderous,” during which the Commission would determine whether disputed articles should be removed permanently.48 Internet portals that fail to temporarily block online postings containing defamatory information would be subject to a fine of up to thirty million won or could be forced to shut down,49 while portals or individuals involved in improperly manipulating Internet search results should be subject to imprisonment of up to one year and a fine up to ten million won.50 The proposed addition of the crime of “cyber-defamation” would punish those who openly insult others through the Internet with up to two years’ imprisonment or a ten million won fine.51

The South Korean government also pursued an approach similar to its regulation of other emergent forms of harmful or illegal content—by deputizing private actors such as portals, bulletin boards, and other ICPs to actively police slanderous content. While legislation would compel them to set up constant in-house monitoring functions,52 many of Korea’s Internet portals also implemented their own measures to curb postings considered to violate privacy. For example, Naver created a simplified process for users to immediately block “groundless rumors or postings.”53

In China, where it is common for dissidents and activists to be charged with subversion and other crimes involving national security for criticizing government officials online,54 authorities have also begun levying criminal defamation charges against those who accuse them of corruption. A few cases of alleged online defamation publicized in spring 2009 not only implicated the freedom of expression, but also people’s right to criticize and make suggestions to any state organ, rights both guaranteed in the constitution.55 After petitions and other attempts to protect concerned farmers’ legal rights had failed, Wu Baoquan and Wang Shuai were detained for their online criticism of land seizures for commercial development pushed through by local government officials, in which farmers were inadequately compensated after being forced off their land.56 Wu Baoquan was tried twice for criminal defamation and ultimately had his sentence increased to two years, although the same court that affirmed his conviction decided to review his case in April 2009.57 Wang Shuai was detained on March 6, 2009, and released on bail only after signing a written confession.58

Since 2007, when its bloggers (now over a million strong) reportedly began discussing sensitive topics ranging from government corruption and foreign relations to HIV/AIDS,59 Vietnam has steadily been refining its legal framework for online activity to bring social media firmly under control.

Article 12 of the Law on Information Technology defines illegal content by proxy, by prohibiting the use of digital information for the purposes of: opposing the state or undermining the “all-peoples unity bloc”; inciting violence, propagating wars of aggression, sowing hatred among nations and peoples or obscenity, depravation, crime, social evils or superstition; undermining the nation's fine traditions and customs; revealing state secrets or other secrets provided for by law; distorting, slandering, or offending the prestige of organizations or the honor, dignity or prestige of citizens; and advertising for or propagating goods or services banned by law.60 Implementing regulations added “sowing hatred and conflict between ethnic [sic] groups and nations” to the list of prohibited acts.61

Internet users and organizations involved in Internet activity in Vietnam are legally responsible for the content they create, upload, store, and transmit on the Internet.62 Bloggers are additionally responsible for ensuring that even hyperlinks do not contain illegal content.63 However, Vietnam does offer a “safe harbor” of sorts for organizations and individuals who transmit or temporarily or automatically store information created by others. Third party hosts and providers are generally not responsible for this content unless they initiate the transmission, choose recipients for the information, or select or modify the contents of transmitted information.64 However, they are expressly responsible for taking “necessary measures” to stop the illegal access to or illegal deletion of information upon government request.65 All online social services providers, including blog service providers, must be prepared to give ad hoc as well as formal, biannual reports on their services, including data on blogs that violate terms of service rules.66

Singapore, whose political elite have a long history of pursuing their opponents and critics with costly and frequent defamation suits, strengthened its penal code with amendments (effective in 2008) to include crimes committed by electronic means.67 For example, abetting a crime now includes acts done outside of Singapore, as long as the crime was committed in Singapore.68 In May 2008, blogger Gopalan Nair, a US citizen living in Fremont, California, had returned to Singapore to support Dr. Chee Soon Juan in defamation proceedings.69 On May 29, Nair posted his observations of the trial and called High Court judge Belinda Ang a “stooge” who was “prostituting herself” as an employee of Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong and his father, Mentor Minister Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew.70 Nair was also accused of insulting another judge in an e-mail from 2006, and ultimately convicted of “intentional insult or interruption to a public servant sitting in any stage of a judicial proceeding”71 and sentenced to three months’ imprisonment on September 17, 2008.72

Critics of Malaysia’s ruling party also continued to be targeted through the use of existing punitive legal mechanisms, as reflected in the bevy of sedition, defamation, and even national security charges levied against the blogger Raja Petra Kamarudin for his online writings. On April 25, 2008, Kamarudin had published an article on his influential political Web site, Malaysia Today, linking then-Deputy Prime Minister Najib Razak (sworn in as Prime Minister in April 2009) and his wife to the October 2006 murder of a Mongolian translator.73 Kamarudin was charged with sedition in May 200874 and faces three criminal defamation charges in a related case.75 From September 12 to November 7, 2008, Kamarudin, who been released on bail in May, was detained under Malaysia’s notorious Internal Security Act of 1960 (ISA), which authorizes the preventive detention of individuals for up to two years (and renewable indefinitely) without trial or any judicial review.76 Kamarudin was accused of creating a national security threat by causing potential tension in Malaysia’s multi-racial and multi-faith society through his online activities.77

In Pakistan, President Musharraf’s crackdown on the broadcast media after declaring a state of emergency in November 2007 resulted in an actual increase in online dissemination of news and synchronicity between online and offline citizen activism. The Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) was established when Musharraf allowed for the creation of privately-owned, independent broadcast media in 2002. As conditions for obtaining a broadcast license, media outlets were required to prevent content containing violence, terrorism, discrimination, extremism, sectarianism, pornography and obscenity from coverage in programming and advertising.78 Media were also directly prohibited from broadcasting any content that is obscene, disturbs public order, endangers national security, or is “against the ideology of Pakistan.”79

Upon declaring the state of emergency in 2007 Musharraf further amended PEMRA’s charter to prohibit programming that “defames or brings into ridicule the head of state, or members of the armed forces, or executive, legislative or judicial organ of the state.”80 Video footage of suicide bombers, other terrorists, and their victims was banned,81 and PEMRA was empowered to close any broadcast service in a “situation of emergency” and seize equipment or seal the premises of licensees “in the public interest.”82 All privately-owned radio and television stations were shut down, some by force,83 and cable operators were banned from broadcasting any national or international news channels.84 Because Musharraf did not take such an assiduous approach towards restricting online content during the emergency, privately owned television stations taken off the air took advantage of the relative openness of the Internet and sent text messages announcing the live streaming of their programming online.85

Since 2007, offended citizens and groups in India have demanded that social networking Web sites be scrubbed of what they believe to be defamatory or obscene content online. Google’s Orkut is the most popular social networking Web site in India and the second most visited portal nationally. As a result of citizens filing complaints with the police, several individuals have been arrested for violating Article 67 of the IT Act, which punishes the online publication or transmission of obscene content.86 In February, Chandigarh IT professional Jatinder Singh Marok was alleged to have created an obscene profile on Orkut of a girl, including her personal identification and photos.87 In another high profile case, Rahul Krishnakumar Vaid, a twenty-two year old IT consultant, was accused of posting obscene and derogatory comments about Sonia Gandhi on an Orkut forum. According to an official account, police obtained Vaid’s identity by asking Google to disclose his IP address, as well as the identification information in his Gmail account.88

With the enactment of its cybercrimes law in June 2007, Thailand became one of the only countries in Asia to require its government to obtain court authorization to block Internet content.89 Vietnam and South Korea are also notable in Asia for expressly mandating filtering as a preventive mechanism against “harmful” content. Vietnam imposes a positive responsibility upon the state, society and schools to protect children from the negative impacts of information that is either obscene or incites violence, which includes authorizing state agencies to build and disseminate content filters.90 All providers must refuse or suspend services to individuals engaged in prohibited online activities, implement a reporting regime, and submit to inspection and examination by competent state agencies. However, online social service providers must also “block and remove illegal content upon detection or at the request of competent state agencies.”91

South Korea authorizes regulation of Internet content through the Korean Communications Standards Commission (KCSC), whose authority extends to ordering the blocking of Web sites, the deletion of a particular message identified as an improper communication, a Web site’s closure, or the suspension of the particular user ID of the individual who posted the improper writing.92 The KCSC was originally empowered to develop general principles or codes of telecommunications ethics, conduct deliberation of and request the “correction” of information declared illegal by Presidential Decree, and operate reporting centers against unhealthy telecom activities.93 Thus, its filtering mandate is part of its power to make determinations on information “harmful” to youth94 as well as recommend action against Web sites containing illegal content, including pornography, information for cybercriminals, gambling services, and Web sites that express support for communism or for the government of North Korea.95

Filtering in Asia

Asia, with its diversity, is home to several organically grown models for Internet filtering. Singapore, along with China, began experimenting with Internet filtering as early as 1996. Beginning September 15, 1996, users were forced to access the Internet through proxy servers that filtered sites banned by the MDA (then called the Singapore Broadcasting Authority (SBA)).96 These servers reportedly contained a database of frequently accessed “approved” material, and also refused access according to an SBA list of banned Web sites.97 At the time, the SBA targeted primarily pornography, with plans to also restrict “unacceptable political and religious discussion, defamation, and racist writings.”98 However, by 2002, these ambitions had been scaled back to the “ceremonial” filtering of a modest number of Web sites, a policy the government reaffirmed in March 2007.99

Singapore has refined a “dual regulation approach”100 to content regulation, where mainstream media are state-controlled or heavily regulated while alternative media such as independent Web sites and blogs are relatively free to publish. At the core of this “light touch” regulatory framework for online content is a class license scheme that requires all ISPs and those ICPs determined to be political parties or persons “engaged in the propagation, promotion or discussion of political or religious issues relating to Singapore” to register with the Media Development Authority.101 Thus, individuals, groups, and other organizations engaged solely in the discussion of these issues online must register for a license.102 However, the class license scheme has been rarely enforced, achieving greater efficacy in cultivating what its critics call a “culture of silence” through self-censorship.103 In April 2007, the Singaporean government created an advisory council to study and make recommendations on its regulatory regime for “interactive digital media.”104 The Advisory Council on the Impact of New Media (AIMS) report, issued on December 8, 2008, praised the longstanding “light touch” approach to regulation of new media, while proposing some incremental changes. For example, AIMS recommended that the registration requirement for political parties be eliminated, but also argued that the Class License Scheme be preserved.105

Like Singapore, China promoted the development of Internet infrastructure and services while strictly regulating media outlets and other forms of speech. While China has never formalized its filtering policy, it diverged from Singapore in developing aggressive filtering practices in concert with a robust internal market for Internet services and content, resulting in the emergence of public-private localized filtering.106 In addition to the broad range of content filtered at the international gateways and through the blocking of keywords, domestic providers wishing to remain in regulatory compliance are required to install internal filtering mechanisms and devote staff resources to monitor content on their Web sites or face civil and criminal liability. For example, in April 2009 an employee of China’s leading search engine, Baidu.com, leaked a folder containing the tools of internal censorship.107 These included lists of topics, keywords, and URLs to be blocked, lists of banned forums, employee guidelines for monitoring work, censorship guidelines for the popular Baidu discussion forums called “post bars,” and guidelines for how to search for information that needs to be banned.108 As a result, China has cultivated a model that buttresses a broad filtering regime with strict regulation of its own content providers, allowing it to maintain more optimal levels of control over its expansive domestic market.

For governments, the surge in user-generated content and multimedia files through online social media sites has made the implementation of filtering policies more complex.109 In February 2008, Pakistan provided one of the most severe examples of a clumsy technical approach to restricting social media, when the government’s attempt to block YouTube in Pakistan made the entire Web site inaccessible to most Internet users around the world for up to two hours.110 On February 22, the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) issued an order to block access to a single video on YouTube--a film called “Fitna” by the Dutch parliamentarian Geert Wilders that purportedly mocked the Prophet Muhammed--while listing three IP addresses.111 In response, the Pakistan Telecommunications Company Limited, the telecom that implements blocking orders, redirected requests for YouTube videos to its own network. This rerouting was advertised to the Internet at large and was picked up by the Hong Kong based ISP PCCW, which then broadcast the redirect to ISPs around the world.112 YouTube staff worked with PCCW to restore access within two hours.113 Access to YouTube was restored in Pakistan after the video listed in the PTA blocking order was removed. Indonesia followed suit, ordering ISPs to block YouTube in April 2008 over the same film after Google reportedly did not respond to the government’s request to remove the video from the Web site.114

Authorities in Bangladesh, a country with an Internet penetration rate of less than 1 percent,115 nevertheless chose to block YouTube for a few days in March 2009 in order to protect the “national interest.” The disputed video covered a partial audio recording of a meeting between the prime minister and military officials, who were angry at the government’s handling of a mutiny by border guards in Dhaka that left more than seventy people dead.116 The Bangla blogging platform Sachalayatan was also reported to be inaccessible beginning on July 15, 2008, and was forced to migrate to a new IP address.117 Although its blocking was not officially confirmed, Sachalayatan was likely Bangladesh’s inaugural filtering event.

Even China, which has developed domestic content control mechanisms for its Internet market that help to shield it from the difficult choices facing other countries, can be vulnerable to the reverberations of social media. Google confirmed that YouTube was blocked in China beginning on March 23, 2009,118 which media reported could have been prompted by a graphic video released by Tibetan exiles in which Chinese troops beat a group of Tibetans.119 Multiple users also reported that YouTube was blocked in China around March 4, 2009, coinciding with the one-year anniversary of the crackdown on protests in Tibetan regions as well as the fiftieth anniversary of the Tibetan uprising of 1959.120

As the proliferation of borderless social media reduces the effectiveness of the blacklist-and-block model, governments are increasingly looking to technology companies to act as gatekeepers for facilitating transnational public-private filtering.121 In Asia, Thailand may present an example of an alternative to the approaches taken by China and Singapore. Thailand also blocked YouTube in April 2007 for hosting a number of videos that insulted King Bhumibol Adulyadej or his family, which constitutes a crime of lèse majesté, punishable under Thai law by up to fifteen years’ imprisonment.122 By May 2007, YouTube agreed to remove a number of the specified videos for violating its terms of service, and the block on the YouTube domain was lifted in August 2007 upon Google’s creation of a program of geolocational filtering for blocking access to specified videos for users in Thailand.123 In 2008, investigations by a project of the MIT Free Culture group appeared to have uncovered the code for a technical mechanism that YouTube uses to allow certain videos to be seen everywhere except in those locations specified in a media restriction tag.124 Although Thailand’s filtering of the Internet has been ramped up in recent years, Thai law also requires court authorization to block a Web site. Thus, Thailand has secured the cooperation of the world’s dominant video aggregator site in implementing selective geolocational filtering on its behalf, without having to resort to a formal or transparent legal process. Its experience could also signal further public-private transnational cooperation between governments and private technology companies that result in selective filtering: a Vietnamese information ministry official stated in 2008 that the government would ask transnational gatekeepers such as Google and Yahoo to help regulate the Vietnamese blogosphere.125

Ultimately, there continues to be no single or uniform approach to filtering in Asia. In August 2008, in contravention of its own policy, Malaysia joined the growing collection of countries that filter the Internet. On August 27, media reported Malaysia Today blocked by order of the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC) for violating Articles 211 and 233(1) of the Communications and Multimedia Act of 1998 (CMA).126 Malaysia Today was alleged to have published offensive, false and indecent content, especially “comments relating to Islam and how Muslims practice it.”127 The blocking order was labeled a preventative action under Section 263 of the CMA, requiring the cooperation of licensees such as ISPs to cooperate in enforcing the laws of Malaysia.128 Former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad criticized this “reneging of a promise” not to censor the Internet as loss of credibility and the public’s respect.129 Although a government official later clarified that MCMC did not receive a direct order to block Malaysia Today but had exercised its discretion under the CMA, Communications Minister Datuk Shaziman Abu Mansor disclosed that over one hundred Web sites and blogs, including Malaysia Today, were blocked for violating various sections of the CMA.130 On September 11, the Malaysian cabinet ordered the MCMC to unblock all Web sites, stating that existing laws would be used to prosecute blogs and Web sites in violation of the CMA, which would be monitored by a MCMC committee comprising police officials, officials from the Attorney-General’s Chambers and the Home Ministry.131

Conclusion

Filtering conducted by Asian governments followed the same broad trajectories in 2007-2008, with some incremental changes, and continues to be most clearly demarcated along national lines and local language and content rather than any regional or categorical formula. Increased scrutiny of filtering practices worldwide has contributed to greater awareness about escalated filtering taking place around political events like elections and political emergencies, with at least six Asian countries reported to have blocked YouTube between 2007 and early 2009. Most of the governments in Asia where ONI conducted in-country testing are expanding their legal mandate and authority to filter and regulate content, especially in targeting online defamation. As social media platforms such as video aggregator Web sites, Web portals, and online discussion forums gain in size and relevance, legal regulation of the Internet is also converging around data retention requirements, delegated liability for ISPs and ICPs, increased criminal penalties for content producers, and other mechanisms that could create a sufficient dragnet around the individuals operating in these increasingly networked public spheres. These measures fall in line with emerging second-generation controls.

