All Content Related to Middle East and North Africa (MENA)

Middle East and North Africa

Mon, 10 Aug 2009 11:05:26 -0400

Note: a previous version of this profile is available at Middle East and North Africa, 2006-2007.

INTERNET IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

Countries in the Middle East and North Africa continue to invest in IT infrastructure and media projects as part of their strategies to develop the local economies and create employment. Among the major examples are Jordan’s plans to establish a free IT zone in Amman, which will give sales and income tax breaks to the software companies and business development firms based in the zone. The zone is part of a strategy designed to increase the number of Internet users from 26 percent to 50 percent. It aims to increase employment in the sector and to boost the sector’s revenues from $2.2 billion in 2009 to $3 billion by end of 2011.1

In addition to existing regional hubs Dubai Media City and Dubai Internet City, the United Arab Emirates launched a new content creation zone to support media content creators in the Middle East and North Africa. The new Abu Dhabi-based zone aims to employ Arab media professionals in film, broadcast, digital and publishing. CNN, BBC, the Financial Times, Thomson Reuters Foundation, and Thomson Foundation are among the partners of the zone.2

At the same time, some countries have initiated efforts to develop Arabic Web content. In this regard, Microsoft is working on translation technology that would make the Arabic language more accessible to Internet users as part of Qatar’s Supreme Council for Information and Communication Technology’s initiative to develop more Web sites with Arabic content.3

The number of Internet users is likely to continue to rise, especially with the introduction of technologies that overcome poor ICT infrastructure that hinders Internet access in the region. WiMAX, for example, was commercially available by end of March 2009 in Algeria, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia, while operators in other parts of the region have started testing the service.4 Additionally, broadband markets are growing fast in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, and commercial 3G mobile services have been launched in Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Syria, and Tunisia.5

Demographic factors are also expected to contribute to the growth of Internet population. The Arab Media Outlook 2008–2012 says that, “Digital media will thrive in the Arab market because the market has a large, technologically accomplished demographic group—its youth—who are comfortable with it and will customize it to their own requirements.” The report also revealed that, “over 50% of the population in Yemen, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco and Egypt are estimated to be currently less than 25 years old, while in the rest of the countries the under-25, ‘net generation’ makes up around 35% to 47% of total population.”6

Liberalization of telecommunications markets has already taken place in several Arab countries. Most incumbent telecom companies in North Africa are already in private hands, with exception of Algerie Telecom, the privatization of which has been postponed due to the global economic crisis.7 However, experts say telecom liberalization in the Middle East and North Africa still lags behind the rest of the world in terms cost and efficiency, a matter which does not encourage direct foreign investment.8

THE MEDIA ENVIRONMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

The Middle East and North Africa is one of the most heavily censored regions in the world. Human rights watchdogs and free speech advocacy groups continue to criticize the media restrictions and repressive legal regimes, and over the past few years, a great number of bloggers and cyber-dissidents have been jailed.

In April 2009, The International Federation of Journalists called for a radical overhaul of media laws in the Middle East, stating that the laws in most of the region’s countries still permit the jailing of journalists for undermining the reputation of the state, the president, the monarch or the religion. Such laws have often been used to suppress reporting of corruption or scrutiny of government actions.9 This media environment created by authorities has been hostile to bloggers and online activism, resulting in a number of arrests across the region. In a list created by the Committee to Protect Journalists of the ten worst countries to be a blogger, four such countries (Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, and Saudi Arabia) were from the region.10

INTERNET AND MEDIA REGULATIONS: THE DEBATE

The last few years have witnessed an increase in the debate over media and Internet censorship in the region. Rifts between the censors and local and regional advocates of freedom of speech have intensified, and more voices continue to express concern about media regulations in the region.

Interestingly, while advocates in the region criticize the regimes for the repressive regulations, which limit freedom of speech online, some governments claim they arrest bloggers and online activists because they abuse what the regimes call “media freedom.” In Egypt for example, the authorities arrested a blogger in May 2009 under the accusation of "Exploitation of the democratic climate prevailing in the country to overthrow the regime." The Cairo-based Arab Network for Human Rights Information deplored the charges and described them as a black comedy.11

Another example of such a rift is from the Gulf countries, where the head of the Doha Centre for Media Freedom criticized Dubai Police for allegedly asking Google to censor YouTube. The head of the center was later criticized by Qatar officials as well as some journalists and was accused of endorsing pornography,12 which is a sensitive topic in many Middle East and North African societies.