1. Paul Budde Communication Pty Ltd., Thailand- Key Statistics, Telecom Market Overview & Forecasts, February 11, 2009. Paul Budde Communication Pty Ltd., Vietnam- Key Statistics, Telecom Market Overview & Forecasts, April 11, 2009.
2. China Internet Network Information Center, “Twenty-third Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in China,” issued March 23, 2009, http://www.cnnic.net.cn/uploadfiles/pdf/2009/3/23/131303.pdf.
3. China Internet Network Information Center, “Twenty-third Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in China,” issued March 23, 2009, http://www.cnnic.net.cn/uploadfiles/pdf/2009/3/23/131303.pdf.
4. China Internet Network Information Center, “Twenty-third Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in China,” issued March 23, 2009, p. 14, http://www.cnnic.net.cn/uploadfiles/pdf/2009/3/23/131303.pdf.
5. Paul Budde Communications Pty Ltd., South Korea Broadband Market - Overview & Statistics, September 6, 2008, p. 1.
6. Lee Min Keong, “Malaysia lowers broadband targets,” ZDNet Asia, September 11, 2007, http://www.zdnetasia.com/news/communications/0,39044192,62032069,00.htm.
7. Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission, Communications and Multimedia: Selected Facts and Figures, Q3 2008, p. 28, http://www.skmm.gov.my/facts_figures/stats/index.asp. Lee Min Keong, “Malaysia lowers broadband targets,” ZDNet Asia, September 11, 2007, http://www.zdnetasia.com/news/communications/0,39044192,62032069,00.htm.
8. Paul Budde Communication Pty Ltd., Malaysia: Internet Services, February 7, 2009, p. 1
9. Paul Budde Communication Pty Ltd., Bangladesh, Key Statistics, Telecom Market Overview & Forecasts, December 28, 2008.
10. See http://www.internetworldstats.com/asia.htm.
11. Nepali Times, “Web pioneer - Mahabir Pun put Nepal on the information technology map not by complaining about how the poor didn't have access to computers, but actually doing something about it,” August 3, 2007.
12. ONI Source, http://www.yadanaboncybercity.com/.
13. OpenNet Initiative Bulletin, Pulling the Plug: A Technical Review of the Internet Shutdown in Burma, November 2007, http://opennet.net/research/bulletins/013/.
14. ONI interview with public access center operator. ONI blog, “Doubts surface over announced Internet maintenance in Burma,” March 24, 2009, http://opennet.net/blog/2009/03/doubts-surface-over-announced-internet-m... Lawi Weng, “Internet Slowdown to Continue at Least One More Day,” April 2, 2009, http://irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=15429. See also Reporters Without Borders, “Growing restrictions on free flow of information,” May 15, 2009, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=31352.
15. Kalinga Seneviratne, “Bloggers Sit On Opposition Benches,” Inter Press Service, March 13, 2008.
16. Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission, Communications and Multimedia: Selected Facts and Figures, Q3 2008, http://www.skmm.gov.my/facts_figures/stats/index.asp.
17. Jeremy Au Yong, “The next frontier; Media experts and top Malaysian bloggers attracted attention for the role they played in Malaysia's recent general election,” The Straits Times (Singapore), April 12, 2008.
18. Carolyn Hong, “KL hands out press passes for online media; Coming of age for Internet journalists, who now can cover govt events,” The Straits Times (Singapore), July 9, 2008.
19. Financial Express, “Blacked out Pakistani TV channels turn to Internet,” November 7, 2007, http://www.financialexpress.com/news/blacked-out-pakistani-tv-channels-t....
20. Huma Yusuf, Old and New Media: Converging During the Pakistan Emergency (March 2007-February 2008), Center for Future Civic Media (MIT), January 12, 2009, http://civic.mit.edu/watchlistenlearn/old-and-new-media-converging-durin.... See also http://2009.inwent-iij-lab.org/?p=196.
21. Seth Mydans, “Steep Rise in Fuel Costs Prompts Rare Public Protest in Myanmar,” The New York Times, August 22, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/23/world/asia/23myanmar.html.
22. Human Rights Watch, Crackdown: Repression of the 2007 Popular Protests in Burma, December 2007, p. 8, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/burma1207web.pdf.
23. See OpenNet Initiative Bulletin, Pulling the Plug: A Technical Review of the Internet Shutdown in Burma, November 2007, http://opennet.net/research/bulletins/013/.
24. Seth Mydans, “Myanmar Rulers Still Impeding Access,” New York Times, June 3, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/03/world/asia/03myanmar.html.
25. Global Voices Online, “Myanmar: Citizen videos in Cyclone Nargis' aftermath,” May 16, 2008, http://globalvoicesonline.org/2008/05/16/video-burmamyanmar-in-cyclone-n....
26. Jonathan Krim, “Subway Fracas Escalates Into Test Of the Internet's Power to Shame,” The Washington Post, July 7, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/06/AR200507....
27. “Grace Wang,” YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zomgZuZoDoM.
28. Grace Wang, “Caught in the Middle, Called a Traitor,” The Washington Post, April 20, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/18/AR200804... National Public Radio, “Duke Student Targeted for Mediating Tibet Protest,” April 21, 2008, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=89803198.
29. People’s Daily, “Hu Jintao talks to netizens via People's Daily Online,” June 20, 2008, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90785/6433952.html.
30. David Bandurski, “China’s Guerrilla War for the Web,” Far Eastern Economic Review, July 2008, http://www.feer.com/essays/2008/august/chinas-guerrilla-war-for-the-web.
31. Brian Lee, “Blue House tries to plug the holes in PR machine,” May 6, 2009, http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2904455.
32. Kalinga Seneviratne, “Bloggers Sit On Opposition Benches,” Inter Press Service, March 13, 2008.
33. Agence France Presse,” Malaysia PM says 'big mistake' to ignore cyber-campaign,” March 25, 2008.
34. Min Lwin, “Junta Approves Investment in Cyber City,” Irrawaddy, July 30, 2008. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/JJ01Ae01.html.
35. Oliver Luft, “Thai government tries to shut down 400 websites,” September 3, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2008/sep/03/digitalmedia.thailand.
36. CNN.com, “Constitution protests continue in Thailand,” June 2, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/06/02/thailand.protests/index.html.
37. Marwaan Macan-Markar, “MEDIA-THAILAND: Police Target Websites Unflattering to Royalty,” IPS, March 8, 2009, http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=46023. Jonathan Head, “Police arrest Thai website editor,” BBC News, March 6, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/mobile/i/bbc_news/asia_pacific/792/79281/story7928....
38. Marwaan Macan-Markar, “MEDIA-THAILAND: Police Target Websites Unflattering to Royalty,” IPS, March 8, 2009, http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=46023.
39. Act on Computer Crime B.E. 2550 (2007), English translation at http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/wp-content/plugins/download-monit....
40. Act on Computer Crime B.E. 2550 (2007), English translation at http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/wp-content/plugins/download-monit....
41. Section 16, Act on Computer Crime B.E. 2550 (2007), English translation at http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/wp-content/plugins/download-monit....
42. Article 13, Prevention of Electronic Crimes Ordinance, 2008 (Ordinance No. IV of 2008).
43. Choe Sang-hun, “Korean Leader Considers Ways to Rework Government,” The New York Times, June 11, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/11/world/asia/11korea.html.
44. The Dong-a Ilbo, “Anti-US Beef Protests: One Year Later,” April 29, 2009, http://english.donga.com/srv/service.php3?biid=2009042903068.
45. The Dong-a Ilbo, “Anti-US Beef Protests: One Year Later,” April 29, 2009, http://english.donga.com/srv/service.php3?biid=2009042903068. Jon Herskovitz and Rhee So-eui, “South Korean Internet catches "mad cow madness",” Reuters, June 13, 2008, http://in.reuters.com/article/internetNews/idINSEO30506420080613?sp=true.
46. Jon Herskovitz and Rhee So-eui, “South Korean Internet catches "mad cow madness",” Reuters, June 13, 2008, http://in.reuters.com/article/internetNews/idINSEO30506420080613?sp=true.
47. Choe Sang-Hun, “Korean Leader Considers Ways to Rework Government,” The New York Times, June 11, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/11/world/asia/11korea.html.
48. Michael Fitzpatrick, “South Korea wants to gag the noisy internet rabble,” The Guardian, October 8, 2008. http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2008/oct/09/news.internet. Kim Tong-Hyung, “Cabinet Backs Crackdown on Cyber-bullying,” The Korea Times, July 22, 2008, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2008/07/123_28003.html.
49. JoongAng Daily, “Do new Internet regulations curb free speech?,” August 13, 2008. http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2893577.
50. Lee Sang-bok, “New regulations proposed for Internet postings,” JoongAng Daily, August 21, 2008, http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2893939.
51. Ser Myo-ja, “GNP files bills to alter the nation’s media landscape,” JoongAng Daily, December 4, 2008, http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2898166.
52. JoongAng Daily, “Do new Internet regulations curb free speech?,” August 13, 2008. http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2893577.
53. Sung So-young, “Portals beef up measures against malicious postings,” JoongAng Daily, October 23, 2008, http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2896433.
54. See, for the example, the case of Hu Jia, at http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/chinese-activist-gets-ja....
55. Article 41, CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html.
56. Joshua Rosenzweig, “China's Battle Over the Right to Criticize,” May 1, 2009, http://www.feer.com/essays/2009/may/chinas-battle-over-the-right-to-crit....
57. See http://siweiluozi.blogspot.com/2009/04/update-review-underway-in-wu-baoq... http://siweiluozi.blogspot.com/search/label/Wang%20Shuai.
58. Joshua Rosenzweig, “China's Battle Over the Right to Criticize,” May 1, 2009, http://www.feer.com/essays/2009/may/chinas-battle-over-the-right-to-crit....
59. Geoffrey Cain, “Bloggers the new rebels in Vietnam,” San Francisco Chronicle, December 14, 2008, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/12/14/MNJ814GR9H.D....
60. Law on Information Technology (No.67/2006/QH11), http://vbqppl4.moj.gov.vn/law/en/2001_to_2010/2006/200606/200606290015_e....
61. Article 6(1), DECREE No. 97/2008/ND-CP OF AUGUST 28, 2008, ON THE MANAGEMENT, PROVISION AND USE OF INTERNET SERVICES AND ELECTRONIC INFORMATION ON THE INTERNET, http://www.mic.gov.vn/lawfiles/31236373.PDF.
62. Article 9, Law on Information Technology (No.67/2006/QH11), http://vbqppl4.moj.gov.vn/law/en/2001_to_2010/2006/200606/200606290015_e.... Article 12(2)(c), DECREE No. 97/2008/ND-CP OF AUGUST 28, 2008, ON THE MANAGEMENT, PROVISION AND USE OF INTERNET SERVICES AND ELECTRONIC INFORMATION ON THE INTERNET, http://www.mic.gov.vn/lawfiles/31236373.PDf.
63. Articles 3.1, 4, Circular No. 07/2008/TT-BTTTT of December 1S3 2008, guiding a number of contents of the Government's Decree No. 97/2008/ ND-CF of August 28, 2008, on the management, provision and use of Internet services and information on the Internet regarding the supply of information on blogs, http://www.mic.gov.vn/lawfiles/23434370.pdf.
64. Article 16(4), Law on Information Technology (No.67/2006/QH11), http://vbqppl4.moj.gov.vn/law/en/2001_to_2010/2006/200606/200606290015_e....
65. Article 16(3), Law on Information Technology (No.67/2006/QH11), http://vbqppl4.moj.gov.vn/law/en/2001_to_2010/2006/200606/200606290015_e....
66. Article 6, Circular No. 07/2008/TT-BTTTT of December 1S3 2008, guiding a number of contents of the Government's Decree No. 97/2008/ ND-CF of August 28, 2008, on the management, provision and use of Internet services and information on the Internet regarding the supply of information on blogs, http://www.mic.gov.vn/lawfiles/23434370.pdf.
67. For example, on October 13, 2008, Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) leader Chee Soon Juan and his sister were ordered to pay over over $600,000 Singapore dollars in damages for defaming Mentor Minister Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and his son, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, in a 2006 SDP newsletter likening the conduct of government officials to another corruption scandal involving the National Kidney Foundation. Zakir Hussain, “PM, MM get $950k damages; Amount determined in part by 'egregious' conduct of the Chees,” The Straits Times (Singapore), October 14, 2008.
68. Article 108B, Penal Code (Amendment) Act 2007, http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/non_version/html/homepage.html.
69. Inter Press Service, “SINGAPORE: STATE SUES BLOGGER FOR CRITICIZING HIGH COURT JUDGE,” June 7, 2008.
70. See http://singaporedissident.blogspot.com/2008/05/singapore-judge-belinda-a....
71. Article 228, Penal Code (Amendment) Act 2007, http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/non_version/html/homepage.html.
72. Zakir Hussain, Gopalan Nair jailed 3 mths,” Straits Times, September 17, 2008, http://www.straitstimes.com/Breaking%2BNews/Courts%2Band%2BCrime/Story/S....
73. Lee Glendinning and agencies, “Malaysian blogger Raja Petra Kamarudin goes on trial over sedition charges,” October 6, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/oct/06/malaysia.pressandpublishing.
74. The Associated Press, “Malaysian blogger charged with sedition,” May 6, 2008, http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/05/06/asia/malay.php.
75. Kamarudin allegedly defamed Razak’s wife, Datin Rosmah Mansor, Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Aziz Buyong and his wife Lieutenant Colonel Norhayati Hassan in a public court declaration in June 2008. Sushma Veera, Second arrest warrant out for Raja Petra,” New Straits Times (Malaysia), Mary 26, 2009, http://www.nst.com.my/Current_News/NST/Wednesday/National/2567087/Articl....
76. See Human Rights Watch, Detained Without Trial: Abuse of Internal Security Act Detainees in Malaysia, September 26, 2005, http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2005/09/26/detained-without-trial-0.
77. Pertubuhan Berita Nasional Malaysia, “DETAINED RAJA PETRA'S ACTIONS THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY - DEPUTY IGP,” September 12, 2008.
78. Article 20, Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Ordinance 2002, http://www.pemra.gov.pk/pdf/ordinance1.pdf.
79. Article 27, Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Ordinance 2002, http://www.pemra.gov.pk/pdf/ordinance1.pdf.
80. Article 20(m), Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Ordinance, 2007 (LXV of 2007), http://www.pemra.gov.pk/pdf/ord031107.pdf.
81. Article 20(j), Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Ordinance, 2007 (LXV of 2007), http://www.pemra.gov.pk/pdf/ord031107.pdf.
82. Article 30(4), Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Ordinance, 2007 (LXV of 2007), http://www.pemra.gov.pk/pdf/ord031107.pdf.
83. “Pakistani police storm television station,” CNN News 3 November 2007 http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/asiapcf/11/03/pakistan.media/.
84. Muhammad Najeeb, “Pakistani media gagged, even Internet not spared,” Hindustan Times 4 November 2007 http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/StoryPage.aspx?id=460572ab-dea2-....
85. Financial Express, “Blacked out Pakistani TV channels turn to Internet,” November 7, 2007, http://www.financialexpress.com/news/blacked-out-pakistani-tv-channels-t....
86. The Information Technology Act, Article 67, 2000. Under the Act, anyone who publishes “any material which is lascivious or appeals to the prurient interest or if its effect is such as to tend to deprave and corrupt . . .” is subject to a fine and up to five years in prison. See http://www.sarai.net/journal/pdf/133-135%20(bill).pdf.
87. The Press Trust of India, “IT professional held for creating girl's obscene Orkut profile,” February 21, 2008.
88. The Times of India, „ One held for posting obscene Orkut message on Sonia,” May 18, 2008, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Pune/One_held_for_posting_obscene_Ork....
89. Article 20, Act on Computer Crime B.E. 2550 (2007), English translation at http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/wp-content/plugins/download-monit....
90. Article 73, Law on Information Technology (No.67/2006/QH11), http://vbqppl4.moj.gov.vn/law/en/2001_to_2010/2006/200606/200606290015_e....
91. Article 11(c), DECREE No. 97/2008/ND-CP OF AUGUST 28, 2008, ON THE MANAGEMENT, PROVISION AND USE OF INTERNET SERVICES AND ELECTRONIC INFORMATION ON THE INTERNET, http://www.mic.gov.vn/lawfiles/31236373.PDF.
92. See Decisions of the Korean Constitutional Court, Opinion 14-1 KCCR 616, 99Hun-Ma480, June 27, 2002, http://www.ccourt.go.kr/home/english/decision_etc/decision2003.htm.
93. Article 53-2, Telecommunications Business Act (1995), Law 4903, January 5, 1995, http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/treg/Legislation/Korea/BusinessAct.htm.
94. Korean Communications Standards Commission, http://www.icec.or.kr/eng/02_Operation/Committees.php.
95. Korean Communications Standards Commission, http://www.singo.or.kr/eng/02_report/Subject_Report.php. See also Reporters without Borders, South Korea country report, 2004. http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=10774.
96. The Economist (U.S. Edition), “NetNanny States,” September 14, 1996.
97. Robert Uhlig, “Singapore to censor Net porn, violence,” Daily Telegraph, September 3, 1996.
98. United Press International, Singapore begins to block Internet, September 14, 1996.
99. Report of Censorship Review Committee, Ministry of Information, Communication and the Arts, www.mda.gov.sg/wms.file/mobj/mobj.316.Censorship_Review_2003.pdf. Agence France Presse, “Singapore vigilant on sedition, ‘ceremonial" on porn censorship,’” March 22 2007.
100. Cherian George, http://singaporemedia.blogspot.com/2007_03_01_archive.html. Channel NewsAsia, “The dangers of dual media regulation,” January 12, 2007.
101. Broadcasting (Class License) Notification 2001, July 15, 1996, http://www.mda.gov.sg/wms.file/mobj/mobj.487.ClassLicense.pdf.
102. See Media Development Authority (MDA), Internet, http://www.mda.gov.sg/wms.www/devnpolicies.aspx?sid=161.
103. Proposals for Internet Freedom in Singapore, p. 10, April 21, 2008, http://www.yawningbread.org/ybsamplerfiles/ bloggerssub.pdf.
104. See http://www.aims.org.sg/.
105. // ENGAGING NEW MEDIA / / CHALLENGING OLD ASSUMPTIONS, A report by the Advisory Council on the Impact of New Media on Society, p. 74-76, December 2008, http://www.aims.org.sg/library/docs/AIMS%20Report%20(Dec%2008)%20-%20Engaging%20New%20Media,%20Challenging%20Old%20Assumptions.pdf.
106. Robert Faris, Stephanie Wang and John Palfrey, “Censorship 2.0,” Innovations: Technology/Governance/Globalization (MIT Press), Winter 2008.
107. “Baidu’s Internal Monitoring and Censorship Document Leaked,” China Digital Times, April 30, 2009, http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2009/04/baidus-internal-monitoring-and-cens....
108. See, e.g., http://chinagfw.org/2009/04/blog-post_5218.html.
109. Robert Faris, Stephanie Wang and John Palfrey, “Censorship 2.0,” Innovations: Technology/Governance/Globalization (MIT Press), Winter 2008.
110. Pakistan’s Internet has a bad weekend,” OpenNet Initiative Blog, February 25, 2008, http://opennet.net/blog/2008/02/pakistan%E2%80%99s-internet-has-a-bad-we.... “Pakistan hijacks YouTube,” Renesys Blog, 2 February 2008 http://www.renesys.com/blog/2008/02/pakistan_hijacks_youtube_1.shtml.
111. Corrigendum — Most Urgent — Subject: Blocking of Offensive Website,” Pakistan Telecommunication Authority, 22 February 2008 http://www.renesys.com/blog/pakistan_blocking_order.pdf.
112. Declan McCullagh, “How Pakistan knocked YouTube offline (and how to make sure it never happens again),” CNet 25 February 2008 http://www.news.com/8301-10784_3-9878655-7.html.
113. Martin A. Brown “Pakistan Hijacks YouTube,” Renesys Blog, 24 February 2008 http://www.renesys.com/blog/2008/02/pakistan_hijacks_youtube_1.shtml.
114. CNN, “Indonesia blocks YouTube to protest Islam film,” April 8, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/04/08/indonesia.youtube/index.html.
115. Paul Budde Communication Pty Ltd., Bangladesh, Key Statistics, Telecom Market Overview & Forecasts, December 28, 2008.
116. “Bangladesh imposes YouTube block,” BBC News, March 9, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7932659.stm.
117. Aparna Ray, “Bangladesh gets a ‘Blog-Ban’ scare,” Global Voices Online, July 28, 2008, http://globalvoicesonline.org/2008/07/28/bangladesh-gets-a-blog-ban-scar....
118. See OpenNet Initiative blog, “Google confirms YouTube blocked in China ,” March 24, 2009, http://opennet.net/blog/2009/03/google-confirms-youtube-blocked-china.
119. Jane Macartney, “Film of Tibet violence may have prompted China to block YouTube,” The Times (UK), March 26, 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article5975252.ece.
120. See http://www.herdict.org.
121. Robert Faris, Stephanie Wang and John Palfrey, “Censorship 2.0,” Innovations: Technology/Governance/Globalization (MIT Press), p.175, Winter 2008.
122. The Nation,“Ban on YouTube lifted after deal: Website to block clips offensive to Thais or that break Thai law,”August 31, 2007, http://nationmultimedia.com/2007/08/31/headlines/head-lines_30047192.php.
123. The Sydney Morning Herald, “YouTube removes clips mocking Thai king,”May 12, 2007, http://www.smh.com.au/news/World/YouTube-removes-clips-mocking-Thai-king.... The Nation,“Ban on YouTube lifted after deal: Website to block clips offensive to Thais or that break Thai law,”August 31, 2007, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2007/08/31/headlines/headlines_30047192.....
124. OpenNet Initiative blog, “YouTube and the rise of geolocational filtering,” March 13, 2008, http://opennet.net/blog/2008/03/youtube-and-rise-geolocational-filtering.
125. Geoffrey Cain, “Bloggers the new rebels in Vietnam,” San Francisco Chronicle, December 14, 2008, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/12/14/MNJ814GR9H.D....
126. See https://mt.m2day.org/2008/content/view/11968/84/. Article 211(1) makes it illegal to provide content which is indecent, obscene, false, menacing, or offensive in character with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten or harass any person. According to Article 233, it is illegal for any person to make any comment, request, suggestion or other communication transmitting the same types of illegal content over networks. Articles 211(1), 233, Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Act of 1998, http://www.skmm.gov.my/the_law/NewAct/Act%20588/Act%20588/a0588s0211.htm... http://www.skmm.gov.my/the_law/NewAct/Act%20588/Act%20588/a0588s0233.htm.
127. The Edge Malaysia, “Net Value: 'CMA provides for prohibition of offensive content,” The Edge Malaysia, September 8, 2008.
128. The Edge Malaysia, “Net Value: 'CMA provides for prohibition of offensive content,” The Edge Malaysia, September 8, 2008.
129. The Straits Times (Singapore), “Mahathir slams blocking of Malaysia Today portal,” August 30, 2008.
130. “‘SKMM not ordered to block access to website,” The Star Online, August 30, 2008, http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2008/8/30/nation/22210685&sec....
131. Sim Leoi Leoi and Florence A. Sam, “MCMC told to unblock Malaysia Today (Update 2),” The Star Online, September 11, 2008, http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2008/9/11/nation/200809111451....

China

evan — Mon, 15 Jun 2009 10:42:59 -0400

Background

The convening of the 17th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress in October 2007, at which China’s top echelon of government leaders chose their eventual successors, was the beginning of a momentous year for China, and consequently for domestic and international news media. On March 10, 2008, hundreds of monks in the Tibetan autonomous region led a series of protests to demand loosening of restrictions on religious practices and even independence for Tibet.1 Chinese authorities rapidly responded with arrests and a violent crackdown against thousands of monks and rioting Tibetans.2 A corresponding clampdown on reporting from the region and other Tibetan-populated areas in western China left media with a dearth of reliable information. With only official accounts and dispatches released by Tibetan exile organizations issues like the actual death toll were questioned. The crackdown in Tibet galvanized protests both supportive and critical of China’s policies towards its religious and ethnic minorities, especially as symbolized in the Olympic torch making its way in an elaborate tour around the world. The conflicts that erupted in cities as distant as Paris3 and Seoul in March and April contributed to a so-called transnational Chinese backlash against western media portrayals of China, culminating in a an “anti-CNN” movement and a call for a boycott against the French supermarket chain Carrefour.4

On May 12, 2008, a 7.9-magnitude earthquake, with its epicenter in Wenchuan county, Sichuan province, killed around 90,000 people and injured hundreds of thousands, leveling over five million buildings and leaving millions homeless.5 During the massive relief efforts and national mobilization of volunteers and monetary contributions immediately following the quake, media were allowed to operate with unprecedented openness, with official state outlets such as China Central Television winning notice and praise for presenting timely and uncanned news. However, within a few weeks authorities had already begun to encircle and regulate the story. The government issued bans on coverage of certain topics and required registration of reporters, but it took authorities repeated efforts to quash coverage of one of the most potent and enduring controversies: the extent of government responsibility for the shoddy school construction attributed to the tragic deaths of thousands of schoolchildren and teachers.6 Authorities did not release an official statistic of the number of schoolchildren who died until almost a year after the quake, and some accused the official figure of 5,335 figure as too low in comparison with Reuters’ estimation of 9,000 deaths, calculated from reports by the state news agency and local media.7 This led one commentator to state that, “Chinese news reports on this major story unfolded in a complicated environment, and it is impossible to render a simple verdict about media coverage.”8

With over USD40 billion spent on hosting the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing, the Chinese government acted to assert control over this global event while presenting an open and welcoming environment for athletes, media, foreign dignitaries and visitors.9 As part of these overtures, the government issued regulations in January 2007 allowing journalists to travel across the country without registering with local authorities and to interview subjects without official consent.10 While the unblocking of Web sites and improved access to officials at Olympics venues marked some improvements in openness and transparency, the government also stepped up surveillance around Beijing and prevented activists from petitioning to use legally sanctioned protest zones.

After a news conference held by the US men's volleyball team, in which several Chinese reporters had their notebooks (and at least one tape recorder) confiscated, Beijing Olympics spokesman Sun Weide denied knowledge of this differential treatment of Chinese reporters: “I am not very clear about the situation you raised," he said. “For Chinese journalists, they very much enjoy the rights to cover the Beijing Olympic Games... the rights are protected by the constitution in China.”11 Yet China’s ‘open-door’ policy for journalists as a result of the Olympics had a marginal impact on Olympics coverage by domestic media. The government persisted in its clampdown on local Chinese media,12 and the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China confirmed 63 cases of reporting interference during the Olympics out of a total of 178 in 2008, including ten incidents of police roughing up reporters and breaking their cameras.13 While the relaxed rules for foreign journalists were made permanent in October 2008,14 new rules issued in February 2009 required reporters based in Hong Kong and Macao to apply for a permit prior to ever reporting trip to mainland China.15

A month after the Olympics concluded, a scandal erupted over tainted milk products that killed six infants and sickened nearly 300,000 others.16 Information soon emerged indicating that provincial governments, central government agencies, as well as officials from the Sanlu group, China’s leading seller of milk powder, had either suppressed earlier reports of contamination or failed to act, likely at the cost of human lives.17 Although it had been receiving complaints about its infant milk powder since December 2007, the Sanlu group only informed its board in August 2008, prompting its joint venture partner Fonterra to inform the New Zealand government.18 A reporter for the newspaper Southern Weekend, known for its investigative reports, wrote in a blog post that he several journalists were prevented in July from publishing findings about how milk powder was making children sick because of pressure from Sanlu officials as well as an overall Olympics-related clampdown on negative news coverage.19 In January 2009, 21 defendants were convicted for their roles in the production and sale of melamine-tainted products, including two melamine producers who received death sentences, and life imprisonment for the former Sanlu chairwoman.20

As 2008 progressed, the Chinese government demonstrated a perceptible shift in its media control policies in order to better manage the handling of negative news reports, which continued to spread with incredible speed and intensity on the Internet. Also known as “Control 2.0,” this approach involves the government taking a more active and rapid response to fast-breaking news events, primarily by attempting to set the agenda for coverage rather than suppress it.21 With lessons learned about the upsides of transparency and timeliness from the early Sichuan earthquake coverage and other emergencies, the central government reportedly began allowing local governments to disclose information about unrest and protests in an apparent attempt to “control the news by publicizing the news.”22 However, despite gestures towards a broader openness with the media, the government clearly did not intend to relinquish control.23 “Control 2.0” often resulted in the same delivery of “authoritative” facts, with state news agencies such as Xinhua and the People’s Daily benefiting from this selectively enhanced coverage over commercial media.24 In February 2009 the official China News Service announced that it would create a “blacklist” of journalists engaged in “unhealthy professional conduct,” and those found breaking rules would be prohibited in news reporting and editing work.25

Coming off of these perceived triumphs and devastating crises, the Chinese government warned that extra vigilance was needed in 2009. The potential for increased social instability triggered by the global financial crisis increased anxieties in a year already punctuated by powerful anniversaries of events tainting the legacy of the CCP, which will also commemorate sixty years since the founding of the People’s Republic of China: twenty years since the June 4, 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown; fifty years since the Tibetan uprising that led to the Dalai Lama’s exile; and ten years since the Falun Gong spiritual movement was banned quickly after their 10,000-strong flash protest in front of Zhongnanhai, the compound of the Chinese central leadership. Thus, officials repeatedly issued reminders that “stability preservation work”26 would be a top priority. At a media forum in January, an official in China’s Internet affairs bureau said, “[y]ou have to check the channels one by one, the programs one by one, the pages one by one … You must not miss any step. You must not leave any unchecked corners.”27 Efforts to enforce stability preservation have resulted in predictable crackdowns on media reporting; for example, in March 2009, reporters were detained, turned back, or had their recordings confiscated when trying to visit Tibetan areas in three provinces ahead of the first anniversary of the unrest in Tibet.28

Internet in China

China leads the world with 298 million Internet users, an increase of 42 percent from 2007 to the end of 2008.29 More astoundingly, in this same time period over 90 percent of these users had broadband access, a spike of over 100 million.30 China also has the world’s biggest cell phone market, with some 583.5 million subscribers.31 The rural-urban divide that influences many gaps in the informatization of the national economy is closing, but remains substantial. With a national Internet penetration rate of 22.6 percent, rural areas and the poorer western provinces are beginning to gain ground.32 At the end of 2008, rural Internet users made up almost a third of the entire online population, a jump of over 60 percent.33 While many of the poorer and western provinces such as Yunnan, Gansu and Guizhou continue to have penetration rates of less than 10 percent, they also have considerable growth rates, upwards of 50 percent.34 Driven by the policy goal that “every village has access to the telephone and every township has access to the Internet” by 2010, infrastructure development has expanded broadband Internet access to 92 percent of townships.35 Gender is also an important demographic factor in the urban-rural divide, with rural male users significantly outnumbering women by 15 percent. Internet users between the ages of 10-19 gained ground in 2008, increasing to 35 percent of all users and overtaking the 20-29 age group to become the leading demographic using the Internet.36

Web sites registered in China are another exponential growth area, increasing by 91.4% from 2007.37 Social media platforms continues to take hold: 210 million Internet users in China have visited video sharing sites, 54 percent have blogs (although only 35 percent of those update them at least once every six months), almost a third participate in online discussion forums, and 19 percent belong to social networking sites.38 Chinese netizens have access to a wide variety of well developed Internet platforms for the domestic market that have typically outpaced foreign services, such as search engines (Baidu’s market share is at 63 percent compared to Google’s 28 percent), online portals (the top four portals – Sohu, Sina, Tencent, and Netease – claim 73 percent of sector revenue), bulletin board services (BBS) and discussion forums, online video sites, blogs, social networking (the service Kaixin has an estimated thirty million daily users), and booming business-to-customer e-commerce.39 From 2006, when only China Netcom and China Telecom were permitted to offer pilot commercial VoIP services in selected cities,40 the number of VoIP service providers has reached 3,000, mainly in Beijing and Shanghai, with the number of users reaching 80 million.41

In 2008, China’s telecom regulator, the Ministry of Information Industry (MII), was dissolved and its functions absorbed into the new Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT).42 In addition to the MII mandate to regulate telecommunications, Internet, broadband, electronics, computing and software, the MIIT’s enhanced authority includes supervision of IT development, formerly held by the National Development and Reform Commission.43 Physical access to the Internet is controlled by the MIIT and is provided by eight state-licensed Internet access providers (ISPs), each of which has at least one connection to a foreign Internet backbone.44 China’s international outlet bandwidth reached 640Gbps in 2008, an increase of 73.6 percent, but China Telecom (ChinaNET) maintained over 50 percent of that bandwidth.45 China Netcom (now China Unicom) joined China’s second largest ISP, China169, after China Telecom split off in 2003.46

In an effort to boost the fixed-line phone industry’s competitiveness in the mobile market, in 2008 numerous ministries jointly decided to merge the assets of the nation’s six state-owned telecommunication companies and form three groups in 2008, announcing a plan to issue licenses for high-speed 3G cell phone services after the restructuring.47 As part of the reorganization, China Netcom was fully incorporated into China Unicom in October 2008, reportedly completing the biggest merger in Chinese history.48 In January 2009, the MIIT issued three 3G licenses, with China Unicom and China Telecom receiving licenses for established 3G services and China Mobile authorized to carry a Chinese TD-SCDMA service, so far unproven, that has been a priority of research and development for the government.49

By sheer scope and range of topics—from online novels to video satires50—the Internet “cannot be ignored as a battleground for spreading public opinion” and sentiment.51 Frequently, incidents that go viral (gaining widespread popularity by virtue of being shared on the Internet), are then catapulted into national prominence. These online phenomena also frequently lead to calls for government action and response. According to journalism professor Hu Yong, dedicated coverage by online portals, extensive commentary on discussion forms, and the potency of Internet rumors that reverberate back into traditional media are driving convergence in the communications industry—especially in spawning “new media events” that often result in consequences for the officials, businesspeople, or celebrities involved.52 In an unpublished investigative report obtained by David Bandurski of the China Media Project, the vice president of People’s Daily Online said that of the secret internal reports sent up to the Central Party Committee each year, two-thirds of the few hundred reports given priority and action by top leaders are from the Internet Office of the State Council Information Office.53

The rising prominence of collective efforts over the Internet to target and expose personal data,54 known as “human flesh search engines,” appear to serve a voracious appetite within the Chinese online community for personal accountability. According to Xinhua, the phenomenon had its origins in 2001, when a man posted a picture of a woman he claimed to be his girlfriend on the portal Mop.com, and other Internet users identified her as a model for Microsoft, proving him a liar.55 Human flesh search engines can initiate investigations as straightforward as looking for missing relatives, but sometimes stray into questionable acts of vigilantism involving threats and harassment. In the years since, the human flesh search engines have scored a series of successes in identifying corrupt officials who have acted shamefully or abused their office (and are often subsequently punished), but they have also attacked private individuals engaging in perceived distasteful behavior.56 They are capable of launching campaigns against people like Grace Wang, a Chinese student at Duke University who was filmed in April 2008 attempting to referee between two opposing groups of protesters at a “Free Tibet” action on campus.57 After the video was posted on YouTube and other Web sites, the online reaction was swift: she was lambasted in Chinese-language discussion forums and portals for being “brainwashed” and a “race traitor,” among other things, and her parents living in China went into hiding after threats were painted on their apartment.58

At times, online activity has tested this relationship between citizens and government on a range of sensitive issues. Signed by over 300 Chinese activists, scholars, lawyers, and others, Charter 08 was issued online on December 9, 2008 as a manifesto inspired by the founding of Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia in 1977.59 It called for the protection of human rights, an independent judiciary, a republican system of “one person, one vote,” and other comprehensive reforms.60 Charter 08 provoked a clear response from authorities, who questioned or detained more than one hundred of the original signatories, including Liu Xiaobo, a well-known dissident who was detained without process on December 8 and continues (as of May 13, 2009) to be held at an unknown location.61 However, through circulation by e-mail and other means, Charter 08 had garnered more than 7,000 signatures as of early 2009.62

Beyond the hot-button incidents that carry news cycles,63 the interaction between top-down media supervisory structures and a more porous and unpredictable online sphere have also contributed to the rise of a number of phenomena unique to the Chinese cybersphere. The so-called Fifty Cent Party, a term referring to an estimated 280,000 web commentators nationwide who zealously support the CCP and were initially rumored to net 50 cents per post, are directly organized by the government to “guide” online public opinion.64 It had its origins at Nanjing University in 2005, where students were recruited with work-study funds to advocate the Party line on an online student forum, and has been institutionalized to the extent that the Ministry of Culture developed Web commentator trainings (complete with exams and job certification) and major Web sites are required to have in-house teams of these government-trained commentators.65 Thus, while the government continues to aggressively intervene in news media coverage, these Fifty Cent Party members are proliferating because the Party has also come to recognize the potential benefits of a public relations approach to online discourse.