While it is common for Internet groups and online activists in the region to organize online campaigns to condemn online censorship and arrests of bloggers and online writers, other online campaigns which call for and support social censorship - mostly online pornography - have emerged in the past few years. For instance, an Arabic Web site called Ehjeb (Arabic for the verb "to block") is becoming increasingly popular, particularly among users of Web forums. The site offers to facilitate blocking of Web sites by sending user-submitted URLs of questionable content to the censors in some of the region’s countries. Also, some Internet users in North African countries where there is no social filtering have organized online campaigns to demand filtering of sexually explicit content.13

Pro-censorship advocates and anti-censorship activists have also used the court system in their attempts to implement or remove censorship. For example, a judge in Egypt filed a lawsuit requesting the banning of 51 Web sites considered offensive. The court rejected the lawsuit in December 2007 and emphasized support for freedom of expression as long as the Web sites do not harm local beliefs or public order. In May 2009 however, a Cairo court ruled in favor of an Egyptian lawyer and ordered the Egyptian government to ban access to pornographic Web sites because they are deemed offensive to the values of religion and society.

In Tunisia however, a blogger challenged the Web filtering regime in the country by filing a legal suit against the Tunisian Internet Agency (ATI) for censoring the social networking site Facebook after it was briefly blocked in August 2008. The court dismissed the case in November 2008 without providing any explanation. These examples and cases illustrate how the fight over access control is taking different shapes and forms, and also indicate that different players will continue the debate and challenge each other.

ACCESS CONTROL IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

Access control in the Middle East and North Africa is multilayered; governments and authorities use different measures to regulate Internet access and online activities. These measures include laws and regulations, technical filtering, physical restrictions, surveillance and monitoring, and harassments and arrests. Among the laws and regulations used to control access in the region are the press and publication laws, penal codes, emergency laws, anti-terrorism laws, Internet-specific laws, ISPs Terms & Conditions, and telecommunications decrees.

Press and Publication Laws, Penal Codes, Emergency Laws, and Anti-terrorism Bills

Many countries in the region use restrictive press laws to regulate online publishing and traditional journalism. For example, censorship of online media and print journalism in Bahrain is exerted using the 2002 Press Law.14 Kuwait’s 2006 Press Law allows imprisonment of journalists for making references to Islam that are deemed insulting,15 or for articles seen as “against national interests.”16 Oman’s 1984 Press and Publication Law authorizes the government to censor publications deemed politically, culturally, or sexually offensive.17 Syria’s 2001 Press Law sets out sweeping controls over publications printed in Syria.18 And journalists in Tunisia have been prosecuted by Tunisia’s press code which bans offending the president, disturbing order, and publishing what the government perceives as false news.19 Yemen’s 1990 Press and Publications Law subjects publications and broadcast media to broad prohibitions and harsh penalties.20 The press law in Morocco has been used to suppress outspoken online writers.21

In addition to press codes, some countries often use penal codes to suppress journalists and online writers. Yemen’s Ministry of Information declared in April 2008 that the penal code will be used to prosecute writers who publish on the Internet content that “incites hatred” or “harms national interests.”22 Syria’s penal code criminalizes spreading news abroad.23 Though the Bahraini government introduced in May 2008 amendments to the 2002 Press Law that eliminate prison sentences for journalists and prior censorship on publications, journalists can still be charged and jailed using the penal code and anti-terrorism law.24

In addition to the use of penal and press codes, two countries – Egypt and Syria – both of which have been under emergency law for some time, have taken advantage of their status to punish individuals deemed threatening. Egypt’s emergency law, in force since the declaration of the state of emergency in 1981, grants the administrative authority powers to search, arrest and detain individuals without the supervision of judicial bodies. Rights groups say that the uninterrupted application of the emergency law since 1981 has led to the emergence of a parallel legal system unchecked by ordinary judicial bodies.25 Similarly, Syria uses the ongoing state of emergency (which began in 1963) to arrest media workers and journalists and political activists risk arrest at any time.26

Morocco uses its anti-terrorism bill, passed following suicide bombings in Casablanca in 2003, to punish journalists. The bill grants the government sweeping legal power to arrest journalists for publishing content deemed to “disrupt public order by intimidation, force, violence, fear or terror.”27

Internet-specific laws

Few countries in the region have introduced Internet-specific laws to regulate Internet activities; among them are the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. The UAE’s 2007 federal cyber law criminalizes hacking, abusing holy shrines or religious rituals, opposing the Islamic religion, transcending family principles and values, setting up a Web site for groups promoting programs in breach of public decency and order, and setting up a Web site or publishing information for a terrorist group under fake names with intent to facilitate contacts with their leadership, or to promote their ideologies and finance their activities, or to publish information on how to make explosives or any other substances to be used in terrorist attacks.28

In January 2008, Saudi Arabia implemented 16 articles of new law on the use of technology. The law includes penalties of ten years in prison and a fine for Web site operators who advocate or support terrorism; three years and fine for financial fraud or invasion of privacy; and five years and a fine for those guilty of distributing pornography or other materials that violate public law, religious values and social standards of the kingdom. Accomplices of the guilty parties and even those who are proven to have only intended to engage in unlawful IT acts can receive up to half of maximum punishments.29

Terms and Conditions of ISPs

Terms and conditions imposed by ISPs are also used to control access in some countries. In Oman for example, Internet use is regulated by the ISP Omantel’s Terms & Conditions, which mandate that users “not carry out any unlawful activities which contradict the social, cultural, political, religious or economical values of the Sultanate of Oman or could cause harm to any third party” as any abuse and misuse of the Internet Services will “result in the termination of the subscription and/or in the proceedings of Criminal or Civil lawsuits against the Customer.”30

Another example is Yemen where the terms and conditions set by the ISP TeleYemen (aka Y.Net) prohibits “sending any message which is offensive on moral, religious, communal, or political grounds.” TeleYemen reserves the right to control access to data stored in its system “in any manner deemed appropriate by TeleYemen.” Section 6.3.3 cautions subscribers that TeleYemen will report “any use or attempted use of the Y.Net service which contravenes any applicable Law of the Republic of Yemen.”31

Telecommunications laws

Telecommunications laws are used to control what ISPs can and cannot host. In Algeria, for example, article 14 of a 1998 telecommunications decree makes ISPs responsible for the sites they host, and requires them to take “all necessary steps to ensure constant surveillance” of content to prevent access to “material contrary to public order and morality.32 Bahrain’s Telecommunications Law of 2002 contains penalties for illicit use of the network, including the transmission of messages that are offensive to public policy or morals.33 And in Tunisia, the 1998 post and telecommunications law enables the authorities to intercept and check the content of email messages.34 Electronic surveillance such as filtering of email messages of government opponents has been reported in Tunisia.35

Surveillance and monitoring

Measures to monitor Internet activities, particularly in Internet cafés, have been introduced in many Arab countries. In Algeria, security forces started raiding Internet cafés and checking browsing history of Internet users after terrorist attacks hit the country in April 2007. In April 2008, the security forces increased their monitoring and surveillance efforts of Internet cafés and Internet cafés were required to collect names and ID numbers of their customers and report this information, together with any suspicious activities to the police.36

Similarly, Jordan began in March 2008 increasing restrictions on the country’s Internet cafés. Cameras were installed in Internet cafes to monitor users, and Internet café owners were required to register the IP number of the café, the users’ personal data, the time of use and the data of Web sites explored.37

Additionally, Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Interior in April 2009 ordered Internet cafés to install hidden cameras and provide a record of names and identities of their customers.38 In Kuwait, Internet café owners also were required to maintain a record of customers’ names and IDs, which they must submit to the Ministry of Communications (MOC) upon request.39

Some Internet café operators in Lebanon admit that they use surveillance computer software that enables them to monitor the desktops and browsing habits of their clients under the pretext of protecting the security of their computer networks or to stop their clients from accessing pornography.40 In March 2008, the Syrian authorities ordered Internet café users to provide their names and identification cards and the times they use the Internet café to Internet café owners who will subsequently present them to the authorities.41

In October 2007, police in Yemen ordered some Internet cafés to close at midnight and demanded that users show their identification cards to the café operator.42 Some Internet café owners use surveillance software to monitor the online activities of their customers and refuse access to clients who access pornography.43

In August 2008, the Egyptian authorities imposed new monitoring measures by demanding that Internet café clients must provide their names, email and phone numbers, before they can use the Internet. Once the data is provided, clients will receive a text message on their cell phones and a pin number that they can use to access the Internet.44

In addition to the above measures, some countries impose physical restrictions on Internet cafés as part of the monitoring efforts. For example, Yemen45 and Oman46 require that computer screens in Internet cafés must be visible to the floor supervisor. No closed rooms or curtains that might obstruct view of the monitors are allowed.