Legal and regulatory frameworks

Although China’s constitution formally guarantees freedom of expression and publication,66 the protection of human rights,67 legal and administrative regulations ensure that the Chinese Communist Party will be supported in its strategy of strict supervision of all forms of online content. The Internet has been targeted for monitoring since before it was even commercially available,68 and the government seems intent on keeping regulatory pace with its growth and development.

Underlying all regulation of the Internet is a pantheon of proscribed content. Citizens are prohibited from disseminating between nine and eleven categories of content that appear consistently in most regulations;69 all can be considered subversive and trigger fines, content removal, and criminal liability.70 Illegal content, although broadly and vaguely defined, provides a blueprint of topics the government considers sensitive, including: endangering national security and contradicting officially accepted political theory, conducting activities in the name of an illegal civil organization, or inciting illegal assemblies or gatherings that disturb social order.71

Campaigns directed at cracking down on the perceived harmful societal effects of Internet development have been both publicly mobilized and opaquely implemented, but the latter are no less of a reality. The severity of Internet content control also fluctuates during different time periods, especially those buffering politically sensitive events. For example, an official announcement from the General Administration of Press and Publications that, “a healthy and harmonious environment for a successful 17th Party Congress” would be encouraged by stamping out “illegal news coverage” and “false news,” precipitated a crackdown on political news reporting, commentary, and Internet discussion through the close of the Party Congress in October.72 In those sensitive months, authorities closed 18,401 “illegal” Web sites and targeted Internet data centers, the physical computers that private firms rent to offer online interactive features.73

On January 5, 2009, seven ministries (including the Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of Culture) were convened by the State Council Information Office (SCIO) to discuss selected activities for repairing the flood of “vulgar” (disu) content on the Internet that harms the minds and bodies of youth.74 The crackdown was soon extended to include cell phone messages, online games and novels, videos and radio programs; by January 23, China Internet Illegal Information Reporting Centre (CIIRC) had received nearly 19,000 reports of harmful content, leading authorities to shut down 1,250 illegal Web sites and to delete more than three million items.75 The targeting of vulgar and pornographic content also netted some political casualties, notably the blog service provider Bullog.cn (Niubo), founded in 2006 by blogger Luo Yonghao. Bullog, which had become an important platform for liberal-leaning intellectuals and political bloggers, was shut down on January 9, 2009 for “picking up harmful information on political and current affairs.”76 Its closure was linked to its status as the leading domestic circulator Charter 08,77 as it had already survived a suspension in October 2007 during the 17th Communist Party Congress, and the purging of multiple high profile blogs.78 By April 2009, Luo had migrated the site as Bulloger.com to a server overseas, which was accessible only by proxy server and “unlikely ever to be allowed to exist in China.”79

In addition to campaigns dedicated to “strict supervision” of online providers in order to curb various types of “harmful” information,80 the government has managed to develop a relatively comprehensive strategy for managing online media. Since 2004, when essays and articles posted online began to be restricted more systematically, government supervision has evolved to rely largely on informal controls within official structures and stringent formal regulation. Nevertheless, it has been a challenge for the Chinese government to establish the same level of control over the Internet and online media as it has over the traditional media, due to factors including the relative decentralization of government supervision, the scale and viral possibilities of content available online, and the greater number of non-state actors.

A major development in Chinese cyberspace since 2005 has been the flourishing of online news media, which now ranks among the top online activities and reached 234 million Internet users in 2008.81 Not only do Chinese users cite the Internet as their most important source for information, more important than television and newspapers, but the national information clearinghouse on information technology, the China Internet Network Information Center, acknowledges that “the report[ing] of major events, such as the Olympics, has enabled network[ed] media to stand on a par with mainstream media.”82 Supervision of the media, previously executed primarily by the Propaganda Department of the CCP, has been split with the SCIO, whose local branches have supervisory responsibility over Internet content.83 For example, most major online content providers and portals are registered in Beijing, and thus are managed by the Beijing Internet Information Administration Bureau under the Beijing Information Office. Web sites and content providers have been reported to operate with greater or lesser levels of freedom depending on where they are registered.84

Any organization transmitting content electronically about current politics, economic issues and other public affairs must abide by the 2005 Provisions on the Administration of Internet News Information Services (Internet News regulations).85 These regulations introduced a complex regulatory scheme with the result that only news originating from state-supervised news outlets could be posted online. Government-licensed and authorized news agencies are limited to covering specific subjects approved by the state,86 but at least are allowed to conduct original reporting on “current events news information,” defined as “reporting and commentary relating to politics, economics, military affairs, foreign affairs, and social and public affairs, as well as reporting and commentary relating to fast-breaking social events.”87 All Web sites that are non-governmental entities, or otherwise not licensed news agencies, are restricted from performing any journalistic function, limiting them to reprinting content from central news outlets or media under the direct control of provincial governments.88 In practice, major portals are not permitted to repost many articles published by print media online.

To discipline media, government ministries and Party organs use both formal controls, such as policies and instructions and defamation liability, and informal mechanisms, including editorial responsibility for content, economic incentives, intimidation, and other forms of pressure.89 Generally, authorities prefer to issue instructions advising on topics to be censored informally via SMS, chat, e-mail or at regular meetings with editors. Coverage of politically sensitive events is zealously managed at every stage in order to reduce the risk of exposure to the smallest possible degree.90 This management includes prior bans on publication and time limits for obeying instructions, as well as “guidance” that serves a more propagandistic function, including instructions on whether to place news, when to place news, where to place it, and in what form it should be publicized. When “mass incidents” or major events such as the 2008 Olympic Games reach their conclusion, the grasp loosens over time, but remains an unrelenting presence.

Despite the challenges and intense resources required to effectively police online media, many of these formal and informal controls have nevertheless been extended to Chinese cyberspace. China's legal framework for Internet access and usage is achieved by the participation of state and non-state actors at all institutional levels.91 Control over Internet expression and content is multilayered and achieved by distributing criminal and financial liability, licensing and registration requirements, and self-monitoring instructions to non-state actors at every stage of access, from the ISP to the content provider and the end user. Some of these blunt and frequently applied methods include job dismissals; the closure of Web sites, often by their Web hosting service, for a broad array of infractions;92 and the detention of journalists, writers, and activists. In 2008, forty-nine individuals were known to be imprisoned for online activities,93 including several (such as Huang Qi and Du Daobin) serving their second period of detention for Internet-related crimes.94 Internet users have also been targeted for posting photographs and other multimedia online.95 For example, journalist Qi Chonghuai was questioned by police about an article he co-wrote about a corrupt local official and photographs of a luxurious government office building on the anti-corruption online forum of the Xinhua News Agency, before being sentenced to four years imprisonment on fraud and extortion charges.96 Schoolteacher Liu Shaokun was detained on June 25, 2008 and sentenced to one year reeducation-through-labor for posting pictures of school buildings that collapsed in the Sichuan earthquake online.97

ICPs, such as BBS and other user-generated content sites, are directly responsible for what is published on their service.98 All services providing Internet users with information that fail sufficiently to monitor their Web sites and report violations, or produce, publish, or distribute harmful information, face fines and other serious consequences, including shutdown, criminal liability, and license revocation.99 The government has used this approach to bring social media like video sharing sites in line with the larger governing framework for Internet content regulation. The Provisions on the Management of Internet Audio and Video Programming Services (“Video Regulations”), effective January 1, 2008, were a further refinement of the government’s attempt to create a sustainable “walled garden” of self-policed local-language content for the Chinese cybersphere.100 Jointly issued by the broadcast media regulator State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT) and the MIIT, the regulations require video service providers that produce their own content to obtain both a broadcast production license as well as rarely-issued Internet news information services licenses regulated by the MIIT.101 Correspondingly, video sites are also prohibited from allowing any individuals to upload content pertaining to “current events” news without a special license.102

In addition to the types of illegal content routinely proscribed in Internet regulations, SARFT issued a notice on March 30, 2009 detailing twenty-one unusually specific and wide-ranging additional content categories that online video providers should edit or delete.103 These include distortions of Chinese culture and history; disparaging depictions of revolutionary leaders, heroes, police, army or judiciary; depictions of torture; mocking depictions of catastrophe, including major natural disasters; excessively frightening images and sounds effects; and “sexually suggestive or provocative content that leads to sexual thoughts.”104 The notice also mandates providers to improve their content administration systems by hiring personnel to review and filter content, especially online music videos and other video entertainment, original content, and even netizen reporters (paike).105

For the first time, individuals are singled out in the Video Regulations, so that "primary investors" and "managers" can be fined up to 20,000 RMB or barred from engaging in similar services for five years for violations such as not sufficiently policing content or changing shareholders without going through specified procedures.106

Implementation of these regulations has been uneven, a trademark of many laws in China. A significant degree of uncertainty was also created by the inaugural requirement that online video service providers be either wholly state-owned (as defined in Article 65 of the 2005 Company Law) or entities where the state holds the controlling interest, until the government clarified in February 2008 that this provision did not apply to already established Web sites.107 Initially, twenty-five video sharing portals were shut down (including 56.com), and another thirty-two video sharing websites including Tudou.com - China's largest video-sharing portal - were warned for hosting improper material in March 2008.108 The third-largest Chinese video sharing site, 56.com, went offline mysteriously in June 2008 for more than a month,109 while Youku.com received a license from SARFT in July 2008.110

Technical filtering associated with the so-called Great Firewall of China is only one tool of informal control applied in China. For example, to manage the explosion of the Chinese blogosphere, which reached 162 million blogs at the end of 2008,111 blog service providers must not only install filters that do not allow the posting of potentially thousands of keyword combinations, but also flag certain posts for review. Comment sections, forums, and other interactive features that pose a higher risk of containing sensitive content can be shut off, while posts can be deleted or concealed by the provider so that only the author can see them.112 Bloggers who are considered to have written too many troublesome posts can have their accounts cancelled at will.

The unfolding of one mass incident presents a crucial case study on the range of online and media strategies to gather and communicate information, as well as government attempts to manage them. On June 22, 2008, the body of middle school student Li Shufen was found in the Ximen River in Weng’an county, Guizhou province.113 Although authorities declared her death to be caused by accidental drowning, her family believed that she was a victim of a crime and pressed for an investigation. Rumors circulated that relatives of the country Party secretary and police chief were among the people Li was with on the night of her death, one of whom said she jumped suddenly while he was doing pushups.114 Less than a week later, a group of hundreds of marchers heading towards government offices morphed into a crowd of up to 30,000 rioters, who surrounded a police headquarters and set fire to buildings and police vehicles.115 For a week, local officials were silent and only one piece of news was released by the official Xinhua News Agency, describing protesters as “some people who did not know about the exact context of what had happened.”116 In contrast to the silence of state-run media, numerous photos and video clips of the rioting appeared immediately on blogs and various online forums such as Tianya and the People’s Daily Strong China forum, while unconfirmed and conflicting stories about the girl’s death were circulated on the Internet.117 Angry netizens and Web site moderators dueled vigorously, with users posting in increasingly oblique and creative ways and Web sites aggressively deleting and blocking information about the incident.118 Furthermore, although hundreds of video clips appeared on YouTube, Chinese users could not access certain videos about the incident, while none appeared on two of biggest China’s domestic video sharing sites, Tudou.com and Uume.com.119 Soon after, state-run media began reporting more news and official announcements regarding the Weng’an riot on Chinese news sites, but without allowing Internet users to leave comments. Other media attempting to cover the story were compelled to apply for special press passes in order to secure interviews, which were then attended by local officials.120 By early July, state media was providing updates on the girl’s cause of death and confirming that four officials had been fired as a result of the incident.121

At the same time, because these compulsory control mechanisms are actually implemented through informal processes, provider-based content control is neither narrow nor entirely predictable. A study of Chinese blog service providers demonstrated that there is substantial variation in censorship methods, the amount of content censored, and providers’ transparency about deleting or de-publishing content.122 Similar findings were reached in a Citizen Lab study of four popular search engines in China, which found significant variations in the level of transparency about filtering, actual content censored, and methods used, suggesting that there is not a comprehensive system for determining censored content.123 While Google and Microsoft, which are hosted outside China, actually de-listed certain search results, the two search engines hosted inside China, Yahoo! and Baidu, ran their Web crawlers behind the China’s filtering system, and therefore did not index Web sites already blocked by the Chinese government. Although Google censored considerably less that the other search engines, it also has a practice of prioritizing authorized local content, which researcher Nart Villeneuve found amplified the significance of the censored Web sites as they were the only ones to offer differing viewpoints.124 Indeed, the complexity of these informal control mechanisms was further revealed in April 2009, when an employee of China’s leading search engine, Baidu.com, leaked a folder containing the substance and flow of internal censorship.125 These included lists of topics, keywords, URLs to be blocked, and banned forums, as well as guidelines for employee monitoring work, censorship of the popular Baidu forums, and information that should be banned.126

The government’s filtering practices can cause considerable anger amongst China’s Internet users, especially when entire platforms or tools such as RSS feed sites or Twitter are blocked.127 The uses of social media form the building blocks for what blogger Isaac Mao calls “sharism,” where the ‘co-computing of people, networks, and machines” form a networked pipeline system to spread information in the face of Internet crackdowns.128

Due to a wide range of factors – from economic incentives and demographic factors of the online community to the dragnet of legal liability – the impact of self-censorship is likely enormous and increasingly public, if difficult to measure. Furthermore, the efforts of industry organizations at self-discipline are not entirely removed from government oversight. In promoting “Internet cooperation,” officials place self-discipline hand-in-hand with admonitions to abide by Chinese laws.129 The CIIRC encourages the reporting of “illegal” or “harmful” information and is sponsored by the Internet Society of China, formally registered as a civil society organization.130 Yet, the CIIRC cited Baidu and Google’s Web and image search engines for returning a large number of obscene and pornographic links as part of an announced official crackdown on obscene and pornographic content in January 2009. Google and Baidu were among a total of nineteen Web sites singled out for harmful, vulgar content available to minors, including, Sina.com, Sohu.com, Wangyi, and Tianya.131

The Chinese constitution protects people’s right to criticize and make suggestions to any state organ.132 However, a few cases of alleged online defamation publicized in spring 2009 exemplify how the Internet is illuminating some of the complexities of influence and power in the relationships between media, different levels of government, and citizens seeking justice.

Land requisitions for commercial development by local governments in China, where farmers are often inadequately compensated for land and suffer significant losses in income, are a common problem of poor governance and an inadequate legal system.133 After petitions and other attempts to protect concerned farmers’ legal rights had failed, Wu Baoquan and Wang Shuai were detained for their online criticism of local government land seizures.134 In 2007, Wu had posted information and conducted his own investigation about a land requisition in Ordos, Inner Mongolia, where officials forced residents off their land in order to sell it to developers. In these land requisitions, they earned exorbitant profits while paying compensation well below market rates to the farmers.135 Wu was tried twice for criminal defamation and ultimately had his sentence increased to two years, although the same court that affirmed his conviction decided to review his case in April 2009.136

Wang Shuai was the author of a satirical blog post suggesting officials from his hometown, Lingbao City in Henan Province, had misappropriated funds for combatting drought by carrying out policies that actually encouraged drought in order to drive down land values and justify paying farmers less compensation for land requisitions.137 He was detained in Shanghai by Lingbao officials on March 6, 2009, and released on bail only after he signed a written confession and his family agreed to cut down their fruit trees, reducing the compensation they would receive for their land.138 As is often the case, it took media attention, this time through a story in the national China Youth Daily newspaper, to spark the online public scrutiny that would influence the outcome of Wu’s case. In this instance, higher Party officials issued an apology (from the Henan province chief of public security), compensated Wang for his eight days in detention, and fired the local Party secretary and punished three other officials.139

Neither Wang nor Wu were journalists using a professional platform to disseminate information, but media were in large part responsible for exponentially expanding public awareness and discourse online on their cases.

The first litigation to be launched over human flesh search engines also tested how Internet libel would be dealt with under Chinese law. A Beijing woman named Jiang Yan had committed suicide in December 2007, months after learning about her husband Wang Fei’s infidelity.140 According to her instructions, posts from the blog diary she left recounting her ordeal were published posthumously by major Web portals, and Wang’s anonymous human flesh search engine critics went to work publishing her husband’s name, address, and other personal details.141 In March 2008, after he was publicly condemned, harassed, and fired from his job, Wang sued the classmate of his wife who had posted her blog on his Web site and the portals Daqi.com and Tianya. In December, after convening a rare panel of fifty-four judges, a Beijing court ruled in Wang’s favor, finding that the classmate and Daqi.com violated Wang’s rights of privacy and reputation, ordering them to pay a total of almost USD1200 in damages for emotional distress, remove the posts, and apologize.142 However, since Wang admitted to his infidelity, the court did not find that Wang had been slandered. It also exonerated Tianya, which had acted “appropriately” by deleting a user post containing Wang’s personal information upon his request.143 Interestingly, after issuing its judgment the Beijing district court held a press conference to recommend that the MIIT use technology to monitor Internet speech and prevent similar infringements.144

While one legal scholar argued that the Chinese legal system “weighs privacy pretty heavily against free speech, even when the speech is truthful,”145 the relatively low fine may not act as quite as strong a deterrent as plaintiffs like Wang may desire. However, the legal system has become increasingly responsive to those who feel victimized by the human flesh search engines, especially corrupt officials. In March 2009, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress approved an amendment to the Criminal Law that would punish government and corporate employees with access to personal data to illegally obtain, sell or leak such information, while Xuzhou city in Jiangsu province became the first jurisdiction to prohibit the dissemination of others’ personal information on the Internet.146

Surveillance

The government has continued to refine Internet surveillance mechanisms to closely track individuals’ online activities.147 In November 2006 the Ministry of Public Security announced the completion of the essential tasks of constructing the first stage of its “Golden Shield” project, which is a digital national surveillance network with almost complete coverage across public security units nationwide.148 Despite the vagueness of public pronouncements on the implementation of the Golden Shield, the surveillance efforts of local governments, as well as organizations delegated responsibility for surveillance such as schools and ICPs, are clearly becoming more sophisticated. Since 2006, local governments have been developing “Safe City” surveillance and communications networks that connect police stations, through IP video surveillance, security cameras and back-end data management facilities, to specific locations including Internet cafés, financial centers, and entertainment areas.149 Private firms known as “censorship entrepreneurs” have also jumped into the fray, providing advanced text mining solutions to enable censors to monitor, forecast and “manage” online public opinion, thereby avoiding scandalous and damaging revelations such as the Internet post in June 2007 that exposed how children were kidnapped and forced into slave labor at illegal brick kilns in Shanxi province.150 One company featured by international media, TRS Information Technology, claims to be the “leading search and content management technology and software provider in China,” serving over 90 percent of the State Council ministries, 50 percent of newspaper press groups, and 300 universities and colleges.151 Although TRS disclosed that its high-end surveillance systems had been generally adopted by police – specifically that the company had installed data-mining systems at eight Shanghai police stations so that one Internet police officer could now do the work of ten – TRS does not list the Ministry of Public Security as one of its “famous customers.”152

Chinese law offers few viable protections for individual privacy, although clauses in most Internet laws and regulations do technically provide for the confidentiality of user information. The exceptions, however, are more important. For example, regulations on the management of e-mail services provide that e-mail service providers are duty-bound to keep personal information and e-mail addresses of users confidential, and may not disclose them except with user consent or when authorized for national security reasons or criminal investigations according to procedures stipulated by law.153 When required by law for reasons involving national security and in criminal investigations, most Internet regulations allow for disclosure of user information. However, they typically fail to specify what formal procedures are required or what evidentiary standards must be met for the disclosure of information. In practice, as has been demonstrated in a number of cases,154 all ISPs and ICPs must not only capitulate to Chinese government demands for censoring content, but are also required to assist the government in monitoring Internet users and recording their online activities. Requests to turn over personal data are often informal or provide little detail, and providers have no discretion to refuse turning over information to public security officials.155

Real-name registration
Registration requirements are often the first step to monitoring citizens’ online activities. Although this rule is not enforced, new subscribers to ISPs have been expected to register with their local police bureaus since 1996.156 In March 2005, as part of a CCP campaign to exercise tighter control over culture, education and media, all university BBS’ were ordered to block off-campus users and require users to re-register with their personal identifying information when going online, eliminating online anonymity.157 The city of Hangzhou was slated to become the first in China to require real-name web registration for users to participate in local chat rooms or online forums, but these regulations were put on hold in May 2009.158 The momentum for real-name systems might be stronger with cell phones, however. In January 2009, Beijing Mobile announced that it would begin requiring customers to show identification when purchasing its Easyown pre-paid SIM cards (which amount to 70 percent of the customers on China Mobile, the nation’s largest carrier) and limit purchases to three per person.159

Data retention
ISPs and ICPs in China must fulfill data retention obligations. ISPs are required to record important data (such as identification, URLs visited, length of visit, and activities) about all of their users for at least sixty days and to ensure that no illegal content is being hosted on their servers.160 While 78 percent of users in China connect from home, 42 percent of users also use Internet cafés as a main access location.161 However, since 2002, Internet access through Internet cafés has heavily been regulated: all cafés are required to install filtering software, ban minors from entering, monitor the activities of their users, and record every user's identity and complete session logs for up to sixty days.162 In many cities, they are also connected by live video feed to local police stations. The providers of electronic bulletin services, including bulletin board services, online discussion forums, chat rooms, et cetera are required to monitor the contents of information released in their service system, time of release, URL or domain name, and keep it for sixty days.163

Owned by Tencent, QQ is China’s most popular instant messenger, and this service was found to have installed a keyword blocking program in their client software to monitor and record users’ online communication, offering it to the police if required.164

Filtering and surveillance are often complementary processes, especially when ISPs and ICPs that are liable for the activities of their users delegate human monitors to monitor and flag content for further review or deletion. Online communications via e-mail and instant messaging (such as QQ and Skype) are also examined and monitored by government.165 In October 2008, a joint report by the Information Warfare Monitor and ONI Asia provided a chilling example of the possibilities for surveillance conducted by non-state actors on a massive scale.166 TOM-Skype, the Chinese-marketed version of the chat and texting software Skype, kept over a million user records in seven types of log files, including IP addresses, usernames, and time and date stamps in all the log files that could be decrypted. All of these log files, along with the information required to decrypt these log ?les, were kept on publicly-accessible servers. For call information logs dating from August 2007, the username and phone number of the recipient was also logged, while content filter logs dating from August 2008 also contained full texts of chat messages (which themselves contained sensitive information such as e-mail addresses, passwords, and bank card numbers). Of the eight TOM-Skype surveillance servers traced by researcher Nart Villeneuve, one server hosted a special version designed for use in Internet cafés and contained log files and the censored keyword list, while another contained logs for TOM Online’s wireless services.

The TOM-Skype surveillance system was triggered when a TOM-Skype user sent or received messages containing a banned keyword listed in a keyfile, and those messages are then stored in log files on a TOM-Skype server. Within the content of these messages stored in the file logs, when filtered out to eliminate English language obscenities, almost 16 percent contain the word ‘communist,’ 7 percent the word ‘falun,’ and 2.5 percent contained ‘Taiwan independence.’ However, the logged messages also made reference to other content outside the range of these long-sensitive topics, such as earthquake and milk powder.167

Furthermore, the data also contained personal information of Skype users that interacted with TOM-Skype users. Users who attempt to access www.skype.com from China are redirected to skype.tom.com. While Skype claimed that TOM fixed the security breaches within twenty-four hours of the report’s publication,168 the report issued a warning for “groups engaging in political activism or promoting the use of censorship circumvention technology accessed through services provided by companies that have compromised on human rights.” From the information contained in the log files, it would be possible to conduct politically motivated surveillance by using simple social networking tools to identify the relationships between users.

Like all other ICPs, most bulletin boards and chat rooms assign personnel to monitor the content of messages.169 Messages submitted by users are censored by human censors and filtering systems before appearing online.170 In order to enhance the surveillance on bulletin board systems, since 2005, the users of campus bulletin boards have been mandated to re-register with their real identifying information before posting messages online.171

In recent years, serious concerns have been raised about the ability of the Chinese government to spy on the country’s 624 million cell phone subscribers: in 2008, one Chinese state-run cell phone company revealed that it had unlimited access to the personal data of their customers and hands the date over to Chinese security officials upon request.172 Since 2004, the Chinese government has been drafting legislation to regulate personal mobile phone communication, which would require all cell phone subscribers to register for mobile phone service with their real name and identification card.173 In addition, Chinese police have installed filtering and surveillance systems for mobile and short message service providers to block and monitor “harmful” short message communications.174 Anyone who distributes “harmful” message or rumors via short message service of mobile phones can be arrested and convicted.175

Cyberattacks

In 2008, organizations advocating for human rights in Tibet and China experienced escalated cyberattacks during politically explosive events, such as the crackdown on Tibetan protesters in March, and in the lead-up to the Olympic Games in August. The preferred method of these attackers was reportedly email viruses, which are more likely to be undetected by commercial anti-virus software because they are hand-crafted.176 From field research conducted at the offices of the Tibetan Government-in-exile in Dharamsala and several Tibetan missions abroad, researchers at the SecDev Group and the Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto discovered an extensive malware based cyber-espionage network that also used “contextually relevant emails” to gain “complete, real-time” control of at least 1,295 infected computers in 103 countries.177 This network, which they called GhostNet, sent emails to specific targets containing a Trojan called gHost RAT, which in taking full control of infected computers allowed GhostNet to search and download specific files and covertly operate attached devices such as microphones and web cameras. Among the high-value infections, comprising close to 30 percent of the computers affected, were many foreign affairs ministries, embassies, regional organizations (such as the ASEAN Secretariat) and news organizations. Although the complicity or awareness of Chinese authorities could not be conclusively established, researchers tracked the instances of gHost RAT to commercial Internet access accounts located on the island of Hainan in China.

ONI testing results

The ‘great firewall of China’ uses a variety of overlapping techniques for blocking content containing a wide range of material considered politically sensitive by the Chinese government. While China employs filtering techniques used by many other countries, including DNS (domain name system) tampering and IP (internet protocol) blocking, it is unique in the world for its system of Internet connections when triggered by a list of banned keywords. Known as a TCP reset, this content filtering by keyword targets content regardless of where it is hosted.

TCP reset filtering is based on inspecting the content of IP packets for keywords that would trigger blocking, either in the header or the content of the message. When a router in the Great Firewall identifies a bad keyword, it sends reset packets to both the source and destination IP addresses in the packet, breaking the connection.

China employs targeted yet extensive filtering of information that could have a potential impact on the Party’s control over social stability, and is therefore predominantly focused on Chinese-language content relating to China-specific issues. For the government, information constituting a threat to public order extends well beyond well-publicized sensitive topics, such as the June 1989 military crackdown, the Tibetan rights movement, and the Falun Gong spiritual organization (all of which are methodically blocked), and includes independent media and dissenting voices, as well as content on human rights, political reform, sovereignty issues, and circumvention tools.

Filtering during the 2008 Olympic Games
ONI monitored a shortlist of prominent blogs, Chinese-language and international news sites, advocacy organizations, and social media platforms continuously from late July to mid-September 2008. This period generally marked the one of most significant openings in access to information since ONI began monitoring Internet filtering in China in 2004, but the foundations of censorship based on control over domestic media and civil society remained.

In 2001, China issued this decree in its official bid for the 2008 Olympic Games: “There will be no restrictions on journalists in reporting on the Olympic Games.”178 This promise was significantly compromised, not only in China’s purported long-term attempt to build a more open and transparent media system,179 but also in the lack of transparency over its policy on access to online information.

At a press conference on July 28, the media director of the Beijing Olympic Committee responded to a Wall Street Journal reporter who physically displayed the filtering of certain websites on his laptop by denying anything was amiss.180 This time, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson laid part of the blame with the websites themselves, claiming they have problems making them “not easy to view in China.”181 Yet three days later, on July 31, the IOC admitted to accepting a deal with the Chinese government in which sensitive websites that were “not considered Games-related” would be blocked.182

During the Olympics, access was partitioned between the Olympics Main Press Center (MPC) in the Olympic Green and the Beijing International Media Center, the main press venue for non-IOC accredited journalists.183 ONI compared data from the MPC and other locations in Beijing, compiling a snapshot of Internet filtering in China leading up to the Olympics. ONI testing conducted at the MPC confirms that filtering of Internet content continued even for members of the foreign press through TCP reset keyword blocking and IP address blocking, the latter accounting for the vast majority of filtering at the MPC. For each test at the MPC, ONI tested at other locations in Beijing with broadband Internet access provided by China Netcom. Throughout this time period, filtering was nearly identical between the MPC and consumer-level access on China Netcom and China Telecom, indicating that the incrementally increased openness was implemented nationally.

Many sites that are routinely blocked by the Chinese government for containing politically sensitive content remained accessible from August 1 to at least mid-September 2008, including the website of human rights organizations (Article 19, China Labour Bulletin) and foreign-hosted Chinese-language news sites. Overseas news organizations such as the World Journal and the BBC News Chinese website were the main beneficiaries of China’s Olympic guarantees.

Even though the IOC acknowledged on July 31 that filtering would continue to take place, a number of websites blocked at the MPC on July 25 were accessible a week later, including Amnesty International, Chinese-language Wikipedia (zh.wikipedia.org), and an increased swath of independent media including Taiwan’s Liberty Times, the Hong Kong-based Apple Daily newspaper, Voice of America news, and Radio Free Asia (www.rfa.org) and its Chinese website.
However, RFA’s Tibetan and Uyghur language websites became inaccessible again around August 20. Although Flickr remained accessible throughout the testing period, two of its photo servers were filtered until mid-August. Most of the sites unblocked for the Olympics remained accessible until at least mid-September 2008 on China Netcom, although a few (including Amnesty International) were again blocked on China Telecom by September 15.

At the same time, ONI found that the sites being filtered frequently address tumultuous and controversial changes wrought in preparation for the Games, from crackdowns on civil society to the transformation of a capital city and other social upheavals. Thus, the majority of advocacy sites and politically ‘sensitive’ organizations remained blocked, sweeping across a broad range of issues from citizen journalism (www.zuola.com) to the Three Gorges Probe, as well as nearly all of the Tibetan exile advocacy groups. Groups staunchly critical of Chinese government policy, including the press freedom groups Reporters Without Borders and Freedom House, continued to be blocked. The status of certain news sites including the China Digital Times Internet news and information clearinghouse, and Boxun.com, a dissident news website that Chinese government officials reportedly look to as a source of internal news, remained unchanged. Furthermore, the accessibility of any website does not guarantee that content on that site will be available, as China’s practice of filtering keywords through a TCP reset appears as robust as ever.

On December 19, 2008, the website of The New York Times was reported blocked even as restrictions were lifted on the Chinese-language Web sites of the BBC, Voice of America and Asiaweek, which had been blocked earlier that week.184

In addition to testing during the Olympics period, ONI also conducted testing in late 2008 on two backbone providers, the state-owned telecoms China Unicom, (CU), formerly China Netcom, and China Telecom (CT), which between them provide coverage nationwide. Because both control access to an international gateway, URL filtering and domain name system (DNS) tampering implemented by CU and CT affect all users of the network regardless of ISP.

Nearly all of the DNS tampering was executed by CU, while CT blocked a number of human rights organizations, pornographic sites, and one Hong Kong-based publisher (mirrorbooks.com) using this method. CU also uses IP blocking to filter nearly 400 IP addresses. These correlated closely to sites blocked on CT through a method obscured to analysis, in which users were presented with an error page informing the user that a network error occurred while accessing the website. While the error page can appear in the case of legitimate network errors, the repeated appearance of the error page indicates blocking is taking place. CT also used a squid proxy to block a handful of websites, including several Flickr photo servers. While the two backbone providers showed less overlap in filtering methods when compared with 2006-2007, there continues to be almost complete correlation in blocking between CU and CT.

At time of testing, most international social media platforms were accessible, including Flickr, Blogspot, Wordpress, Facebook, and Twitter. In contrast to 2006-2007, when all individual Blogspot blogs tested were accessible on China Netcom and blocked or inaccessible on China Telecom, in 2008 CU and CT blocked nearly all of the same individual Blogspot blogs tested. Technorati continued to be blocked.

In late 2008, China had resumed blocking many Web sites that were blocked in 2006-2007 and made accessible during at least part of the Olympics period. These included the independent overseas news sites (The Liberty Times) and Radio Free Asia’s main website and its Mandarin, Uyghur, and Tibetan language sites. However, in contrast to 2006-2007, some of these websites were unreliably or intermittently accessible during December 2008 testing, possibly as a result of the TCP reset filtering method used. Sites blocked using the TCP reset included YouTube, Chinese-language Wikipedia, and BBC News.

A few sites that were accessible in 2006-2007 had been blocked by the time of testing in 2008, most notably Wikipedia, (en.wikipedia.org). The site Wikileaks was also blocked by both ISPs in 2008 testing.

The greatest variations in filtering patterns between 2006-2007 and 2008 occurred with Chinese-language news media Web sites, likely in continuity from the Olympics. As in 2006-2007, few international news organizations were filtered, and some formerly blocked (e.g. Voice of America News) were accessible. Notably, some prominent Chinese-language media blocked in 2006-2007 were accessible in 2008, including the World Journal, www.singtao.com, and the Apple Daily. However, a significant number of independent media representing different points on the political spectrum continued to be filtered.

In 2006-2007 and 2008, China filtered a significant portion of content specific to its own human rights record and practices. As such, only a few global human rights sites with a global scope continued to be filtered, including Human Rights and Freedom House. Article 19 and Human Rights First were no longer blocked in 2008, and filtering on Amnesty International was renewed after a hiatus during the Olympics period. A typical example of this targeting of China-related content is the differential treatment of two related organizations: while the Web site for the writers’ association PEN American Center hosted content on the jailed dissident and Charter 08 co-author Liu Xiaobo, it was accessible (www.pen.org) while the Chinese PEN Center (www.chinesepen.org), a site with both English and Chinese content, was blocked by both ISPs. The sites of watchdogs on Chinese rights defenders and labor rights continued to be blocked, as did a substantial number of rights organizations based in Hong Kong.

Certain targets for blocking continued to cut across political and social lines of conflict in 2008. The consistent filtering of Web sites supporting greater autonomy and rights protection for the Uyghur (http://www.uyghurcongress.org/), Tibetan, and Mongolian (http://www.innermongolia.org/) ethnic minorities is not surprising, as these issues have already been excluded from official discourse inside China. Nearly all of the overseas Tibetan organizations, which conduct a wide range of activities from news broadcasting for the Tibetan community to the Tibetan Youth Congress, which lobbies for full independence for Tibet. China also continued to block a substantial number of sites on religion, including the International Coalition for Religious Freedom, Catholic organizations, and sites on Islam in Arabic, including those presenting extremist viewpoints (http://www.alumah.com/).

In 2008, China continued to filter a significant number of sites presenting alternative or additional perspectives on its policies toward Taiwan and North Korea. For example, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) of Taiwan (http://www.dpp.org.tw/) is continually filtered. However, a number of sites with no political content but ending with the domain .tw were blocked, and Greenpeace Taiwan was the only country website of the organization blocked by both ISPs.

As in 2006-2007, the major exceptions to the focus on politically sensitive topics specific to China in 2008 were circumvention tools and pornography. A portion, though not a majority, of proxy tools and anonymizers in both the Chinese (http://gardennetworks.com/) and English languages (http://www.peacefire.org/) was blocked. The circumvention tool Psiphon is also blocked, along with the Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto and the Information Warfare Monitor, sister institutions engaging in research on circumvention and surveillance. Both ISPs also blocked a substantial amount of pornographic content.

Although the scope of Internet filtering in China extends far beyond the highly sensitive issues known as the “three Ts: Tibet, Tiananmen, and Taiwan,” the continued potency of these subjects evidently prompted the Chinese government to step up filtering of leading international websites and social media platforms in 2009. On March 24, 2009, Google officially confirmed that YouTube was blocked in China, from a steep drop in traffic on the evening of March 23 to “near zero” by March 24.185 Herdict.org also captured accounts providing evidence of a previous reported block of Youtube beginning on March 4, coinciding with the one-year anniversary of the crackdown on protests in Tibetan regions (during which YouTube was also reported blocked in March 2008) as well as the 50th anniversary of the Tibetan uprising of 1959. Blogspot became inaccessible around May 9,186 and on June 2, two days before the 20th anniversary of the June 4th military crackdown, Flickr, Twitter, live.com, and Hotmail were blocked in rapid succession.187

In May 2009, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) in China sent a notification to computer manufacturers of its intention to require all new PCs sold in China after July 1 to have filtering software pre-installed.188 The notice, jointly issued by the MIIT, the Civilization Office of the Central Communist Party Committee, and the Ministry of Finance, according to the PRC Government Procurement Law, mandates the procurement of all rights and services related to a designated software called “Green Dam Youth Escort” to be made available for free public use in accordance with the Government Procurement Law. Green Dam is a product of the Jinhui Computer System Engineering Co., which reportedly received 40 million RMB from the government for a year-long contract.189

The purported intent of the Green Dam software is to filter harmful online text and image content in order to prevent the effects of this information on youth and promote a healthy and harmonious Internet environment.190 However, researchers at the OpenNet Initiative and the Stop Badware project conducting an initial technical assessment of the software found that Green Dam’s filtering is not only ineffective at blocking pornographic content as a whole, but also includes unpredictable and disruptive blocking of political and religious content normally associated with the Great Firewall of China.191

As a computing tool Green Dam is far more powerful than the centralized filtering system China currently implements. It actively monitors individual computer behavior to the extent that its ‘language processing’ tool can institute extremely intrusive ‘kill’ action on sites if the content algorithm detects ‘inappropriate’ sensitive political or religious speech.192 These actions include the sudden termination of web browser tabs, whole browsers, and a wide range of programs including word processing and email. In order to enable this application layer monitoring, Green Dam installs components deep into the kernel of the computer operating system. Researchers also found that the killing of sites upon inappropriate keywords or URLs like “falundafa.org” extends to killing single letters that auto-complete in the location boxes and auto-complete lists in browsers. For example, if a user enters epochtimes.com into the location, the user will see the page briefly, see the warning box briefly, and then have the whole browser killed. But after the user restarts the browser, epochtimes.com will be in the browser history and therefore in the auto-complete list, so that the user may only have to type 'e' into the location box to trigger the appearance of epochtimes.com in the auto-complete list and cause Green Dam to kill the whole browser.193

The monopoly status granted to Jinhui is unprecedented, representing the first instance where a government mandated a specific filtering software product for use at a national level instead of performance standards that encourage consumer choice, security and product quality. The mandated procurement and pre-installation of Green Dam also adds a new and powerful control mechanism to the existing filtering system, in addition blocking already done at the international backbones and by individual online content providers. Distributing control mechanisms to end-users at the periphery allows the government to partially offload the burden of monitoring and blocking content to individual machines on the network, amounting to a “huge distributed super computer dedicated to controlling online content.”194

In addition to interfering with the performance of personal computers in an unpredictable way, the poor design of Green Dam also presents security risks that allow any web site the user visits to take control of the user’s computer, with the potential for malicious sites to steal private data and other illegal acts, or even turn every Chinese computer running Green Dam into a member of a botnet.195 The StopBadware Project at the Berkman Center confirmed that the application violates its Badware guidelines for software, as it does not disclose the filtering of political speech or the unexpected behavior of completely killing processes that contain such speech.196

Conclusion

The Chinese government has maintained a strict and vigorous approach towards Internet censorship, interfering with public knowledge and discourse through pervasive filtering practices and a multitude of non-technical methods. In 2008, China led the world with 300 million Internet users, and the sheer scale and expanding scope of online content presented a significant challenge for a government intent on maintaining social stability and order in China’s networked spheres. The 2008 Olympic Games held in Beijing had a net positive impact on access to information, but this has abated without continued international pressure for greater openness and transparency. The foundation of China’s information control framework continues to be built on ensuring domestic providers are responsible for filtering and monitoring hosted content. In fine-tuning this system China is also adopting subtler and more fluid controls, including attempts to promote a public relations approach to online commentary and news reporting as well as measures to distribute control mechanisms to end users through the procurement of filtering software on home computers.

Author: Stephanie Wang

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44. China Internet Network Information Center, “Twenty-third Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in China,” issued March 23, 2009, p. 29, http://www.cnnic.net.cn/uploadfiles/pdf/2009/3/23/131303.pdf.
45. China Internet Network Information Center, “Twenty-third Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in China,” issued March 23, 2009, p. 29, http://www.cnnic.net.cn/uploadfiles/pdf/2009/3/23/131303.pdf.
46. Paul Budde Communication Pty Ltd., “China-Telecommunications Infrastructure,” April 24, 2009.
47. Paul Budde Communication Pty Ltd., “China-Telecommunications Infrastructure,” April 24, 2009.
48. Xinhua News Agency, “China Netcom, China Unicom merger completed, biggest in country's history,” October 15, 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-10/15/content_10200183.htm.
49. Sumner Lemon, “After Years of Delays, China Finally Issues 3G Licenses,” IDG News Service, January 7, 2009, http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/156612/after_years_of_dela....
50. “Where there are River Crabs, there are Grass-Mud Horses” (nali you hexie, nali you caonima)” is based on plays on characters and meaning, forming a “law of Chinese cyberpolitics:” online censorship always meets resistance. See http://chinadigitaltimes.net/china/grass-mud-horse/.
51. China Internet Network Information Center, “Twenty-third Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in China,” issued January 2009 (Chinese), p. 3, http://www.cnnic.net.cn/uploadfiles/pdf/2009/1/13/92458.pdf.
52. Alice Xin Liu, “Hu Yong interview: the digital age, Orwell's "Newspeak" and Chinese media,” Danwei, April 16, 2009, http://www.danwei.org/media/hu_yong_interview.php.
53. David Bandurski, “China’s Guerrilla War for the Web,” Far Eastern Economic Review, July 2008, http://www.feer.com/essays/2008/august/chinas-guerrilla-war-for-the-web.
54. Lokman Tsui, “Day 2 4.1: Chen Lu, Human Flesh Search,” May 28, 2009, http://www.lokman.org/2009/05/28/day-2-41-chen-lu-human-flesh-search/.
55. Bai Xu and Ji Shaoting, “Human flesh search engine’: an Internet lynching?”, Xinhua News Service, July 4, 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-07/04/content_8491087.htm.
56. Ryan McLaughlin, “Human flesh search engines--crowd-sourcing "justice"” CNet Asia Blogs: The Tech Dynasty, January 28, 2009, http://asia.cnet.com/blogs/thetechdynasty/post.htm?id=63008617.
57. “Grace Wang,” YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zomgZuZoDoM.
58. National Public Radio, “Duke Student Targeted for Mediating Tibet Protest,” April 21, 2008, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=89803198.
59. Charter 08, Unofficial translation at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/22210 http://www.hrichina.org/public/contents/press?revision_id=89851&item_id=....
60. Charter 08, Unofficial translation at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/22210.
61. China Human Rights Defenders, “Over One Hundred Signatories Harassed Since Launch of Charter 08,” January 8, 2009, http://crd-net.org/Article/Class9/Class98/200901/20090108141140_12945.ht....
62. John Garnaut, “Late-night visit from police as Charter 08 support grows,” The Sydney Morning Herald, January 13, 2009, http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2009/01/12/1231608616941.html.
63. Roland Soong, “A Review Of The Chinese Internet In 2008,” EastSouthWestNorth blog January 24, 2009, http://www.zonaeuropa.com/20090124_1.htm.
64. David Bandurski, “China’s Guerrilla War for the Web,” Far Eastern Economic Review, July 2008, http://www.feer.com/essays/2008/august/chinas-guerrilla-war-for-the-web.
65. David Bandurski, “China’s Guerrilla War for the Web,” Far Eastern Economic Review, July 2008, http://www.feer.com/essays/2008/august/chinas-guerrilla-war-for-the-web.
66. Article 34, Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, amended March 14, 2004, by the 10th NPC at its 2nd Session, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html.
67. Article 33, Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, amended March 14, 2004, by the 10th NPC at its 2nd Session, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html.
68. See the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China for the Safety Protection of Computer Information Systems (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jisuanji xitong anquan baohu tiaoli), issued by the State Council on February 18, 1994.
69. The nine types of content that have been illegal to produce or disseminate since the earliest Internet Regulations are: 1) violating the basic principles as they are confirmed in the Constitution; 2) endangering state security, divulging state secrets, subverting the national regime, or jeopardizing the integrity of national unity; 3) harming national honor or interests; 4) inciting hatred against peoples, racism against peoples, or disrupting the solidarity of peoples; 5) disrupting national policies on religion, propagating evil cults and feudal superstitions; 6) spreading rumors, disturbing social order, or disrupting social stability; 7) spreading obscenity, pornography, gambling, violence, terror, or abetting the commission of a crime; 8) insulting or defaming third parties, infringing on legal rights and interests of third parties; and 9) other content prohibited by law and administrative regulations. Two categories of prohibited content were added in Article 19 of the Provisions on the Administration of Internet News Information Services (Internet News Information Services Regulations) (hulianwang xinwen xinxi fuwu guanli guiding), promulgated by the State Council Information Office and the Ministry of Information Industry on September 25, 2005. These two additional categories are 1) inciting illegal assemblies, associations, marches, demonstrations, or gatherings that disturb social order; and 2) conducting activities in the name of an illegal civil organization. Translation is available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=24396.
70. See, for example, Rules of the NPC Standing Committee on Safeguarding Internet Security (Quanguo renda changweihui guanyu weihu hulianwang anquan de guiding), issued by the NPC Standing Committee on December 28, 2000.
71. Article 19, Provisions on the Administration of News Information Services, issued by the Ministry of Information Industry and the State Council Information Office on September 25, 2005, http://www.isc.org.cn/20020417/ca315779.htm (Chinese), unofficial English translation at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=24396.
72. Human Rights Watch Press Release, “China: Media Chokehold Tightens Before Party Congress,” August 17, 2007, http://china.hrw.org/press/news_release/china_media_chokehold_tightens_b.... Michael Bristow, “China tightens grip ahead of congress,” BBC News, September 14, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6992946.stm ONI interview with online portal editor, October 2007.
73. Peter Ford, “Why China shut down 18,401 websites”, Christian Science Monitor, September 25, 2007, http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0925/p01s06-woap.html?page=1.
74. Xinhua News Agency, “Seven departments launch operation for fixing the spread of vulgarity on the Internet,” (qi bumen kaizhan zhengzhi hulianwang disu zhifeng xingdong), January 5, 2009, http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2009-01/05/content_1196447.htm.
75. Xinhua News Agency, “Porn crackdown to shield China's youth during holiday,” China.org.cn, January 23, 2008, http://www.china.org.cn/china/news/2009-01/23/content_17178010.htm.
76. Vivian Wu, “Popular Blog Service Provider Shut Down,” South China Morning Post, January 10, 2009.
77. John Garnaut, “Nervous China tightens grip on internet,” Sydney Morning Herald, January 12, 2009.
78. China Digital Times, “Bullog shut down,” January 9, 2009, http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2009/01/bullog-shut-down/.
79. Radio Free Europe, “China Closes 'Porn' Sites,” Radio Free Europe, April 1, 2009.
80. For example, In June 2006, the Information Office under the State Council and the MII embarked on a period of “strict supervision” of search engines, chat rooms, and blog service providers to curb the circulation of “harmful” information online. Xinhua News Agency, “China to tighten supervision over blogs, online search engines,” June 29, 2006. See also Howard French, “Chinese discuss plan to tighten restrictions on cyberspace ,” The New York Times, July 4, 2006.
81. China Internet Network Information Center, “Twenty-third Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in China,” issued March 23, 2009, p. 3 (Chinese version).
82. China Internet Network Information Center, “Twenty-third Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in China,” issued March 23, 2009, p. 35, http://www.cnnic.net.cn/uploadfiles/pdf/2009/3/23/131303.pdf.
83. David Shambaugh, CHINA’S PROPAGANDA SYSTEM: INSTITUTIONS, PROCESSES AND EFFICACY, THE CHINA JOURNAL, NO. 57, JANUARY 2007, p. 25-58.
84. Interview with editor of a national online portal, XX 2007. See also MacKinnon, Rebecca. "China’s Censorship 2.0: How companies censor bloggers" First Monday [Online], Volume 14 Number 2 (25 January 2009), http://www.uic.edu/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2378/....
85. Article 2, Provisions on the Administration of News Information Services, issued by the Ministry of Information Industry and the State Council Information Office on September 25, 2005, http://www.isc.org.cn/20020417/ca315779.htm (Chinese), unofficial English translation at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=24396.
86. Article 15, Provisions on the Administration of News Information Services, issued by the Ministry of Information Industry and the State Council Information Office on September 25, 2005, http://www.isc.org.cn/20020417/ca315779.htm (Chinese), unofficial English translation at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=24396.
87. Article 2, Provisions on the Administration of News Information Services, issued by the Ministry of Information Industry and the State Council Information Office on September 25, 2005, http://www.isc.org.cn/20020417/ca315779.htm (Chinese), unofficial English translation at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=24396.
88. Article 11, Provisions on the Administration of News Information Services, issued by the Ministry of Information Industry and the State Council Information Office on September 25, 2005, http://www.isc.org.cn/20020417/ca315779.htm (Chinese), unofficial English translation at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=24396.
89. See Benjamin Liebman, “Watchdog or demagogue? The media in the Chinese legal system,” The Columbia Law Review, January 2005, p. 41.
90. See Stephanie Wang and Robert Faris, “Welcome to the Machine,” Index On Censorship,. (Volume 37, Issue 2 May 2008), pages 106 – 113.
91. Anne S.Y. Cheung, THE BUSINESS OF GOVERNANCE: CHINA'S LEGISLATION ON CONTENT REGULATION IN CYBERSPACE, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, Fall 2005-Winter 2006, 38 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 1.
92. China Human Rights Defenders, Tug of War over China's Cyberspace: A Sequel to Journey to the Heart of Censorship (Part II), March 19, 2009, http://crd-net.org/Article/Class9/Class11/200903/20090319000543_14370.ht....
93. Reporters Without Borders, “2009 Annual Report: China,” http://www.rsf.org/en-rapport57-China.html.
94. China Human Rights Defenders, “Tug of War over China's Cyberspace: A Sequel to Journey to the Heart of Censorship (Part II),” March 19, 2009, http://crd-net.org/Article/Class9/Class11/200903/20090319000543_14370.ht....
95. Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “Annual report on Chinese Internet Surveillance (2007)” (Zhongguo Wangluo Jiankong Yu Fanjiankong Niandu Baogao), http://www.crd-net.org/Article/Class1/200807/20080710165332_9340.html.
96. Reporters Without Borders, “Journalist gets four years for exposing Communist Party corruption in Shandong”, May 2008, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=27034.
97. Human Rights in China Press Release, “Family Visits Still Denied to Sichuan School Teacher Punished after Quake-Zone Visit,” July 29, 2008, http://www.hrichina.org/public/contents/press?revision_id=66556&item_id=....
98. Article13, Rules on the Management of Internet Electronic Bulletin Services (Hulianwang dianzi gonggao fuwu guanli guiding), issued by the Ministry of Information Industry on October 7, 2000.
99. Article 20, Measures for Managing Internet Information Services (Hulianwang xinxi fuwu guanli banfa), issued by the State Council on September 25, 2000, effective October 1, 2000.
100. OpenNet Initiative blog, “China incentivizes self-censorship in regulation of online video,” January 4, 2008, http://opennet.net/blog/2008/01/china-incentivizes-self-censorship-regul....
101. Article 9, Provisions on the Management of Internet Audio and Video Programming Services, unofficial translation available at issued by the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) and the Ministry of Information Industry of the People’s Republic of China on December 20, 2007, effective January 31, 2008, unofficial translation available at http://opennet.net/news/china-provisions.
102. Article 2, Provisions on the Administration of News Information Services, issued by the Ministry of Information Industry and the State Council Information Office on September 25, 2005, unofficial English translation at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=24396.
103. SARFT Notice for Strengthening the Administration of Internet Audio and Video Programming Content (guangdian zongju guanyu jiaqiang hulianwang shiting jiemu neirong guanli de tongzhi), issued March 30, 2009, http://www.sarft.gov.cn/articles/2009/03/30/20090330171107690049.html.
104. Section 2(1-21), SARFT Notice for Strengthening the Administration of Internet Audio and Video Programming Content (guangdian zongju guanyu jiaqiang hulianwang shiting jiemu neirong guanli de tongzhi), issued March 30, 2009, http://www.sarft.gov.cn/articles/2009/03/30/20090330171107690049.html. Unofficial translation at Danwei, “New rules imposed on Internet video content,” April 1, 2009, http://www.danwei.org/media_regulation/new_rules_imposed_on_internet.php.
105. Section 3, SARFT Notice for Strengthening the Administration of Internet Audio and Video Programming Content (guangdian zongju guanyu jiaqiang hulianwang shiting jiemu neirong guanli de tongzhi), issued March 30, 2009, http://www.sarft.gov.cn/articles/2009/03/30/20090330171107690049.html. Unofficial translation at Danwei, “New rules imposed on Internet video content,” April 1, 2009, http://www.danwei.org/media_regulation/new_rules_imposed_on_internet.php.
106. Article 23, Provisions for the Management of Internet Audio and Video Programming Services, issued by the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) and the Ministry of Information Industry of the People’s Republic of China on December 20, 2007, effective January 31, 2008, unofficial translation available at http://opennet.net/news/china-provisions.
107. Paul Budde Communication Pty Ltd., “China-New Internet Economy,” April 24, 2009.
108. Interactive Investor, “China orders 8 more online video-sharing web sites to shut down”, May 2008, http://www.iii.co.uk/news/?type=afxnews&articleid=6721662&action=article.
109. Jonathan Richards, “‘Chinese YouTube’ shut down amid censor fears,” Times Online, June 20, 2008, http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/tech_and_web/article4179103... Loretta Chao, “Closure of Chinese Online-Video Site Sparks Concern,” The Wall Street Journal, June 20, 2008,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121390202591089267.html?mod=2_1567_leftb.... 56.com was issued an Internet video provider license in December 2008. Reuters, “Vobile Announces Commercial Deployment With Leading Video Sharing Website 56.com,” March 23, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS95209+23-Mar-2009+PRN200....
110. Steven Schwankert, “China Approves Video Site Youku's License,” July 10, 2008, IDG News Service, http://pcworld.about.com/od/interne1/China-Approves-Video-Site-Youk.htm.
111. China Internet Network Information Center, “Twenty-third Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in China,” issued March 23, 2009, p. 38, http://www.cnnic.net.cn/uploadfiles/pdf/2009/3/23/131303.pdf.
112. See Stephanie Wang and Robert Faris, “Welcome to the Machine,” Index On Censorship,. (Volume 37, Issue 2 May 2008), pages 106 – 113.
113. Roland Soong, “The Weng’an Mass Incident,” EastSouthWestNorth blog, July 1, 2008, http://www.zonaeuropa.com/20080701_1.htm.
114. Bob Chen, “China: Let's do push-up!” Global Voices Online, July 7, 2008, http://globalvoicesonline.org/2008/07/07/china-lets-do-push-up/.
115. Roland Soong, “The Weng’an Mass Incident,” EastSouthWestNorth blog, July 1, 2008, http://www.zonaeuropa.com/20080701_1.htm.
116. Xinhua News Agency, “Police station assaulted, torched by local people in southwest China county,” June 20, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-06/29/content_8456602.htm.
117. ONI blog, “China’s Net Nannies in full force after riot in Southern China,” July 2, 2008, http://opennet.net/blog/2008/07/china%E2%80%99s-net-nannies-full-force-a....
118. Jonathan Ansfield, “Guizhou Riots: How much steam can the machine filter?,” Newsweek blog, July 2, 2008, http://blog.newsweek.com/blogs/beijing/archive/2008/07/02/can-the-propag.... ONI blog, “China’s Net Nannies in full force after riot in Southern China,” July 2, 2008, http://opennet.net/blog/2008/07/china%E2%80%99s-net-nannies-full-force-a....
119. ONI blog, “China’s Net Nannies in full force after riot in Southern China,” July 2, 2008, http://opennet.net/blog/2008/07/china%E2%80%99s-net-nannies-full-force-a....
120. Roland Soong, “The Weng’an Mass Incident,” EastSouthWestNorth blog, July 1, 2008, http://www.zonaeuropa.com/20080701_1.htm.
121. “Final autopsy shows girl in southwest China protest drowned,” Xinhua, July 10, 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-07/10/content_8519852.htm.
122. Rebecca MacKinnon, "China’s Censorship 2.0: How companies censor bloggers" First Monday [Online], Volume 14 Number 2 (25 January 2009), http://www.uic.edu/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2378/....
123. Nart Villeneuve, Search Monitor Project: Toward a Measure of Transparency, June 2008, http://www.citizenlab.org/papers/searchmonitor.pdf.
124. Nart Villeneuve, Search Monitor Project: Toward a Measure of Transparency, June 2008, p. 19, http://www.citizenlab.org/papers/searchmonitor.pdf.
125. “Baidu’s Internal Monitoring and Censorship Document Leaked (1) (Updated),” China Digital Times, http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2009/04/baidus-internal-monitoring-and-cens....
126. See, e.g., http://chinagfw.org/2009/04/blog-post_5218.html.
127. “Chinese Censors Cut Off Twitter, Hotmail and Flickr (Updated),” China Digital Times, http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2009/06/chinese-censors-cut-off-twitter-hot....
128. Isaac Mao, “Meta: Great Firewall vs. Social Media,” March 6, 2009, http://www.isaacmao.com/meta/2009/03/great-firewall-vs-social-media.html.
129. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Liu Jianchao's Regular Press Conference on December 16, http://www.chinaconsulatechicago.org/eng/fyrth/t526582.htm.
130. See http://ciirc.china.cn/.
131. Xinhua News Agency, “Seven departments launch operation for fixing the spread of vulgarity on the Internet,” (qi bumen kaizhan zhengzhi hulianwang disu zhifeng xingdong), January 5, 2009, http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2009-01/05/content_1196447.htm.
132. Article 41, CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html.
133. See, e.g. China Digital Times, “China’s Emerging Land Rights Movement,” December 22, 2007, http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2007/12/chinas-emerging-land-rights-movemen....
134. Joshua Rosenzweig, “China's Battle Over the Right to Criticize,” May 1, 2009, http://www.feer.com/essays/2009/may/chinas-battle-over-the-right-to-crit....
135. Cai Ke, “Wrongly-jailed blogger fights for justice,” China Daily, May 20, 2009, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-05/20/content_7793902.htm.
136. “Update: Review Underway in Wu Baoquan's Case,” April 22, 2009, http://siweiluozi.blogspot.com/2009/04/update-review-underway-in-wu-baoq... http://siweiluozi.blogspot.com/search/label/Wang%20Shuai.
137. Joshua Rosenzweig, “China's Battle Over the Right to Criticize,” May 1, 2009, http://www.feer.com/essays/2009/may/chinas-battle-over-the-right-to-crit....
138. Joshua Rosenzweig, “China's Battle Over the Right to Criticize,” May 1, 2009, http://www.feer.com/essays/2009/may/chinas-battle-over-the-right-to-crit....
139. Joshua Rosenzweig, “China's Battle Over the Right to Criticize,” May 1, 2009, http://www.feer.com/essays/2009/may/chinas-battle-over-the-right-to-crit....
140. EastSouthWestNorth blog, “The First ‘Human Flesh Search’ Trial,” August 2, 2008, http://www.zonaeuropa.com/20080802_1.htm.
141. EastSouthWestNorth blog, “The First ‘Human Flesh Search’ Trial,” August 2, 2008, http://www.zonaeuropa.com/20080802_1.htm.
142. Reuters, “Man wins case vs ‘human flesh search engine’”, December 19, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/technologyNews/idUSTRE4BI1I620081219.
143. China Journal blog, “A Verdict in the Case of the ‘Human Flesh Search Engine,’” Wall Street Journal, December 19, 2008, http://blogs.wsj.com/chinajournal/2008/12/19/a-verdict-in-the-case-of-th....
144. Caijing.com, “Webmasters Found Guilty of Online Harassment,” December 22, 2008, http://english.caijing.com.cn/2008-12-22/110041383.html.
145. “Court decision in ‘human flesh search engine’ case,” January 13, 2009, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/china_law_prof_blog/2009/01/court-decis....
146. Xinhua News Agency, “Law urged to protect personal information,” March 4, 2009, Xinhua News Agency, “Law amendments adopted to protect personal information, punish bribe-taking relatives of officials,” February 28, 2008, http://www.china.org.cn/government/NPC_CPPCC_2009/2009-03/04/content_173... http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-02/28/content_10916168.htm; Li Xinran, “
Xuzhou shuts down 'human flesh search engine'” Shanghai Daily, January 20, 2009, http://www.shanghaidaily.com/sp/article/2009/200901/20090120/article_388....
147. Forbes, “Who will be watching you in Beijing?” http://www.forbes.com/travel/2008/07/08/olympics-security-privacy-forbes..., July 08, 2008.
148. Ministry of Public Security, “National Development and Reform Commission issues national approval for the ‘Golden Shield’ construction project at management conference,” (guojia fazgaiwei zhuchi zhaokai dahui tongguo “jindun gongcheng” jianshe xiangmu guojia yanshou) ?????????????“????”????????), November 17, 2006, http://www.mps.gov.cn/cenweb/brjlCenweb/jsp/common/article.jsp?infoid=AB.... See Greg Walton, China's Golden Shield: Corporations and the Development of Surveillance Technology in the People's Republic of China, a Rights and Democracy Report, October 2001, http://www.ichrdd.ca/english/commdoc/publications/globalization/goldenSh....
149. “Safe-City Project Home For New Chinese IP Video Surveillance Technology,” China Tech News, March 11, 2008, http://www.chinatechnews.com/2008/03/11/6475-safe-city-project-home-for-... “China Security & Surveillance Announces Additional Safe City Project Win in Yinchuan City,” Reutuers, June 30, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS125704+30-Jun-2008+PRN20....
150. Kathrin Hille, “China bolsters internet censors' scrutiny,” Financial Times, January 5 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f858f9aa-dac8-11dd-8c28-000077b07658,dwp_uuid=....
151. TRS Information Technology, http://www.trs.com.cn/en/TRS/about/.
152. TRS Information Technology, http://www.trs.com.cn/en/TRS/about/.
153. Article 3, Measures for the Management of Email Services (huliangwang dianzi youjian fuwu guanli banfa), issued by the Ministry of Information Industry on November 7, 2005, effective March 30, 2006.
154. Chinese cyber-dissidents and activists, such as the journalist Shi Tao, have been convicted in part because of some email service providers’ disclosure of their users’ personal information to the Chinese police. Reporters Without Borders, Press Release, “Cyber-dissident convicted on Yahoo! information is freed after four years,” November 9, 2006, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=8453. See also Human Rights in China Case Highlight, Shi Tao and Yahoo, at http://hrichina.org/public/highlight/index.html.
155. See Dui Hua News Blog, “Police Document Sheds Additional Light on Shi Tao Case,” July 25, 2007,
http://www.duihua.org/2007/07/police-document-sheds-additional-light.htm....
156. Human Rights Watch Backgrounder, Freedom of Expression and the Internet in China, http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/china-bck-0701.htm; Alfred Hermida, “Behind China's Internet red firewall,” BBC News Online, September 3, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/technology/2234154.stm.
157. Washington Post, “Chinese Crack Down On Student Web Sites”, March 24, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A61334-2005Mar23?language=print....
158. Xinhua News Agency, “Internet real-name registration system: Why so difficult to implement? An Investigation into the implementation of the Hangzhou Regulations for Network Security Protection,” May 19, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2009-05/19/content_11399392.htm; David Bandurski, “Xinhua: Hangzhou’s “real-name Web registration system” is “on the shelf”,” China Media Project, May 20, 2009, http://cmp.hku.hk/2009/05/20/1632/.
159. “Beijing Mobile’s Plan for Real Name Registration for Easyown Cell Phone Numbers,” China Digital Times, http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2008/01/beijing-mobiles-plan-for-real-name-....
160. Article 14, Measures for Managing Internet Information Services (Hulianwang xinxi fuwu guanli banfa), issued by the State Council on September 25, 2000, effective October 1, 2000.
161. China Internet Network Information Center, “Twenty-third Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in China,” issued March 23, 2009, p. 27 (Chinese version).
162. Articles 19, 21, 23, Regulations on the Administration of Business Sites Providing Internet Services (Hulianwang shangwang fuwu guanye changsuo guanli tiaolie), issued by the State Council on September 29, 2002, effective November 15, 2002.
163. Article 14, Rules on the Management of Internet Electronic Bulletin Services (Hulianwang dianzi gonggao fuwu guanli guiding), issued by the Ministry of Information Industry on October 7, 2000, effective.
164. Chinese Human Rights Defender, “How does government monitor our online communication?” (Zhengfu Ruhe Jiankong Women De Dianzi Wangluo Tongxu), http://crd-net.org/Article/Class1/200803/20080324093843_8168.html.
165. Chinese Human Rights Defender, “How does government monitor our online communication?” (Zhengfu Ruhe Jiankong Women De Dianzi Wangluo Tongxu), http://crd-net.org/Article/Class1/200803/20080324093843_8168.html.
166. Nart Villeneuve, BREACHING TRUST: An analysis of surveillance and security practices on China’s TOM-Skype platform, Information Warfare Monitor and ONI Asia Joint Report, October 1, 2008, http://www.infowar-monitor.net/breachingtrust/.
167. John Markoff, “Surveillance of Skype Messages Found in China,” The New York Times, October 1, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/02/technology/internet/02skype.html?pagew....
168. Sky Canaves, “Skype Responds to China Surveillance Report,” The Wall Street Journal Blogs-China Journal, October 2, 2008, http://blogs.wsj.com/chinajournal/2008/10/02/skype-response-on-china-sur....
169. Sumner Lemon, “China tightens surveillance of Internet forums,” The Standard, March, 2005, http://archive.thestandard.com/internetnews/002807.php.
170. Reporters Without Borders, “Living dangerously on the Net,” May, 2003, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=6793.
171. Washington Post, “Chinese crack down on student web sites”, March 24, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A61334-2005Mar23?language=print....
172. Australia Broadcasting Corporation, “China's mobile network: a big brother surveillance tool?,” January 28, 2008, http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/01/28/2147712.htm.
173. China Business Daily, “Regulation on the Management of Short Message Service will soon come into being,” (Tongxin Duanxiaoxi Fuwu Guanli Guiding Jijiang Chutai), March 27, 2008, http://www.txxxb.com/news/article.php?id=7544; Australia Broadcasting Corporation, “China's mobile network: a big brother surveillance tool?,” Jan 28, 2008, http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/01/28/2147712.htm; Also see Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “How does government monitor our online communication?” (Zhengfu Ruhe Jiankong Women De Dianzi Wangluo Tongxu), http://crd-net.org/Article/Class1/200803/20080324093843_8168.html.
174. China Business Daily, “Regulation on the Management of Short Message Service will soon come into being,” (Tongxin Duanxiaoxi Fuwu Guanli Guiding Jijiang Chutai), March 27, 2008, http://www.txxxb.com/news/article.php?id=7544; Australia Broadcasting Corporation, “China's mobile network: a big brother surveillance tool?,” Jan 28, 2008, http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/01/28/2147712.htm; Also see Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “How does government monitor our online communication?” (Zhengfu Ruhe Jiankong Women De Dianzi Wangluo Tongxu), http://crd-net.org/Article/Class1/200803/20080324093843_8168.html.
175. China Business Daily, “Regulation on the Management of Short Message Service will soon come into being,” (Tongxin Duanxiaoxi Fuwu Guanli Guiding Jijiang Chutai), March 27, 2008, http://www.txxxb.com/news/article.php?id=7544; Australia Broadcasting Corporation, “China's mobile network: a big brother surveillance tool?,” Jan 28, 2008, http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/01/28/2147712.htm; Also see Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “How does government monitor our online communication?” (Zhengfu Ruhe Jiankong Women De Dianzi Wangluo Tongxu), http://crd-net.org/Article/Class1/200803/20080324093843_8168.html.
176. Brian Krebs, “Cyber Attacks Target Pro-Tibet Groups,” Washington Post, March 21, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/21/AR200803....
177. Information Warfare Monitor, Tracking GhostNet: Investigating a Cyber Espionage Network, March 29, 2009, http://www.scribd.com/doc/13731776/Tracking-GhostNet-Investigating-a-Cyb....
178. Human Rights Watch, “China’s Olympian Human Rights Challenges: In the Words of Chinese Officials,” http://china.hrw.org/in_the_words_of_chinese_officials.
179. Xinhua News Agency, “Openness to foreign media to remain after Games, July 30, 2008, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-07/30/content_6890786.htm.
180. Jacquelin Magnay, “Fury vented at great firewall of China,” The Sydney Morning Herald, July 28, 2008,
http://www.smh.com.au/news/beijing2008/reporters-vent-fury-at-great-fire....
181. Katie Thomas, “Officials investigate reports of censorship at Olympic Press Center,” NYTimes Blog: 2008 Beijing Olympics and Paralympics, July 29, 2008, http://olympics.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/07/29/officials-investigate-repor....
182. Nick Mulvenney, “UPDATE 1-Olympics-IOC admits to deal with China on censorship,” Reuters, July 30, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/olympicsNews/idUSPEK15086520080730?sp=tru....
183. Xinhua News Agency, “Beijing Olympic press centers open,” July 8, 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-07/08/content_8509880.htm.
184. Keith Bradsher, “China Blocks Access to The Times’s Web Site,” The New York Times, December 19, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/20/world/asia/20china.html.
185. Miguel Helft, “YouTube Blocked in China,” New York Times, March 24, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/25/technology/internet/25youtube.html?_r=....
186. Herdict, “www.blogger.com in China,” http://www.herdict.org/web/explore/detail/id/CN/2488.
187. Tania Branigan, “China blocks Twitter, Flickr and Hotmail ahead of Tiananmen anniversary,” The Guardian (UK), June 2, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2009/jun/02/twitter-china.
188. See Rebecca MacKinnon, “Original government document ordering "Green Dam" software installation,” June 8, 2009, http://rconversation.blogs.com/rconversation/2009/06/original-government....
189. “Notice Regarding the Pre-Installation of “Green” Online Filtering Software on Computers (??????????????????,guanyu jisuanji yuzhuang luse shangwang guolu ranjian de tongzhi),” Ministry of Industry and Information Technology Notice No. 226 [2009], May 19, 2009, http://tech.sina.com.cn/it/2009-06-09/17073163327.shtml., unofficial translation at http://www.hrichina.org/public/contents/press?revision_id=169834&item_id... Xinhua News Agency, “Anti-porn filter software stirs up disputes in China,” June 11, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-06/11/content_11522822.htm.
190. “Notice Regarding the Pre-Installation of “Green” Online Filtering Software on Computers (??????????????????,guanyu jisuanji yuzhuang luse shangwang guolu ranjian de tongzhi),” Ministry of Industry and Information Technology Notice No. 226 [2009], May 19, 2009, http://tech.sina.com.cn/it/2009-06-09/17073163327.shtml.
191. OpenNet Initiative Bulletin, “China's Green Dam: The Implications of Government Control Encroaching on the Home PC,” June 12, 2009, http://opennet.net/chinas-green-dam-the-implications-government-control-....
192. Ibid.
193. Ibid. See also http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/hroberts/2009/06/12/china-bans-the-letter-f....
194. Ibid.
195. Scott Wolchok, Randy Yao, and J. Alex Halderman, "Analysis of the Green Dam Censorware System," Computer Science and Engineering Division, The University of Michigan, Revision 2.4, June 11, 2009, http://www.cse.umich.edu/~jhalderm/pub/gd/.
196. OpenNet Initiative Bulletin, “China's Green Dam: The Implications of Government Control Encroaching on the Home PC,” June 12, 2009, http://opennet.net/chinas-green-dam-the-implications-government-control-....

Pakistan

miriam — Thu, 10 May 2007 20:12:50 -0400

Background

Press freedom in Pakistan is restricted by the military-run government, headed by General Pervez Musharraf since 1999. In addition to applying military control over the judiciary and the ruling party in Parliament, print and electronic media have been censored where the content is deemed to be antigovernment or anti-Islamic. Government repression of media is particularly acute with regard to Balochi and Sindhi political autonomy, content considered blasphemous, and other antistate or antireligious content. A vibrant civil society movement working against Internet censorship continues to operate within Pakistan and monitors all developments in URL blocking.1 International human rights groups have reported on the persecution of journalists at the hands of the Pakistani military intelligence agency.2

Internet in Pakistan

Internet usage in 2005 is reported to be 10.5 million, with a 6.8 percent penetration rate.3 According to September 2006 estimates, there are approximately twelve million Internet users in Pakistan, at a 7.2 percent penetration rate.4 Pakistan has experienced considerable growth in its information communications technology (ICT) sector; in 2003 the government deregulated its telecom market, opening itself up to corporate competition in telephone, mobile, and Internet services.5 Internet access is widely available at cybercafés, which accommodate many lower-income and casual users. Rates for usage range from USD0.15/hour to upward of USD0.50/hour, depending on location and amenities. Although the Net Café Regulation Bill 2006 requires Internet cafés to monitor their patrons, there is currently no effective mechanism to verify compliance or enforce this law.6 Athough Net café managers are expected to monitor the activities in their establishments, based on user experience these cafés appear to be unregulated by the regular police.

Since deregulation the market has become highly competitive, and there are currently over thirty Internet service providers (ISPs) in Pakistan of varying size and quality of service. The largest ISPs in the country include Cybernet, Comsats, Brainnet, Gonet, and Paknet (a subsidiary of the Pakistan Telecommunications Company Limited, or PTCL). Modem, DSL, and recently high-speed Internet service are all available in Pakistan, but the reliability of these connections remains low. The majority of home Internet users are connected by modem, while cybercafés tend to split one modem or DSL connection over many computers, reducing connection speed. High-speed Internet service is currently accessible only to wealthier patrons or businesses.

All Internet traffic in and out of Pakistan is routed by the PTCL through its subsidiary, the Pakistan Internet Exchange (PIE), with three international gateways at Islamabad/Rawalpindi, Lahore, and Karachi, and small/medium points of presence (POPs) in six other cities.7 Currently, PIE handles 2,324 Mb/s of IP backbone traffic that comes to Pakistan using SMT4s on SMW4 and STM1s on SMW3 connected with BT, France Telecom, Telecom Italia, Verizon, and so on.8 Bandwidth through FLAG Telecom in collaboration with PTCL is at 620 Mb/s. Domestic Internet traffic is peered at the PIE gateways within the country. The PIE’s Karachi exchange reportedly processes at least 95 percent of Pakistan’s Internet traffic passes.9

Bloggers across Pakistan objected to the intermittent block on Blogspot.com and the temporary blocking of Wikipedia in 2006, and initiated a virtual civil society movement to repeal the orders.10 This virtual civil society engages in awareness and advocacy work on Pakistan’s Internet censorship through up-to-date blogs, as well as by posting information on Wikipedia. Through these sites, users share a multitude of techniques to circumvent the URL block and continue to access their Web sites of choice. An example of this is the use of pkblogs.com to access and post on banned blogspot.com sites.

Legal and regulatory frameworks

Internet censorship in Pakistan is legally regulated by the PTA, under the directive of the government, the Supreme Court of Pakistan, and the Ministry of Information Technology and Telecommunications (MITT). The PTA implements its censorship regulations through directives handed down to the PTCL,11 of which the Emirates Telecommunications Corporation (Etisalat) took majority control in 2006.12

In February 2002 the PTA challenged the legality of the use of Voice-over Internet Protocol (VoIP) as a replacement for long-distance calls. Because VoIP has achieved considerable popularity as a cost-effective alternative to long-distance calls, the PTCL banned VoIP and voice chat Web sites in early 2002; the service was undermining revenues for outgoing long-distance phone calls to the United States.13

In January 2003 the MITT directed the PTCL to block pornographic and blasphemous sites by placing content filters at all Internet exchanges,14 an effort that was not entirely effective.15 In March 2004 the Federal Investigation Agency also ordered all ISPs to block pornographic Web sites, a task beyond the technical capability of the ISPs at the time.16

On February 28, 2006, the PTCL issued a blocking directive banning a dozen URLs determined to have posted controversial Danish cartoons depicting images of the Prophet Muhammad.17 Within two weeks in March, in a series of escalating instructions, the Supreme Court directed the government to block all Web sites displaying the cartoons; to explain why they had not been blocked earlier; to block all blasphemous content; and to determine how access to such content could be denied on the Internet worldwide.18 The Supreme Court also ordered police to register cases of publishing or posting the blasphemous images under Article 295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code, where blasphemy or defamation of the Prophet Muhammad is punishable by death.19 Desecration or derogation of the Quran is punishable by life imprisonment.20

On September 2, 2006, the MITT announced the creation of a committee to monitor content of offensive Web sites. According to the Ministry statement, “the committee, headed by the secretary of the MITT, will examine contents of websites reported or found to be offensive and containing anti-state material.”21 To address the grievances of Internet users with this censorship body, the government set up a Deregulation Facilitation Unit to deal with users’ complaints.22

ONI testing results

ONI field testing was conducted on Brainnet, Cybernet, and Paknet ISPs. Testing results showed that blacklisted URLs were blocked at either the ISP or PIE level, or at both locations. The PTCL has implemented a limited, perhaps symbolic, block on pornography and religious conversion sites. However, more aggressive efforts have been made to target content regarding Balochi independence movements, Sindhi human rights and political autonomy movements, material considered blasphemous, antigovernment material, and anti-Islamic materials, though a clear pattern or criteria for what is filtered is lacking. Among these categories, Web sites depicting blasphemous content or addressing Balochi political independence were the most comprehensively blocked.

Because one of the twelve Web sites identified as depicting the Danish cartoons was hosted on blogspot.com, the PTCL used a blocking mechanism that filtered the entire domain. As a result of this strategy, thousands of personal blogs hosted on blogspot.com were inadvertently filtered for most of 2006. Most material relating to the Danish cartoon incident was blocked by the ISPs; only one Web site containing the cartoons that was reportedly blocked (http://danishcartoons.ytmnd.com) was found to be fully accessible through the testing process.

By April 2006 the PTA extended their blocking to antistate Web sites as well as those promoting Balochi human rights and political autonomy.23 ONI testing confirmed that internal security conflicts were a strong focus for filtering: all Web sites tested relating to independence (for example, http://www.balochunitedfront.org/) and human rights (for example, http://balochestan.com) in the province of Balochistan were blocked, as well as selected sites promoting Sindhi political autonomy and human rights. Notably, though Balochi and Sindhi independence and human rights sites have been filtered, the few existing Web sites pertaining to Pashtun secessionism were fully accessible. This may be because the majority of Pashtuns are illiterate in their local language, and secessionist politics in the northwest frontier province are significantly less potent than in Balochistan and Sindh provinces. Therefore the more politically organized Balochi and Sindhi movements arguably pose a greater threat to the central government than these selected pro-Pashtunistan Web sites.

In addition to blasphemous, secessionist, and human rights Web sites, a variety of blogs and Web sites containing anti-Islamic and anti-Pakistani content were blacklisted, such as Indian militant extremist sites (http://www.hinduunity.com) and anti-Islamic blogs (http://www.jihadwatch.com). A number of less polemical Web sites, including personal blogs hosted on blogspot.com, and Web sites dedicated to promoting religious tolerance (http://www.faithfreedom.com) were also blocked.

ONI testing showed that the majority of newspapers and independent media, circumvention tools, international human rights groups, VoIP services, civil society groups, minority religious sites, Indian and Hindu human rights groups, Pakistani political parties, and sexual content (including pornography and gay and lesbian content) were accessible on all three ISPs. Pornographic content was largely accessible, with only symbolic blocking of selected sites. Civil society groups contend that all blogspot.com sites have been blocked; however, ONI testing found the site for the “Don’t Block the Blog” campaign (http://help-pakistan.com) to be accessible on all three ISPs.

The lack of technical sophistication of the PTCL explains the comprehensive block on Blogspot. The PTCL lacks the capacity to target the specific URLs that contain offensive content, and simply blocks the entire IP address on which the offending site was hosted. Although this filtering system has resulted in the collateral blocking of entire domains such as blogspot.com, the rudimentary nature of the blocking mechanism also makes it easier for users to circumvent the block using proxy servers or other bypassing methods.24 Not only is the PTCL charged with blocking blacklisted URLs, but the it also hands down blocking directives directly to the ISPs to implement. The ISPs then implement, or attempt to implement, the blocking orders; the results of the ONI testing show that this sometimes led to a redundancy in blocking at both the ISP level and the central Internet exchange point.

Conclusion

Currently Pakistanis have unimpeded access to most sexual, political, social, and religious content. However, the Pakistani government continues to use repressive measures against antimilitary, Balochi, and Sindhi political dissidents, and it blocks Web sites highlighting this repression. The government also filters high-risk antistate materials and blasphemous content.

The Pakistani government does not currently employ a sophisticated blocking system, nor does the government have a coherent policy on what sites should be blacklisted. The recently established ministerial committee will probably contribute to the development of a comprehensive framework for government censorship as methods for implementing blocking directives are refined. Civil society activists and cyber-dissidents continue to advocate for free expression and blogging rights, which are curtailed by crude blocking methods that have imposed blanket blocks on entire domains such as blogspot.com.

NOTES

1. Pakistan 451, http://pakistan451.wordpress.com/ ; and Don’t Block the Blog campaign, http://help-pakistan.com/main/dont-block-the-blog/.
2. Reporters Without Borders, Pakistan: Annual Report 2007, February 19, 2007, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=20794.
3. International Telecommunication Union, World Telecommunication Indicators 2006.
4. Internet World Stats, Asia: Marketing Research, Internet Usage, Population Statistics and Information, February 19, 2007, http://www.internetworldstats.com/asia.htm.
5. Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited, http://www.ptcl.com.pk/introduction.html.
6. Zulfiqar Ali, “Cabinet approves bill to regulate cyber-cafes: Bill makes cyber-cafe owners liable for prosecution if any ‘unethical’ or ‘immoral’ activities are detected within their premises,” Asia Media, May 26, 2006, http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=46879.
7. E-mail interview with Convener of Internet Service Provider Association of Pakistan (ISPAK).
8. Ibid.
9. Naveed Ahmad, “PTCL blocks vital Internet sites to comply with SC order,” The News, http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=6254.
10. Don’t Block the Blog campaign, http://help-pakistan.com/main/dont-block-the-blog/.
11. Wikipedia, “Internet censorship in Pakistan,” February 20, 2007, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_censorship_in_Pakistan.
12. DAWN, “Deal signed to give Etisalat PTCL control,” March 13, 2006, http://www.dawn.com/2006/03/13/top5.htm.
13. Daily Times, “PTCL still directionless over VoIP issues,” January 26, 2003, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_26-1-2003_pg7_30.
14. DAWN, “PTCL directed to block porno, blasphemous sites,” January 29, 2003, http://www.dawn.com/2003/01/29/nat5.htm.
15. Imran Ayub, “PTCL to block all objectionable websites,” The News International Pakistan, December 27, 2003, http://www.apnic.net/mailing-lists/s-asia-it/archive/2003/12/msg00028.ht... ; World IT Report, “Pakistan faces difficulties to block porn sites, February 3, 2003, http://www”.worlditreport.com/News/&mod=search&searchWords=Pakistan%20PTCL&st_id_search=93657&time=1&sub=1.
16. Reporters Without Borders, Pakistan: Annual Report 2004, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=10794.
17. Ammara Durrani, “Ban on ‘blasphemous’ websites: PTA blocks blogs not carrying profane material,” The International News, March 6, 2006, http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/mar2006-daily/06-03-2006/national/n8.htm.
18. Ibid.
19. Article 295-C, Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1986, (Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary, part 1, October 12, 1986), http://www.thepersecution.org/50years/paklaw.html; Daily Times, “SC orders case against cartoon publishers,” April 18, 2006, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006%5C04%5C18%5Cstory_18-... see also Akbar S. Ahmed, “Pakistan’s blasphemy laws: Words fail me,” Washington Post, May 19, 2002, p. B01, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentI....
20. Article 295-B, Pakistan Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), http://www.thepersecution.org/50years/paklaw.html.
21. Nasir Iqbal, “Body set up to block websites,” Dawn News, September 3, 2006, http://www.dawn.com/2006/09/03/nat3.htm.
22. Ibid.
23. Pakistan Telecommunications Authority, Blocking of Websites Access, April 25, 2006, Nasir Iqbal, “Body set up to block websites,” Dawn News, September 3, 2006, http://www.dawn.com/2006/09/03/nat3.htm.http://ice.citizenlab.org/blogim....
24. Khalid Omar, “Connecting the dots,” Spider: Pakistan’s Internet Magazine, April 2006, http://www.spider.tm/apr2006/main.html?pgsrc=szone&submenu=szone1&dirtar....

South Korea

miriam — Thu, 10 May 2007 19:40:07 -0400

Background

The Republic of Korea (also known as South Korea) was established in 1948 and spent four decades under authoritarian rule until a democratic system emerged in 1987.1 South Korean foreign relations remain dominated by the state’s relationship with traditional adversary the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (or North Korea), with which South Korea has technically been at war since the two sides fought to a stalemate in 1953.2 Since that time, South Korea has been largely intolerant of dissident views and those espousing communism or supporting North Korea; publicly praising North Korea has been, and remains, illegal. Human rights groups charge that, since its enactment in 1948, thousands of South Koreans have been arrested under the state’s anti-communist National Security Law (NSL).3 Those arrested over the years include students, publishers, trade unionists, political activists, professors, and Internet surfers.4 Many have been arrested and jailed for peacefully expressing their political views.5 Some prisoners arrested under the NSL were allegedly held for three to four decades, ranking them among the world’s longest-held political prisoners.6

Despite South Korea’s current “sunshine policy” of diplomatic engagement with North Korea, investigations and arrests continue for those publicly supporting North Korea and its policies.7 In a recent celebrated case, a sociology professor at Dongguk University was investigated by authorities and suspended by the university for posting an article on the Internet in which he argued that North Korea’s invasion of the South in 1950 should be interpreted as an attempt to reunify the two Koreas.8 Overall, however, Korea’s human rights record has steadily and markedly improved since the 1990s.9

Internet in South Korea

South Korea is the most connected country in the world. By 2005 more than 89 percent of South Korean households had Internet access; 75 percent of these households used broadband.10 South Koreans are connected to the most advanced national network infrastructure in the world. Following the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, South Korea invested heavily in its broadband infrastructure, providing its citizens with a national network that carries data at speeds up to 50 megabits per second.11 A majority of South Korean Internet users use the Internet more than once per day.12 The vast majority of users access the Internet from home.13 Even so, playing video games and chatting online remains a popular pastime in the approximately 30,000 broadband “PC bangs” (Internet cafés) throughout South Korea.14 Online gaming, fueled by South Korea’s ultra high speed broadband infrastructure, is a national obsession, with as much as 35 percent of the population playing online games regularly.15

By 2004, seventy-six different Internet service providers (ISPs) were providing connection services to South Korean Internet users.16 But three South Korean ISPs control nearly 85 percent of the market for Internet access, the largest of which—KorNet—provides about half the ADSL lines in the country, making it the largest ADSL supplier in the world.17

In accordance with state ethics guidelines, most South Korean search engines require users to verify they are at least nineteen years old (using a national identification number) before allowing access to porn sites.18 Peer-to-peer file sharing is a popular online activity in South Korea,19 though authorities have begun to crack down on peer-to-peer services and monitor them for pornography and other content deemed harmful. Anecdotally, however, many users appear able to circumvent the various technological restrictions on Internet use and have unrestricted access to pornography and other sites that the state deems harmful or offensive.

Online citizens’ media has played an important role in Korean politics and Internet culture in recent years, led by ohmynews.com, a popular Seoul-based online newspaper that mostly publishes articles written and submitted by ordinary citizens.20 OhmyNews has been widely acknowledged as strongly influencing the 2002 election of Korean President Roh Moo-hyun.21

Legal and regulatory frameworks

The primary regulation governing Internet speech in South Korea is the NSL. First promulgated in 1948, the NSL was designed to prevent communist ideology and pro–North Korea sentiment from penetrating South Korean society.22 The NSL punishes pro–North Korea activists by criminalizing “antistate” activities.23 The statute provides for up to seven years’ imprisonment for “those who praise, encourage, disseminate or cooperate with anti-state groups … being aware that such acts will endanger the national security and the democratic freedom.”24 The NSL provisions are vague, permitting state actors broad discretion in their application. The statute governs both print and online media, and has been invoked against individuals attempting to engage with North Korea or promote North Korea’s political views, and has therefore been cited as having a chilling effect on free expression in the media.25 Citing the NSL, the Ministry of Information and Communication in 2004 instructed ISPs in South Korea to block access to thirty-one Web sites considered to be North Korean propaganda.26

The NSL is immensely controversial in South Korean society, and is a focal point of intense debate between conservative leaders, who argue the law is necessary to protect the nation from threats posed by North Korea, and liberal politicians, who argue the law is repressive, dictatorial, and outdated, and should therefore be repealed.27 In 2004, the Korean Constitutional Court upheld Article 7 of the NSL, which criminalizes the act of publicly praising and supporting North Korea, as a constitutionally permissible restriction on speech.28

Several other laws and decrees extend legal liability to content posted on the Internet, including the Telecommunications Business Act, which makes it illegal to transmit over telecommunications lines any content that compromises public safety, order, or morals;29 and the Election Law, amended in 2004 to illegalize Internet dissemination of information that defames politicians during their election campaigns and to empower authorities to review ISP records containing information about suspected violators.30

The Korean Internet Safety Commission (KISCOM), formerly the Information and Communications Ethics Committee (ICEC), is an independent body established in 1995 under the Telecommunications Business Act to formulate a code of communications ethics and inform state policy aimed at “eradicating subversive communications and promoting active and healthy information.”31 KISCOM is empowered to define “harmful” content and recommend which Web sites should be blocked.32 KISCOM also employs a system to monitor the circulation of “illegal and harmful contents on the Internet.”33 In addition, KISCOM formulates and administers a voluntary “Internet Content Rating Service” permitting Web sites to self-evaluate their level of appropriateness for minors, and provides to parents and schools filtering software and related technologies compatible with the rating service.34

ISPs have become increasingly responsible for policing content on their networks. In 2001, the state promulgated the “Internet Content Filtering Ordinance,”35 reportedly requiring ISPs to block as many as 120,000 Web sites on a state-compiled list, and requiring Internet access facilities that are accessible to minors, such as public libraries and schools, to install filtering software.36 The Youth Protection Act of 199737 makes ISPs officially responsible, as “protectors of juveniles,” for making inappropriate content inaccessible on their networks.38

The 2001 ordinance also classified homosexual Internet content as “harmful and obscene” under the Youth Protection Act.39 The Ministry of Information and Communications formally adopted this classification and immediately ordered a large South Korean Web site devoted to issues of homosexuality to classify itself in ICEC’s content rating system as harmful, and block minors from accessing the site or face fines and imprisonment.40 Homosexual rights advocates challenged the order in court as an illegal restriction on free speech. Although the court ruled in favor of the ICEC, it seriously questioned the constitutionality of ICEC’s ordinance classifying homosexual content as harmful to minors.41 In 2003, the Korean National Youth Protection Committee removed homosexuality from the categories of “harmful and obscene.” The reversal came in response to a Korean National Human Rights Protection Committee resolution finding that classifying homosexual content as harmful and obscene is an unconstitutional restriction on individuals’ rights of expression and pursuit of happiness.42

ONI testing results

In 2001, South Korea reportedly required its ISPs to block as many as 120,000 sites on an official list.43 When ONI conducted its testing at the end of 2006, however, the evidence indicated that Internet filtering in South Korea, although present, is not as extensive as reports have suggested. Testing was conducted through residential Internet access inside South Korea on the two of the largest South Korean ISPs—KorNet and HanaNet—between October 2006 and January 2007. The testing revealed that South Korea filters political and social content, specifically targeting sites containing North Korean propaganda or promoting the reunification of North and South Korea, as well as a handful of sites devoted to gambling and two sites devoted to pirated software (http://mscracks.com/ and http://kickme.to/fosi).

ONI determined that a large majority of pro-North Korea or pro-unification Web sites on ONI’s testing list were blocked,44 along with a selected number of gambling-related sites. The blocking was extremely consistent across the two ISPs tested, as in virtually every instance a Web site that registered as blocked on HanaNet registered as blocked on KorNet as well. On each ISP, ONI detected two methods of blocking: IP (Internet Protocol) blocking and doman name server (DNS) tampering. IP blocking occurs at the router level, between the South Korean ISP and the Internet. The routers are programmed to stop information coming from certain IP addresses. DNS tampering prevents Internet domain names from resolving to their proper IP addresses. Sites blocked by KorNet through DNS tampering resolve to a blockpage hosted by the police at http://211.253.9.250/, which states that the page has been lawfully blocked and lists the user’s own IP address.

ONI’s tests suggested there is little blocking of sensitive social content in South Korea, despite KISCOM’s focus on cleansing the Web of “harmful” social content. Besides two sites devoted to pirated software, ONI’s testing registered no blocks in other social categories, including pornography and gay and lesbian content. South Korea does, however, attempt to restrict minors’ access to pornography by requiring age identification for entry to Korean porn sites.

Conclusion

Although South Korea is the world leader in Internet penetration and broadband penetration, its citizens do not have access to a free and unfiltered Internet. The state imposes a substantial level of filtering for a free and democratic society. It requires ISPs to block sites on government lists and fosters a culture of self-censorship through broadly worded laws that make individuals criminally liable for posting “antistate” content. The state also requires that Korean Web sites engage in a self-rating system, and that ISPs and other Internet access facilities, such as cybercafés and schools, self-police for content deemed harmful to youths. Despite reports that the South Korean government has considered discontinuing its filtering of pro–North Korean Web sites,45 ONI’s testing indicated that the government still filters a large amount of content related to North Korea, as well as a handful of Web sites devoted to gambling and pirated software.

NOTES

1. BBC Online, Country Profile: South Korea, November 10, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/country_profiles/1123668.s....
2. See Time, “North, South Korea to restart talks,” February 15, 2007, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1590185,00.html.
3. See, for example, Asian Human Rights Commission, “South Korea: Seven activists detained and charged with violating the National Security Law,” August 31, 2001, http://www.ahrchk.net/ua/mainfile.php/2001/160/.
4. Amnesty International, Republic of Korea (South Korea): Time to Reform the National Security Law, February 1, 1999, http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA250031999?open&of=ENG-KOR.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. See Human Rights Watch, South Korea: Events of 2006, in World Report 2007, http://hrw.org/englishwr2k7/docs/2007/01/11/skorea14758.htm.
8. Cho Chung-un, “Kang case rekindles debate on National Security Law,” Korea Herald, October 17, 2005, http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=31651.
9. See Amnesty International Australia, “South Korea: Moving forward on human rights,” February 12, 2007, http://www.amnesty.org.au/Act_now/campaigns/asia_pacific/features/south_....
10. International Telecommunication Union, World Telecommunication Indicators 2006.
11. See Kristin Kalning, “Forget reality TV. In Korea, online gaming is it,” MSNBC.com, February 21, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17175353/.
12. See South Korea Internet Statistics Information System, http://isis.nida.or.kr/.
13. Ibid.
14. Paul Budde Communications Pty Ltd., Asia: Broadband: Market Overview, 2006, p. 12.
15. See Kristin Kalning, “Forget reality TV. In Korea, online gaming is it,” MSNBC.com, February 21, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17175353/.
16. Paul Budde Communications Pty Ltd., South Korea: Key Statistics, Telecom Market Overview & Analysis – 2005, 2006, p. 1.
17. Paul Budde Communications Pty Ltd., South Korea: Broadband Market: Overview & Statistics, 2006, pp. 1–2.
18. See, for example, Kim Tae-Gyu, “Is Google becoming victim of its own success?: Strong search capability allegedly used for identity theft, porn site harvesting,” Korea Times, July 27, 2006, http://times.hankooki.com/lpage/200607/kt2006072718493610230.htm.
19. See, for example, Cho Jin-So, “Korea: Online music sharing flourishes,” Korea Times, August 29, 2006, http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=51923.
20. See http://ohmynews.com ; see also http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OhmyNews ; Christopher M. Schroeder, “Is this the future of journalism?” Newsweek, June 18, 2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5240584/site/newsweek/.
21. See Christopher M. Schroeder, “Is this the future of Journalism?” Newsweek, June 18, 2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5240584/site/newsweek/.
22. Washington Post, “South Korea weighs allowing once-taboo support for the North,” November 22, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A2477-2004Nov21.html.
23. John Kie-chiang Oh, Korean Politics: The Quest for Democratization and Economic Development, pp. 36–7, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press (1999).
24. National Security Law of South Korea, Article 7, (unofficial English translation at http://www.kimsoft.com/Korea/nsl-en.htm).
25. See, for example, Sandra Coliver, Paul Hoffman, Joan Fitzpatrick and Stephen Bowen, eds., Secrecy and Liberty: National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information, pp. 420–23, The Hague and Boston : M. Nijhoff Publishers (1999).
26. See Nart Villeneuve, The Filtering Matrix: Integrated Mechanisms of Information Control and the Demarcation of Borders in Cyberspace, January 2006, available at http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue11_1/villeneuve/.
27. Korea Herald, A Nation-Splitting Law, September 8, 2004, http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=14429.
28. Ibid.
29. Telecommunications Business Act of the Republic of Korea, Article 53.
30. See Public Official Election Act of the Republic of Korea, Articles 8-5, 8-6, 272-3, English translation available at http://www.nec.go.kr/english/res/Public_Official_Election.pdf.
31. See Korea Internet Safety Commission Web site, http://www.icec.or.kr/.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid; see also 2600 News, “Internet censorship in South Korea,” June 5, 2002, http://www.2600.com/news/view/article/1184.
35. Electronic Frontiers Australia, Internet Censorship: Law & Policy Around the World, 2002, http://www.efa.org.au/Issues/Censor/cens3.html#sk.
36. See, for example, http://web.skku.edu/~sktimes/251/society.html.
37. See Youth Protection Committee Web site (in Korean), http://youth.go.kr/.
38. See Korea Times, “Teenagers to be blocked from cyber pornography,” August 19, 2004, http://search.hankooki.com/times/times_view.php?term=cyber+pornography++....
39. See Han Chae-yun and Yi Huso, Sungkyun Times, “On-again and off-again:
Korean on/off-line LGBTQ/Iban community blocked,” September 2002, http://web.skku.edu/~sktimes/251/society.html ; http://www.gaylawnet.com/news/2002/ce02.htm.
40. Ibid.
41. Chosun.com, “Homosexual Web site ruled constitutional,” December 22, 2003, http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200312/200312220010.html.
42. See Homosexuality Removed from Classification of “Harmful and
Obscene” in Youth Protection Law, Sodomy Laws, April 22, 2003, http://www.sodomylaws.org/world/south_korea/sknews001.htm.
43. See, for example, Reporters Without Borders, “Internet under surveillance,” at http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=7248.
44. The blocked pro–North Korea sites on ONI’s testing list include: http://osaka.korea-htr.com/koreakokoku.html, http://www.baekdoonet.has.it/, http://www.bommin.net/, http://www.chongryon.com/index.html, http://www.cnet-ta.ne.jp/juche/defaulte.htm, http://www.dprk-book.com/, http://www.dprk-stamp.com/, http://www.jpth.net/, http://www.kancc.org/, http://www.kcckp.net/, http://www.kcna.co.jp/, http://www.korea-dpr.com/, http://www.korea-np.co.jp/main/main.aspx, http://www.krbook.net/index-k.htm, http://www.krsrt.com/, http://www.minjok.com/, http://www.ournation-school.com/, http://www.silibank.com/silibank/korea/, http://www.uriminzokkiri.com/, and http://www.worldcorea.net/.
45. See, for example, Chosun.com, “S. Korea to lift ban on pro–North Korean Web sites,” January 5, 2005, http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200501/200501050015.html.

Singapore

miriam — Thu, 10 May 2007 18:36:13 -0400

Background

Singapore’s government uses restrictive laws, political ties to the judiciary, and ownership and intimidation of the media to suppress dissenting opinion and opposition to the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP). Provisions of the Internal Security Act (ISA), the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act (CLA), the Undesirable Publications Act (UPA), and other statutes prohibit the production and possession of “subversive” materials and permit the detention of suspected offenders without judicial review.1 Citizens, including Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) leader Chee Soon Juan, have been arrested for speaking publicly without a permit,2 and foreign activists from civil society organizations have been detained, interrogated, and deported.3 Government plaintiffs have been able to levy civil liability and heavy damages through defamation suits against independent and critical voices, including those of opposition politicians and of regional publications with domestic circulation.4 Moreover, virtually all domestic newspapers and television and radio stations are owned by corporations with economic ties to the government; hence they adhere closely to the PAP line when reporting on sensitive issues.5 Taken together, these economic and legal controls contribute to a climate of pervasive self-censorship of political commentary. These mechanisms of control and influence allow the Singapore government to cripple basic freedoms of expression and assembly under the guise of protecting public security and preserving order.

Internet in Singapore

In 2005, the number of Internet users in Singapore reached 2.42 million, or 67.2 percent of the population,6 giving the country one of the highest Internet penetration rates in the world. Home access is commonplace, with residential dialup and broadband subscriptions totaling more than 2.1 million.7 Over 70 percent of businesses use the Internet,8 and public access is widespread and expanding. In December 2006, a three-year national wireless service was launched, providing laptop users with free Wi-Fi Internet access in high-traffic areas across the island.9 Terminals in cybercafés and libraries supply the public with additional connectivity.

Three main Internet Access Service Providers (IASPs)—SingNet, StarHub, and Pacific Internet—serve as the “gateways” to the Web, providing access to Internet service resellers (ISRs) for sale to the public.10 Though all three IASPs are public corporations, Temasek Holdings (the government’s holding company) remains the majority shareholder in SingNet and StarHub.11

Legal and regulatory frameworks

Singapore’s Media Development Authority (MDA) claims to have instituted a “light-touch” regulatory framework for the Internet, promoting responsible use while giving industry players “maximum flexibility.”12 In addition to promoting self-regulation and public education, the MDA maintains license and registration requirements that subject Internet content and service providers to penalties for noncompliance with restrictions on prohibited material. The MDA is charged with ensuring that “nothing is included in the content of any media service which is against public interest or order, or national harmony, or which offends good taste or decency.”13 The core of this framework is a class license scheme stipulated by national statute (the Broadcasting Act)14 and by industry policies and regulations issued by the MDA.

Under the class license scheme, all Internet service providers (ISPs) and those Internet content providers (ICPs) determined to be political parties or persons “engaged in the propagation, promotion or discussion of political or religious issues relating to Singapore” must register with the MDA.15 As licensees, ISPs and ICPs are also bound by the MDA’s Internet Code of Practice. The Code defines “prohibited material” broadly, specifying only a few standards for sexual, violent, and intolerant content.16 Where filtering is not mandated at the ISP level, the Code requires that ICPs deny access to material if so directed by the MDA. Licensees that fail to comply with the Code may face sanctions, including fines or license suspensions or terminations, as authorized under the Broadcasting Act. In 2005, one Web site titled “Meet Gay Singapore Friends” was reportedly fined USD5,000 by the MDA for being in violation of the Code.17

Threats of civil and criminal liability under other laws further deter Internet users from posting comments or content relating to sensitive issues. In May 2005 the state-funded agency A*STAR accused Jiahao Chen, a Singaporean doctoral student in the United States, of posting “untrue and serious accusations against A*STAR, its officers and other parties,” and threatened Chen with “legal consequences unless the objectionable statements were removed and an acceptable apology published.”18 Chen complied with A*STAR’s demands and replaced the posts with an apology, thereby avoiding a potential defamation suit.19 The high-profile case prompted caution20 in the Singapore blogosphere and discussion21 on how to avoid suit under the nation’s defamation laws.22

In October 2005 two men were jailed under the Sedition Act23 for the first time in nearly forty years. One received a one-month sentence and the other a nominal one-day sentence and USD5,000 fine for posting racist remarks denigrating Muslims and Malays.24 In January 2006, a twenty-one-year-old was also charged with violating the Sedition Act after he posted four cartoons of Jesus on his blog. The charges were eventually dropped, but not before Singaporean authorities had confiscated the individual’s computer and removed the cartoons from his blog.25

In November 2006 SDP activist Yap Keng Ho was sentenced to ten days in jail after he refused to pay a fine for speaking at an illegal SDP rally, held in April 2006. Yap had posted a video of the speech on his blog and was ordered to remove it by a judge.26

The above incidents appeared to presage further repressive legislation and policies against Singaporean Internet users. In 2007 the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) is expected to table before parliament a slate of amendments to the Penal Code. The proposed amendments expand the scope of nineteen offenses to cover acts perpetrated via electronic media, including “uttering words with deliberate intent to wound the religious feelings of any person” (§298); defamation (§499); and making “statements conducing to public mischief” (§505).27 Section 298 is being modified further to cover “the wounding of racial feelings,” so that offenders may be prosecuted under the Sedition Act or the Penal Code.28 The MHA amendments also introduce nineteen new offenses, including abetting “an offense which is committed in Singapore, even if any or all of the acts of abetment were done outside Singapore,” as via Internet or mobile phone (§108B).29

ONI testing results

ONI conducted testing on Singapore’s two major IASPs, SingNet and StarHub, and on a third ISP, SysTech. A common perception of the Singaporean Internet community points to the existence of a list of 100 banned Web sites purportedly maintained by the Media Development Authority (MDA). ONI found that only seven Web sites tested, all relating to pornography, were blocked, including sex.com, playboy.com, and penthouse.com. The blocking of only these high-profile sites suggests that filtering is indeed mandated for symbolic, rather than preventative, purposes. Moreover, the seven sites blocked on SingNet and StarHub were all accessible on SysTech.

Conclusion

The Singapore government implements a limited filtering regime, relying mainly on nontechnological measures to curb online commentary and content relating to political, religious, and ethnic issues. The purported purpose of these measures is “to promote and facilitate the growth of the Internet while at the same time safeguarding social values and racial and religious harmony.”30 The threats of lawsuits, fines, and criminal prosecution inhibit more open discourse in an otherwise vibrant Internet community.

NOTES

1. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2006: Singapore, at 1.e., http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78790.htm ; see also Singapore Statutes Online, http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/.
2. Human Rights Watch, “Singapore: Release opposition leader,” December 8, 2006, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/12/08/singap14792.htm.
3. Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development, “Detained civil society activists suffer cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment before deportation,” October 15, 2006, http://www.forum-asia.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=83&I....
4. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2006: Singapore, at 1.e., 2.a., 2.d., 3, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78790.htm.
5. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2006: Singapore, at 2.a., http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78790.htm.
6. Asia Internet Usage and Population Statistics, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats3.htm (citing International Telecommunication Union data).
7. InfoComm Development Authority (IDA), Statistics on Telecom Services for 2006 (Jul. – Dec.), http://www.ida.gov.sg/Publications/20061205181639.aspx (listing 1,489,500 residential dialup subscriptions and 657,900 residential broadband subscriptions as of October 2006).
8. InfoComm Development Authority (IDA), Measuring Infocomm Usage by Companies, 2005, http://www.ida.gov.sg/Publications/20061205110753.aspx.
9. InfoComm Development Authority (IDA), “Media Release: Free access to Wireless@SG Network extended from two to three years,” http://www.ida.gov.sg/News%20and%20Events/20061204103552.aspx?getPagetyp....
10. See Media Development Authority (MDA), Internet Industry Guidelines, http://www.mda.gov.sg/wms.file/mobj/mobj.496.internet_industry_guide.pdf.
11. See SingTel, Board & Management, http://home.singtel.com/about_singtel/board_n_management/default.asp ; StarHub, Investor Relations – Stock Information, http://www.starhub.com/corporate/investorrelations/index.html.
12. See Media Development Authority (MDA), Internet, http://www.mda.gov.sg/wms.www/devnpolicies.aspx?sid=161.
13. Media Development Authority Act of Singapore, Part III, 11.1(h), http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/.
14. Broadcasting Act (Cap. 28), http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/.
15. Broadcasting (Class License) Notification 2001, July 15, 1996, http://www.mda.gov.sg/wms.file/mobj/mobj.487.ClassLicense.pdf.
16. “Prohibited material is material that is objectionable on the grounds of public interest, public morality, public order, public security, national harmony, or is otherwise prohibited by applicable Singapore laws.” Media Development Authority (MDA), Internet Code of Practice, http://www.mda.gov.sg/wms.file/mobj/mobj.497.internet_code.pdf.
17. “Prohibited material is material that is objectionable on the grounds of public interest, public morality, public order, public security, national harmony, or is otherwise prohibited by applicable Singapore laws.” Media Development Authority (MDA), Internet Code of Practice, http://www.mda.gov.sg/wms.file/mobj/mobj.497.internet_code.pdf.
18. A*STAR, Press Statement, May 6, 2005, http://www.a-star.edu.sg/astar/about/action/pressrelease_details.do?id=0....
19. See Singapore News, “Student shuts down blog after A*Star threatens to sue,” May 6, 2005.
20. See, for example, “A sad day for the Singapore blogosphere,” April 25, 2005, http://singaporeangle.blogspot.com/2005/04/sad-day-for-singapore-blogosp... (expressing views of over thirty bloggers).
21. See South China Morning Post, “Bloggers cautiously test the limits of free speech,” July 18, 2005.
22. See Defamation Act (Cap. 75), http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/.
23. See Sedition Act (Cap. 290), http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/.
24. See “Racist bloggers jailed,” The Straits Times, October 8, 2005.
25. Reporters Without Borders, “Government drops charges against blogger who posted Jesus cartoons,” July 20, 2006, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=18106.
26. Reporters Without Borders, “Blogger belonging to democratic party jailed for ten days,” November 24, 2006, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=19702.
27. See Ministry of Home Affairs, Consultation Paper on the Proposed Penal Code Amendments, p. 6, http://www.agc.gov.sg/publications/docs/Penal_Code_Amendment_Bill_Consul....
28. Ibid, p. 9.
29. Ibid, p. 17.
30. See Media Development Authority (MDA), Internet, http://www.mda.gov.sg/wms.www/devnpolicies.aspx?sid=161.

Nepal

evan — Thu, 10 May 2007 17:12:47 -0400

Background

Nepal is among the world’s least-developed countries. It has endured extreme political instability in recent years because of its transition from absolute monarchy to democracy and because of its years of struggle between the state and militant Maoist insurgents, who control large portions of the countryside. Nepal was under the rule of an absolute monarch until 1990, when popular pressure forced the king to transition to a democratic system of parliamentary monarchy.1 Since then, internal governmental collapse and parliamentary dissolution have been common occurrences.2 During periods of extreme political volatility, the state has clamped down on the press and free expression. In 2005, citing deteriorating security conditions in Nepal from Maoist violence, the king imposed authoritarian rule and a week-long media blackout, during which the country was cut off from the Internet.3 The state and Maoist rebels both have a history of harassing journalists and repressing media coverage.4 Nevertheless, with the exception of King Gyanendra’s authoritarian rule in 2005–06, Nepal has experienced tremendous growth of a “vibrant” and largely free independent media since parliament was established in 1990.5

Internet in Nepal

Although through 2005 less than 1 percent of Nepal’s population of twenty-three million used the Internet, the Internet market in Nepal is growing rapidly—the result of a competitive Internet service provider (ISP) market and low Internet access prices.6 Thirty-one private ISPs offer Internet access to businesses and consumers, though two, Worldlink and Mercantile, dominate the market with a combined share of more than 70 percent.7 Cyber cafés are important sources of Internet access for Nepalis; the country is believed to have the highest concentration of cybercafés in the world.8 Much of Nepal’s Internet access is concentrated in the more-developed Katmandu Valley region, as the mountainous terrain and low income in remote regions of the country make access more difficult. However, one effort to bring Internet access to rural populations—the Nepali Wireless Networking Project—has already wirelessly connected seven remote mountain villages to the Internet, with plans to network twenty-one villages in all.9

Although relatively few Nepalis presently get their news from the Internet, it has nevertheless become an important source of independent news in Nepal.10 When King Gyanendra assumed authoritarian control in 2005, for example, traditional media were either shut down or heavily censored to ensure the publication of only favorable news about the monarch.11 Nepali bloggers became an important political voice and source of information to the world about the situation unfolding inside the country.12

Legal and regulatory frameworks

Nepal’s legal system is in flux because of its unstable political landscape and its new constitution. The most recent collapse occurred in February 2005, when the king assumed control of the government and armed forces.13 Mass civilian protests followed, and he was forced to reinstate parliament and ultimately relinquish all official powers to the prime minister and parliament.14 The king sought to stifle the independent media during his tenure, passing the repressive Media Law, which prohibited criticism of the king and royal family and the broadcast of news over independent FM radio stations (an important source of independent news in the country). The Media Law also increased the penalties for defamation tenfold. The law was repealed once parliament was reinstated.15

In December 2006, seven political parties and the Maoists agreed on a new interim constitution that paves the way for the Maoists to join the political mainstream and nationalizes royal properties,16 leaving the fate of the monarchy up to a general election.17 The interim constitution guarantees certain social freedoms including freedom of speech and expression, freedom to protest, and freedom to establish a political party, among others.18 The constitution also guarantees the freedom to publish, including a specifically enumerated freedom to publish on the Internet.19 It advises, however, that those who publish information that causes social disruption or disparages others may be subject to punishment under relevant laws.20

One such law is likely the Electronic Transaction and Digital Signature Act of 2004 (ETDSA), which regulates online commerce and financial transactions and criminalizes certain online behavior, including hacking and fraud. ETDSA also provides criminal penalties, including fines and up to five years in prison, for the publication of “illegal” content on the Internet (though it provides no definition of illegal content), or for the publication of hate speech or speech likely to trigger ethnic strife.21 Similarly, the National Broadcasting Act of 1993 and the National Broadcasting Regulation of 1995 provide for fines and/or imprisonment for broadcasting content likely to cause ethnic strife or social unrest, undermine national security or moral decency, or conflict with Nepali foreign policy.22

However, the extent to which any previously existing laws will retain their force under the new government is unclear.

ONI testing results

Testing was conducted from October 2006 through January 2007 on six Nepali ISPs: Worldlink, Everest, Mercantile, Nepal Telecom, Speedcast, and Websurfer. The tests revealed no evidence of filtering for any of the categories tested.

Conclusion

Ongoing political instability remains a constant threat to independent media in Nepal, as there is a history of insurgents and the state harassing journalists and clamping down on media freedoms during times of political tension. In 2006 Nepal emerged from a particularly repressive period: the king’s authoritarian rule was abolished, parliament was reinstated, and a new interim constitution was put into effect guaranteeing freedom of expression and of the press. These freedoms do not, however, extend to speech that is likely to incite social unrest or disparage others, which are sensitive issues for the state because of the ethnic and socioeconomic strife underlying the struggle with the Maoists. At present, however, Nepali journalists report virtually unconditional freedom of the press, including the Internet, and ONI’s testing revealed no evidence that Nepal imposes technological filters on the Internet.

NOTES

1. See Maya Chadda, Building Democracy in South Asia: India, Nepal, Pakistan, Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers (2000), pp. 113–20.
2. See generally John Whelpton, A History of Nepal, Cambridge University Press (2005), pp. 208–24.
3. BBC News, “Q&A: Nepal’s future,” November 8, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/2707107.stm ; see Mark Glaser, “Nepalese bloggers, journalists defy media clampdown by king,” Online Journalism Review, February 23, 2005, http://www.ojr.org/ojr/stories/050223glaser/.
4. See, for example, Reporters Without Borders, “Maoists and government urged to respect press freedom undertakings,” August 22, 2006, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=18632 ; International Freedom of Expression Exchange, “Parliament abolishes repressive media law,” http://www.ifex.org/fr/content/view/full/74580/ ; Committee to Protect Journalists, Press Release, “Over 200 journalists arrested, 31 in custody,” April 20, 2006, http://peacejournalism.com/ReadArticle.asp?ArticleID=8550.
5. See, for example, World Association of Newspapers, “Founding father of independent media in Nepal remains hopeful, despite continued restrictions,” June 2005, http://www.wan-press.org/article7574.html ; BBC Online, “Nepal protests against media law, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4432882.stm.
6. Paul Budde Communication Pty Ltd., Nepal, Telecoms Market Overview and Statistics, July 30, 2006, p. 11.
7. Ibid., pp. 1, 14.
8. Ibid., p. 12.
9. Ibid., p. 13.
10. See Vincent Lim, “Blogging for democracy in Nepal,” AsiaMedia, April 13, 2006, http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=43000.
11. See Mark Glaser, “Nepalese bloggers, journalists defy media clampdown by king,” Online Journalism Review, Februry 23, 2005, http://www.ojr.org/ojr/stories/050223glaser/.
12. Ibid.
13. BBC News, “Q&A: Nepal’s future,” November 8, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/2707107.stm.
14. Charles Haviland, “Erasing the 'royal' in Nepal,” BBC News, May 19, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/4998666.stm.
15. International Freedom of Expression Exchange, "Parliament abolishes repressive media law,” http://www.ifex.org/fr/content/view/full/74580/.
16. S. Chandrasekharan, “NEPAL: Interim constitution unveiled:
Monarchy dumped,” December 17, 2006, http://www.saag.org/%5Cnotes4%5Cnote354.html.
17. See Nepal Interim Constitution, http://www.nepalnews.com/archive/2007/jan/jan15/Constitution_2063.doc.
18. See Nepal Interim Constitution, Article 12.3, http://www.nepalnews.com/archive/2007/jan/jan15/Constitution_2063.doc.
19. Nepal Interim Constitution, Article 45.1.
20. Nepal Interim Constitution, Article 12.
21. Nepal Electronic Transaction and Digital Signature Act, Article 47, http://www.nta.gov.np/cyber_law.html.
22. National Broadcasting Act of Nepal, Articles 15–16, http://www.moic.gov.np/policy/pol_broad_act_2049.php ; National Broadcasting Regulation, Article 9, http://www.nta.gov.np/national_broadcasting_regulation_2052.html.

North Korea

evan — Thu, 10 May 2007 16:57:56 -0400

Internet and Intranet in North Korea

The community of Internet users in North Korea consists almost entirely of elites and foreigners. A select few, including members of Kim Jung Il’s inner circle, enjoy unfiltered Internet access via satellite link to servers in Germany, thanks to a 2004 joint venture between Pyongyang’s Korea Computer Center (KCC) and its Berlin-based counterpart KCC Europe. Most Internet users, however, are dependent upon Chinese service providers for connectivity—and thus are subject to China’s filtering regime. For years, these providers could be reached only via international dialup from exclusive hotels in Pyongyang. In 2002, optical cable connections between the North Korean capital and Shanghai became operational at the Internet PC Room—the first Internet café in the country. Still, few North Koreans can afford the hourly fee of USD10, effectively limiting use of the PC Room to foreign diplomats, businesspersons, journalists, and tourists.

A growing segment of the North Korean population is gaining access to Chinese networks via Web-enabled mobile phones smuggled in from China and sold on the black market.1 However, for most North Koreans, access to online content is exceedingly rare and limited to the few dozen Web sites that comprise Kwangmyong, the nation’s domestic intranet. Content on Kwangmyong is chosen, and user conduct monitored, by the government. Information comes primarily from databases maintained by the Central Scientific and Technological Information Agency, the Grand People’s Study House, and other repositories.2 This content is intended for use at select research institutes, schools, and factories. Aside from these establishments, only government ministries and a handful of enterprises and individuals have the computers, telecommunications capacity, and the authorization needed to utilize the national intranet.

Small, government-sanctioned businesses offering public intranet access have been observed in urban areas, but user fees are likely prohibitive for the average North Korean. In 2005 human rights groups revealed photographs of one such venue—called the Information Technology Store—in the city of Chungjin. The facility houses several terminals with intranet connectivity and offers computer classes at the steep price of 20,000 won per month—seven to eight times the average monthly wage.3 Such costs are believed to be mandated by the state so as to deter ordinary citizens from using the resources and services of these facilities.

Legal and regulatory frameworks

The near absence of connectivity, even to the isolated and heavily filtered Kwangmyong intranet, is consistent with the North Korean regime’s efforts to regulate all information and communication in the country. There are no independent media in North Korea. Personal radios and televisions must be modified to receive only government stations and registered with the authorities. A nationwide ban on mobile phones has also been in place since May 2004.

It is the state’s command of institutions and resources that allows it to achieve such pervasive control over online media. The government allocates available technologies to establishments and authorizes user access as it sees fit. Legal measures play only a subsidiary role in actualizing state control, and for citizens, they confer no actionable rights vis-à-vis the state. Thus, although Article 67 of the DPRK’s Socialist Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and of the press, there is no means of instituting a legal challenge to the state’s dominion over online access and expression.

NOTES

1. Rebecca MacKinnon, “Chinese cell phone breaches North Korean hermit kingdom,” YaleGlobal, January 17, 2005, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=5145.
2. Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, “North Korea: Channeling foreign information technology to leverage IT development,” December 2003, http://www.ncix.gov/archives/docs/NORTH_KOREA_AND_FOREIGN_IT.pdf.
3. A. Yang Jung, “Controlling the Internet café in North Korea,” The Daily NK, July 13, 2005, http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00300&num=206.

Burma (Myanmar)

evan — Thu, 10 May 2007 16:30:08 -0400

Background

Myanmar’s abysmal human rights record worsened in 2006,1 prompting increased pressure from the United States, the EU, and ASEAN for reform. In September the U.N. Security Council approved the U.S. government’s proposal to put Myanmar formally on the Council’s agenda.2 Leaders from the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) claim neocolonialists are infiltrating media technology on pretexts of protecting human rights and countering drug trafficking.3 Other sensitive issues included political and constitutional reform, separatist movements, religious and ethnic minorities, forced and child labor, access by humanitarian organizations, and the country’s first disclosed outbreak of bird flu. The government suppressed reports on a wide range of additional issues, from rising cement and fuel prices to restrictions on private banks,4 and jailed two journalists who photographed the new, remote capital at Pyinmana.5

Internet in Myanmar

The reported number of Internet users in 2005 ranged from 78,000 to nearly 300,000, at the upper limit representing approximately 0.56 percent of Myanmar’s population.6 Myanmar remains one of thirty countries with less than 1 percent Internet penetration.7 Most users access the Internet in cybercafés (starting at USD0.30 per hour, down from USD0.75 in 2004 and USD0.95–1.50 in 2003),8 which are said to be present in five cities but planned to reach 324 townships within three years.9 Connection speeds are slow, however, as broadband is available primarily to government and businesses and used mostly for Internet telephony via Voice-over Internet Protocol (VoIP), though the government pledged to bring ADSL to every township by the end of 2006.10 There are only two Internet service providers (ISPs) allowed in Myanmar: state-owned telecom Myanmar Posts and Telecom (MPT), which is the only source of new Internet services,11 and Myanmar Teleport (MMT, formerly Bagan Cybertech), which is reportedly the infrastructure arm of Myanmar's Internet system and responsible for blocking content. In September 2005 the Ahaed Co. of Myanmar and the Canadian ICT company Teleglobe reportedly signed a memorandum of understanding to establish a private ISP.12 Reliability is also an issue: in May 2006 the entire country was disconnected for four days because of alleged damage to an undersea cable.13

Legal and regulatory frameworks

Myanmar heavily regulates online access and content via legal, regulatory, and economic constraints. As in other areas, however, the state’s policies are difficult to assess because they are rarely published or explained.

Network-ready computers must be registered (for a fee) with the MPT; failure to do so can result in fines and prison sentences of seven to fifteen years.14 Sharing registered Internet connections is also punishable by revocation of access and presumably similar “legal action.”15 Broad laws and regulations confer power upon the SPDC, which is also involved in all judicial appointments,16 to punish citizens harshly for any activity deemed detrimental to national interests or security. Regulations issued in 2000 subjected online content to the same kind of strict filtering that the Press Scrutiny and Registration Division carries out (despite print media being almost exclusively state owned):17 users must obtain MPT permission before creating Web pages, and they cannot post anything “detrimental” to the government or simply related to politics. The MPT can “amend and change regulations on the use of the Internet without prior notice.”18

Costs indeed limit access significantly: even households that can afford a PC and long-distance connection fees outside the capital Yangon (Rangoon) and Mandalay cannot pay USD35/month19 for a broadband account. Dialup access leaves them with state-monitored e-mail (free services are blocked)20 and a small collection of pre-approved sites on the country’s intranet, known as the Myanmar Wide Web.21 As for cybercafés, promoted since 2002 by a “Public Access Centers” (PAC) program for e-mail and gaming purposes,22 the government has been urging business owners to legally register as PACs. This requires them to log user identities and Web sites visited and send the information back to the state-owned Myanmar Info-tech.23 There are reports, however, that many tech-savvy users risk connecting to proxy servers abroad and thereby access the entire Web undetected.24

ONI testing results

Testing was conducted on the two ISPs in Myanmar, Myanmar Teleport (MMT) and Myanmar Posts and Telecom (MPT). Both MMT and MPT filtered extensively and focused overwhelmingly on independent media, political reform, and human rights sites relating to Myanmar, as well as free Web-based e-mail services and circumvention tools.

Both ISPs blocked roughly the same number of circumvention tools, including Proxify, Guardster, and Anonymizer (although only MPT blocked www.anonymizer.com).

In June 2006 Gmail and Gtalk were made inaccessible and Skype was banned25—a reported attempt not only to censor communications but also to preserve the government’s monopoly over telephone and e-mail services as MPT’s revenues dipped.26 ONI testing confirmed that although no search engines (MSN, Google, and so on) were blocked, Yahoo! Mail, Gmail, Hushmail, and mail2web were blocked by both ISPs, while MPT took the precaution of blocking thirteen additional e-mail sites, including Hotmail and Fastmail. Only MPT blocked Skype.

In addition to filtering Radio Free Asia (www.rfa.org) and OhmyNews, both MMT and MPT blocked many major independent news sites reporting on Myanmar. This included English language publications such as the Irawaddy, Mizzima News, and BurmaNet News (burmanet.org), as well as sites in the national language (www.burmatoday.net). Only MPT blocked the Voice of America Web sites (http://www.voanews.com/) in English and Burmese, while MMT targeted regional news sites such as the Times of India and Asia Observer.

Sites containing content on human rights advocacy and democratic reform continued to be a priority for blocking. A number of nongovernmental organization (NGO) sites with different levels of involvement in Myanmar human rights issues were blocked (Open Society Institute at www.soros.org; http://www.burmacampaign.org.uk/). Within this group were Web sites documenting the persecution of ethnic minorities and the personal Web site of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Other continuities in blocking included coalitions for democratic change in Myanmar, such as the Web site of the coalition government of the Union of Burma (www.ncgub.net), opposition movements (www.chinforum.org), and rights groups (www.womenofburma.org).

There were significant differences in filtering between the two ISPs. Of the sites found to be blocked in Myanmar, less than a third were blocked on both ISPs. The remaining blocked sites were blocked on one ISP or the other, but not both. MMT blocked almost exclusively sites with ties to Myanmar, where the term “Burma” in the URL was one of the common threads among the filtered sites, from human rights groups (www.burmawatch.org; www.hrw.org) critical of the government to peripheral personal sites (such as a site with photographs of Myanmar). MPT filtered many more sites from the global list, blocking a large majority of the pornography Web sites tested, while MMT filtered very few such sites.

Several curious results indicated that the Myanmar government does not take an entirely systematic approach to filtering. For example, Amnesty International (www.amnesty.org) was blocked entirely on MPT, but MMT filtered only several Amnesty reports on the country. Other significant variations among the ISPs, including the inconsistent blocking of pornography and gambling sites that suggest distinct filtering methods, are unusual given both ISPs are state-run.

Conclusion

Although Myanmar does not deploy its filtering regime with the same sophistication and breadth as other countries with similarly repressive online environments, the paranoid grip of the SPDC is felt in the restrictions on access, the high cost of services, and the frequently brutal clampdown on information and expression in all other spheres of Burmese life. This may be why there are not many known cases of cyber-dissidents in custody, given that people have been arrested for anything from publishing subversive poetry to listening to the BBC or Radio Free Asia in public.27

NOTES

1. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (2005): Burma, March 8, 2006, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61603.htm.
2. Summary statement by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on matters of which the Security Council is seized and on the stage reached in their consideration, UN Doc. S/2006/10/Add.36, September 22, 2006.
3. Gen. Than Shwe, 85th Anniversary National Day Message, November 24, 2005, http://www.mofa.gov.mm/news/24nov05.html.
4. Financial Times, “Burma’s privately owned presses are on a roll; Private sector journals are gaining popularity in spite of heavy pressure from state censors,” December 8, 2005.
5. Reporters Without Borders, “Court upholds three-year sentences for journalists who photographed new capital,” June 27, 2006, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=16898.
6. Xinhua News Agency, “Internet users in Myanmar number nearly 300,000,” November 8, 2006; International Telecommunication Union, World Telecommunication Indicators 2006.
7. International Telecommunication Union, ICT Statistics, http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/ict/index.html.
8. BBC Monitoring International Reports, “Burma Internet users use proxy servers to visit blocked websites,” October 17, 2006 (includes text from Ko Thet, "A hole in the Net," The Irawaddy, October 1, 2006); The Guardian Online, “The great firewall of Burma,” July 22, 2003; and Reporters Without Borders, Internet: Burma, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=10748&Valider=OK.
9. Xinhua News Agency, “Internet users in Myanmar number nearly 300,000,” November 8, 2006.
10. Ibid.
11. Xinhua News Service, “Myanmar to grant foreign, local engagement in emerging cyber city,” November 28, 2006.
12. http://www.burmanet.org/news/2005/09/12/xinhua-news-agency-myanmar-to-expand-internet-services/.
13. BBC Monitoring International Reports, “Burma’s Internet link with outside world fails for fourth day” (text by official Chinese agency Xinhua), May 16, 2006.
14. Computer Science Development Law, sections 27, 28, September 20, 1996, http://www.myanmar.com/gov/laws/computerlaw.html.
15. Digital Freedom Network, “The new Net regulations in Burma,” January 31, 2000, archived copy available at http://web.archive.org/web/20010220220441/http://dfn.org/voices/burma/we....
16. Ibid.
17. International Press Institute, 2005 World Press Freedom Review: Burma, http://www.freemedia.at/cms/ipi/freedom_detail.html?country=/KW0001/KW00....
18. Digital Freedom Network, “The new Net regulations in Burma,” January 31,2000, archived copy available at http://web.archive.org/web/20010220220441/http://dfn.org/voices/burma/we....
19. BaganNet, “Access Services,” October 30,2006, http://www.bagan.net.mm/products/access/broadband_ADSL.asp.
20. BaganNet, “About mail4u,” October 2006, http://www.bagan.net.mm/products/services/aboutmail4u-e.asp.
21. Shawn W. Crispin, “A quantum leap in censorship,” Asia Times Online, September 22, 2006, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/HI22Ae01.html.
22. BBC Monitoring International Reports, “Burma Internet users use proxy servers to visit blocked websites,” October 17, 2006 (includes text from Ko Thet, "A hole in the Net," The Irawaddy, October 1, 2006).
23. The Myanmar Times, “Burma enforces licensing of Internet cafes,” March 20, 2006, (Text of report in English by Khin Hninn Phyu, reprinted by the BBC) at http://www.burmanet.org/news/2006/03/31/myanmar-times-via-bbc-burma-enfo....
24. Democratic Voice of Burma, “Press freedom in Burma,” May 7, 2006, http://english.dvb.no/news.php?id=7010 ; and Shawn L. Nance, “How to fool the cyber spooks,” The Irrawaddy Online, March 27, 2005, http://www.irrawaddy.org/aviewer.asp?a=4504&z=104 (inset).
25. Indo-Asian News Service, “Google, Gmail banned in Myanmar: Surfers,” June 30, 2006.
26. Reporters Without Borders, “Internet increasingly resembles an Intranet as foreign services blocked,” July 4, 2006, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=18202 ; The Irrawaddy, “Junta blocks Google and Gmail,” June 30, 2006.
27. See, for example, Mizzima News, “Four dissidents sentenced up to 19 years in prison for anti-government poems,” June 21, 2006, http://www.mizzima.com/MizzimaNews/AlertBurma/22-June-2006-02.html.

Malaysia

evan — Thu, 10 May 2007 15:21:07 -0400

Background

Malaysia has a long history of state censorship and tight media controls. All four major newspapers are pro-state, and any oppositional and independent media outlets face the possibility of harassment by police, extended legal wrangling, detention, and imprisonment for publishing speech critical of the state.1 As many as twenty different Malaysian laws restrict speech, and free speech activists contend this leads to self-censorship by journalists.2 The state also monitors the content of Web sites, and independent news Web site Malaysiakini.com claims to have been the subject of several police investigations and an eviction notice as a result of publishing content deemed defamatory or offensive.3

Internet in Malaysia

Since 1996, Malaysia has embarked on an international public relations campaign to draw technology research and development to its Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC), a high-tech business center and communications infrastructure designed to help Malaysia become an international information technology leader.4 Developing Internet infrastructure in Malaysia is a state priority, and consumers are encouraged to purchase PCs and Internet access. By 2005, Malaysia had approximately eleven million Internet users, and with a national Internet penetration rate of 42 percent was third in Southeast Asia behind Hong Kong and Singapore.5 The state, recognizing the opportunities for e-commerce and for individuals to exchange ideas and information,6 has strongly encouraged adoption of broadband Internet throughout the country.7 Nevertheless, uptake has been slow as dial-up remains the method by which most Malaysians access the Internet.8 Broadband penetration reached a mere 2 percent in 2006, far behind other Southeast Asian regional leaders such as Singapore and Hong Kong, which had broadband penetrations of nearly 16 and 24 percent, respectively.9

Legal and regulatory frameworks

Malaysia’s constitution guarantees every citizen the right of free speech and expression, but also sets significant limitations on that freedom, as Parliament may by law effect “such restrictions [on free speech] as it deems necessary or expedient in the interest of the security of the Federation ….”10 Parliament has enacted numerous laws enabling broad state control over the media. Notable print and broadcast media regulations include the Printing Presses and Publications Act, which requires all print publishers to seek annual renewal of a publication license granted at the state’s discretion, and the Sedition Act, which criminalizes the expression or publication of words that tend to incite hatred or contempt against any government.

The Communications and Multimedia Act of 1998 (“CMA”) and the Communications and Multimedia Commission Act of 1998 (“CMCA”) together directly govern Malaysia’s telecommunications, broadcasting, and Internet sectors, including related facilities, services, and content.11 The CMCA establishes the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission, which is empowered to regulate the information technology and communications industries. The commission takes the position that Internet content must be regulated and controlled for “reasons of access, privacy and security and protection of individual rights.”12 The CMA empowers the commission with broad authority to regulate online speech, providing that “no content applications service provider, or other person using a content applications service, shall provide content which is indecent, obscene, false, menacing, or offensive in character with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten or harass any person.”13 Publishers of media content in violation of this provision may face criminal penalties, including a fine of up to RM50,000 and/or a maximum of one year in prison.14 The CMA also establishes the Content Forum, which formulates and implements the Content Code—voluntary guidelines for content providers concerning the handling of content deemed offensive and indecent.15

The CMA and other laws empower the state with extensive media controls. To foster the growth of the Internet market and the MSC, however, the state has generally refrained from directly censoring the Internet. In its “Bill of Guarantees” to approved MSC companies, the state pledges not to censor Internet content.16 Nevertheless, Internet content publishers in Malaysia operate under constant risk that the CMA and numerous other laws regulating speech and content on traditional media will be interpreted or amended to extend to Internet publications.17

In January 2007, Malaysian Prime Minister Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi made a somewhat ineffectual distinction by stating that while the government policy is not to censor the Internet, bloggers are bound by laws on defamation, sedition, and other limits on speech.18 Badawi’s statement was an official restatement of the policy announced in August 2006 that bloggers who publish seditious, malicious, or defamatory content will be reported to police.19 In January 2007, the New Straits Times (NST) newspaper and several of its executives inaugurated the first known defamation suits against bloggers. Jeff Ooi (http://jeffooi.com/) and Ahirudin Attan (http://rockybru.blogspot.com), both prominent bloggers and the latter the President of the National Press Club, were sued simultaneously for both blog posts and reader comments.20 The allegedly libelous content included Jeff Ooi’s blog coverage of NST and its editors’ roles in misrepresenting facts, publishing a caricature of the Prophet Muhammad and plagiarism in blog posts in 2006.21 Ooi had previously been investigated by the Communications and Multimedia Commission and the police concerning comments a reader posted on his blog that were deemed offensive to the official version of Islam in Malaysia.22

ONI testing results

Testing was conducted during October and November 2006 on two of the largest Malaysian Internet service providers (ISPs), Jaring and TMNet, and also on Macrolynx, a smaller Malaysian ISP. The tests revealed no evidence of filtering for any of the categories tested.

Conclusion

Malaysia retains strict control over traditional broadcast and print media through a broad web of vaguely worded regulations.23 To encourage growth of Internet and new media technologies and commerce in Malaysia, however, the state has promised Internet companies that it will not censor the Internet. ONI’s testing revealed no evidence of technological Internet filtering. This does not necessarily mean, however, that the Internet environment in Malaysia is free of government influence and control. Bloggers and independent online news publishers report being investigated and harassed by police on several occasions for posting allegedly offensive or seditious content, and the state media frequently run articles and opinion pieces questioning whether the Internet should be subject to tighter state controls.

NOTES

1. See Reporters Without Borders, Malaysia: 2004 Annual Report, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=10201.
2. Ibid.
3. See Steven Gan, “Yes, another police report,” August 11, 2006, http://www.malaysiakini.com/editorials/55265 ; see also South East Asian Press Alliance, “World publishers and editors back Malaysiakini's non-disclosure policy,” January 30, 2006, http://www.seapabkk.org/news/malaysia/20030130.html.
4. See http://www.msc.com.my/msc/msc.asp.
5. International Telecommunication Union, World Telecommunication Indicators 2006; Paul Budde Communication Pty Ltd., Asia: Internet, March 5, 2006, p. 3.
6. Communications and Multimedia Content Forum of Malaysia, “Broadband in Malaysia: More supply than demand?” 2006, http://www.cmcf.org.my/HTML/cmcf_industry_watch-12.asp ; The Communications and Multimedia Content Forum of Malaysia, “Convergence,” 2006, http://www.cmcf.org.my/HTML/cmcf_industry_watch_3.asp.
7. Paul Budde Communication Pty Ltd., Malaysia: Broadband Market, July 30, 2006, p. 1.
8. Ibid.
9. International Telecommunication Union, World Telecommunication Indicators 2006.
10. Constitution of Malaysia, Article 10.
11. See The Communications and Multimedia Content Forum of Malaysia, http://www.cmcf.org.my/.
12. Ibid.
13. Malaysian Communications Multimedia Act of 1998, section 211(1).
14. Malaysian Communications Multimedia Act of 1998, section 233.
15. See The Communications and Multimedia Content Forum of Malaysia, http://www.cmcf.org.my/.
16. See MSC Malaysia National Rollout, http://www.msc.com.my/msc/rollout_status.asp.
17. See, for example, Star Online, “Government looking at gaps in printing Act,” July 27, 2006, http://www.thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2006/7/27/nation/14961817... (“The Government will study if the Printing Presses and Publications Act should be amended to include the electronic media and the Internet media”).
18. Malaysia General News, “Gov’t won’t censor Internet bloggers but they must be responsible, says PM,” January 23, 2007.
19. Reuters, “Malaysian leaders carry quarrel into cyberspace,” August 11, 2006.
20. South China Morning Post, “Newspaper sues Internet bloggers for defamation,” January 19, 2007, reprinted at http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=61629.
21. See Jeff Ooi’s blog Screenshots at http://jeffooi.com/.
22. See Ethan Zuckerman, “Global voices blogger Jeff Ooi questioned in Malaysia regarding Weblog,” Global Voices, February 28, 2005, http://www.globalvoicesonline.org/2005/02/28/global-voices-blogger-jeff-....
23. See, for example, http://www.kempen.gov.my/coci/mypress.htm.

Thailand

miriam — Wed, 09 May 2007 21:56:26 -0400

Background

In the aftermath of a military coup that followed years of heightened fear and self-censorship, the Internet community in Thailand continues to face uncertainties created by censorship policies, antiquated laws, regulatory reform, and the privatization of state-owned telecoms. Considered by many to have inaugurated Internet filtering in Thailand, former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra pursued aggressive censorship policies and, through his family-owned Shin Corporation, orchestrated a series of defamation suits against his critics.1 After Thaksin was deposed in a military coup on September 19, 2006, the interim government abrogated the 1997 Constitution, abolished the Constitutional Court, and imposed a series of restrictions on news reporting and political activity that threatened national solidarity.2

Internet in Thailand

Internet usage in Thailand began with a small base and has increased sixfold over the past five years.3 Initially, rather than encouraging growth of the Internet for all people, the government used and developed it only for state academic institutions and government agencies.4

The total number of Internet users in 2005 was estimated at 12,500,000, representing a PC Internet penetration rate of approximately 19 percent.5 However, homes and businesses in Bangkok and other major cities make up most of the penetration rate, and there is little Internet connectivity in surrounding areas.6 In 2004, about 15 percent of schools had access to the Internet.7 It is believed that more people may use the Internet as content becomes available in local languages rather than English.8 Although no significant gender divide has emerged, over half of Thai Internet users are between fifteen and twenty-four years old.9 Of this group nearly 27 percent use the Internet at cybercafés while 18 percent access from home.10 Broadband Internet access is available, but it is still undeveloped at less than 2 percent household penetration.11

Internet connectivity in Thailand is built around education/research networks, commercial networks (Internet service providers, or ISPs), and government networks.12 CAT Telecom (CAT, formerly the Communications Authority of Thailand) and the Telephone Organization of Thailand (TOT), the two big state-owned telecoms, each operate an international Internet Gateway (IIG) as well as one each of three domestic exchanges for twenty-one licensed ISPs and four noncommercial Internet hubs.13

Legal and regulatory frameworks

The Ministry of Information and Communications Technology (MICT) and its subordinate bodies, including the National Information Technology Committee (NITC), CAT, TOT, and the National Electronics and Computer Technology Center (NECTEC), all regulate the Internet.14

Prior to the coup the constitution provided a nominal legal basis for censorship, although the precise authority for filtering Internet content remains unclear. Under the abrogated 1997 Constitution, Thai citizens were guaranteed the rights to express opinions; to communicate by “lawful” means; and to access information with certain limitations for state security, maintaining public order or morals, and safeguarding others’ right to privacy and reputation.15 It remains unconstitutional to criticize or level accusations against the king.16

Broad claims associating criticism of government with injury to the king, or lèse majesté, have also been used to enforce censorship. Thailand is one of the few remaining countries in the world to prosecute crimes of lèse majesté, where individuals who insult, defame, or threaten the Thai royal family can be sentenced to from three to fifteen years of imprisonment. Such allegations, in spite of King Bhumibol’s own sanction of public criticism of the Thai crown, are leveled infrequently but have targeted independent media voices17 and used as a “political tool to discredit opponents.”18 Lèse majesté, which in Thailand involves a scope of expression far broader than the actions of the king himself, has begun to form the basis for the blocking and removal of Web sites.19

In July 2003 Thailand became the first country to impose a curfew on online gaming.20 In March 2006 a regulation enforced by the Culture Ministry forbade persons under eighteen years of age from entering Internet cafés between the hours of 10pm and 2pm.21

The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) was brought into operation in late 2004 as an independent telecom regulator and given the exclusive authority to grant licenses for telecom or IT services.22 Previously, an ISP could obtain a concession contract only by giving a free equity stake of about 35 percent to CAT Telecom (formerly the Communications Authority of Thailand) in exchange for a share of the profits from the networks these companies built and paid for.23 In March 2005 the NTC announced that it would grant free licenses once permanent guidelines were in place.24

In August 2003, Thaksin’s government ordered ISPs to begin blocking a list of Web sites that were compiled by CAT and hosted on its server.25 The MICT’s Cyber Inspector team was also charged with rooting out gambling and sex sites.26 In late 2005 the government announced its plans to block over 800,000 pornographic and violent Web sites; ISPs would be ordered to take down the sites, and those that did not follow the order would have their licenses revoked.27 The prime minister also formed a nine-member Internet inspection committee, which met online each morning to compile a list of sites for ISPs to block.28 Although citizens were encouraged to submit sites for blocking through various forums,29 there has been a marked lack of transparency in the government’s decision-making process and execution of filtering. As a new constitution is slated for 2007, the legal authority for Internet filtering continues to be contested.

In the first days of martial law after the coup, military leaders issued orders intended to restore “normalcy,” demanding all political parties to stop their activities, banning new political parties, and requiring the cooperation of news media to discourage the reporting of public opinion.30 The MICT followed suit, enforcing a temporary ban on political text-messaging and phone-ins, where ISPs and authors would be held responsible for offensive messages.31

Not yet enacted at the time of the coup, a revised law laying out the terms and penalties of computer crimes was approved in principle by the newly installed National Legislative Assembly on November 15, 2006. Sponsored by the MICT and the interim military government, this bill in its current form would punish the forwarding of a pornographic e-mail with up to three years imprisonment and the posting of online activity posing a threat to “national security” as an offense under the national security law.32

ONI testing results

The stated goal of 800,000 pornographic and violent Web sites to be blocked as a result of Thaksin’s policy is only one of many reported figures of blocked sites in Thailand. For example, in 2004 there were reportedly 1,247 blocked URLs, most of which were pornographic sites, along with a few sites devoted to online gaming and one site belonging to a separatist movement.33 This proportion remained relatively intact in other accounts. Before it took down its public reports, the Police Bureau on High Tech Crime claimed to have blocked all of the over 34,000 “illicit” Web sites reported since April 2002, with Thai and foreign pornography sites at about 56 percent of the total, sites that sell of sex equipment (Thai) 12 percent, and sites with content posing a “threat to national security” at 11 percent.34 From 2002 to 2005 the MICT also blocked over 2,000 sites, reportedly mostly pornography sites.35 In addition, multiple alleged block lists containing a majority of pornography sites were “leaked.” It was common for prominent sites to be made inaccessible, only to be unblocked after a period of time.

ONI conducted testing after the coup on three major ISPs: KSC, LoxInfo, and True. Of the sites tested, only a small percentage was actually blocked. The Thai government does implement filtering and primarily blocks access to pornography, online gambling sites, and circumvention tools. Outside these categories, only a few sites were blocked by all three ISPs. Two of these sites were inaccessible and suspected to be blocked. One of these sites, the anti-coup Web site http://www.19sep.com received significant media coverage for being blocked six times over a period of three months.36 The other, the Web site of the Patani United Liberation Organisation (http://puloinfo.net) considered by the government to be a Malay Muslim separatist group, appears to be a recent incarnation of the site www.pulo.org that was also blocked and has since been taken down.

Although it has long been declared a top priority of filtering in Thailand, a minority of the Thai-related pornography sites ONI tested were actually blocked by all three ISPs. Only one pornography site (www.sex.com) on the global list was blocked by all three ISPs.

Filtering is demonstrated by redirection to an MICT blockpage. Although it has been reported that ISPs are required to block a list of banned Web sites distributed by the NITC, ONI testing found that filtering varies across ISPs. LoxInfo and True showed significant overlap in sites filtered, blocking a substantial number of additional circumvention tools and anonymous proxies (http://guardster.com; www.stayinvisible.com), pornography, and gaming sites. A few sites promoting human rights, such as the Patani Malay Human Rights Organisation (www.pmhro.org), were also blocked by both ISPs.

Only KSC appeared to address the issue of lèse majesté, blocking a number of pages on amazon.com and other commerce sites featuring biographies of the king. These present an example of URL filtering in Thailand, as various amazon.com URLs were blocked but the domain (www.amazon.com) remained available on all ISPs tested.

Conclusion

The current official approach toward filtering is in flux, especially in the face of questions about the legal authority and procedures for censorship after the abolishment of the 1997 Constitution. However, evidence from ONI testing suggests that targets for blocking have remained consistent, with a strong focus on pornography and lesser priorities made of gaming and circumvention tools. Only a small number of sites with sensitive political content, particularly about the Thai monarchy and insurgents in the south, continue to be inaccessible. It remains to be seen whether the harsh legacy of censorship of all media created by the former prime minister’s government will be carried forward in post-coup Thailand.

NOTES

1. For example, the Shin Corporation sought four hundred million baht (USD10 million) in defamation suits from the Thai Post newspaper and the first defendant, Supinya Klangnarong, a media freedom activist with the NGO Campaign for Popular Media Reform. See also Reporters Without Borders, Thailand:Annual Report 2006, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=17364.
2. Council for Democratic Reform, Announcement No. 3, September 19, 2006.
3. Paul Budde Communication Pty Ltd., Thailand-Internet, 2006, p. 1.
4. Steven Huter, Sirin Palasri, and Zita Wenzel, The History of the Internet in Thailand. Network Startup Resource Center: University of Oregon Books, http://www.nsrc.org/case-studies/thailand/english/conclusion.html.
5. Paul Budde Communication Pty Ltd., Thailand-Internet, 2006, p. 1.
6. National Statistical Office: Thailand, 2005 Information and Communication Technology Survey, http://web.nso.go.th/eng/en/stat/ict/ict05_rep.pdf.
7. National Electronics and Computer Technology Center (NECTEC), Thailand MICT Indicators 2005, February 2005, pp. 28, 41, http://iir.ngi.nectec.or.th/download/indicator2005.pdf.
8. Paul Budde Communication Pty Ltd., Thailand-Internet, 2006, p. 1.
9. National Electronics and Computer Technology Center (NECTEC), Thailand MICT Indicators 2005, February 2005, http://iir.ngi.nectec.or.th/download/indicator2005.pdf.
10. Ibid.
11. Paul Budde Communication Pty Ltd., Telecommunication Sector Snapshot: Thailand, 2006.
12. National Electronics and Computer Technology Center (NECTEC), Internet Network Infrastructure:Thailand’s Perspective, January 10, 2002, http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN012808....
13. Internet Connectivity in Thailand, December 2006, http://iir.ngi.nectec.or.th/internet/map/current.html.
14. Reporters Without Borders, Internet Under Surveillance 2004: Thailand, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=10777.
15. Articles 37, 39, 58, 59. See Article 19, Freedom of Expression and the Media in Thailand, December 2005, p. 38.
16. Article 8, Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, adopted October 11, 1997; Article 1, Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand (Interim Edition), adopted October 1, 2006.
17. Asia Human Rights Commission, Update on Urgent Appeal, April 10, 2006, http://www.ahrchk.net/ua/mainfile.php/2006/1651/.
18. Article 19, Freedom of Expression and the Media in Thailand, December 2005, p. 75.
19. For example, the Midnight University Web site and forum (www.midnightuniv.org) was blocked in July 2006 on claims of lèse majesté, although it was accessible at time of testing. See Bangkok Post, “Web board banned, claim of lese majesty,” July 28, 2006, reprinted at http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/06thailandcoup/article.asp?parentid=49971. The site for discussing political and social issues was blocked by the MMICT on September 29, 2006, the day after scholars at Chiang Mai University affiliated with the Web site tore up mock copies of the interim military government’s constitution. Bangkok Post, “Thai university website closed after protest over interim charter,” October 1, 2006, reprinted at http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article-southeastasia.asp?parentid=54251.
20. Phermsak Lilakul, “Ragnarok curfew starts tonight,” The Nation, July 17, 2003.
21. Anchalee Kongrut, “16-hour Internet cafe curfew for under-18s,” Bangkok Post, April 25, 2006.
22. Telecommunications, IT and E-Commerce, http://bia.co.th/027.html.
23. Paul Budde Communication Pty Ltd., Thailand-Internet, 2006, p. 5.
24. Ibid.
25. Bangkok Post, “Govt forces ISPs to block `inappropriate' web sites,” September 7, 2003.
26. Bangkok Post, “PM wants tighter curbs on internet,” December 18, 2003.
27. Agence France-Presse, “Thailand to block over 800,000 sites,” November 28, 2005.
28. Ibid.
29. See, for example, Thaisnews, “New program will be launched on Radio Thailand,” January 31, 2006, http://www.thaisnews.com/news_detail.php?newsid=160479.
30. Announcement by the Council for Democratic Reform No. 10: Request for Cooperation in News Reporting, September 20, 2006; Announcement by the Council for Democratic Reform No. 15: Ban on Meetings and other Political Activities by Political Parties, September 21, 2006, http://www.mMICT.go.th/cdrc/read_all.asp?cid=1 ; Bangkok Post, “Coup leaders authorise press censorship,” September 20, 2006.
31. Financial Times, Thai Press Reports, “MICT imposes temporary ban on political text-messaging and phone-in,” September 26, 2006.
32. Thai Press Reports, “National Legislative Assembly approves computer crime bill in principle,” November 20, 2006.
33. Miles Ignotus, “Censoring the Web,” Bangkok Post, February 15, 2004.
34. Bangkok Post, “Censors busy on the Internet,” November 24, 2006, http://cyber.police.go.th/reporting/report/sum.php (page no longer available).
35. Kavi Chongkittavorn, “Stop messing with Internet access and free debate,” The Nation, November 20, 2006.
36. The Nation, “Freedom of speech: Anti-coup website blocked again without notification,” December 30, 2006, http://nationmultimedia.com/2006/12/30/politics/politics_30022916.php.