TECHNICAL FILTERING IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ONI conducted tests for technical Internet filtering in all of the countries in the Middle East and North Africa between 2008 and 2009. Test results prove that the governments and Internet service providers (ISPs) censor content deemed politically sensitive; critical of governments, leaders or ruling families; morally offensive; or in violation of public ethics and order.

Testing also revealed that political filtering continues to be the common denominator across the region. Many states in the Middle East and North Africa prevent their citizens from accessing political content or have blocked such content in the past. For example, Bahrain, Qatar, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Libya, and Tunisia have censored Web sites containing content critical of the governments and leaders, Web sites which claim human rights violations, and/or Web sites of opposition groups. Mauritania has briefly blocked the news Web site Taqadoumy, and Egypt has at some point blocked the Web site of the Islamic opposition group Muslim Brotherhood, as well as the Web site of the Labor Party’s newspaper.

To one degree or another, the Gulf countries, as well as Sudan, Tunisia, Gaza, and Yemen, censor pornography, nudity, gay and lesbian content, escort and dating services, and sites displaying provocative attire. Also censored by most of these countries are Web sites which present critical reviews of Islam and/or attempt to convert Muslims to other religions. Some of these countries also filter Web sites related to alcohol, gambling, and drugs.

Generally, the countries that implement political or social filtering also target to various degrees proxies and circumvention tools to prevent users from bypassing filters. Some of these countries also block online translation services and privacy tools apparently because they also can be used to access blocked content.

Regional Trends in Access Control

Internet censorship in the Middle East and North Africa is on the rise, and the scope and depth of filtering are increasing. Previous ONI tests revealed that political filtering was limited in some countries, but 2008-2009 results indicate that political censorship is targeting more content and is becoming more consistent. For example, previous tests found that Yemen temporarily blocked political Web sites in the run-up to the 2006 presidential elections, and Bahrain did the same ahead of parliamentary elections. However, 2008-2009 testing revealed that filtering in these two countries has been consistently extended to include several Web sites run by opposition groups or news Web sites and forums which espouse oppositional political views.

In the meantime, countries that have been filtering political content continue to add more Web sites to their political blacklists. For example, filtering in Syria was expanded to include popular sites such as YouTube, Facebook, and Amazon, as well as more Web sites affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood Kurdish opposition groups. Another example is Tunisia, which added more political and oppositional content as well as other apolitical sites such as the OpenNet Initiative and Global Voices Online.

Social filtering is also increasing and is catching up with the continuously growing social Web. Most of the Arab countries were found to have started to block Arabic-language explicit content that was previously accessible. Interestingly, filtering of Arabic-language explicit Web content in the Middle East and North Africa is usually not as fast as that of other languages. ONI’s investigation revealed that the US-based commercial filtering software used by most of the ISPs in the region does not pick up Arabic content as comprehensively as content in English.

Increases in filtering are the norm in the Middle East and North Africa, and unblocking is the exception. Of the few examples of unblocking of Web sites is Syria’s restoration of access to Wikipedia Arabic, Morocco’s lifting of a ban on a few pro-Western Sahara independence Web sites, and Libya’s allowing access to some previously banned political sites. Sudan’s filtering of gay and lesbian, dating, provocative attire and health-related sites was also more limited compared to previous test results.

Another regional trend is that more Arab countries are introducing regulations to make Web publishing subject to press and publication laws and requiring local Web sites to register with the authorities before they can go live. In Jordan, for example, the country’s Legislation Bureau in the Prime Minister’s Office issued in September 2007 a decision that Web sites and electronic press must comply with the provisions of the publications and publishing law and fall under the oversight of the Publications and Publishing Department, which announced it would exercise immediate supervision and censorship.

Another example is Saudi Arabia, which announced in May 2009 plans to enact legislation for newspapers and Internet Web sites that will require Saudi-based Web sites to get official licenses from a special agency under the purview of the Ministry of Information. Bahrain already has a similar system that requires local Web sites to register with the Ministry of Information.

Among the new trends in controlling access is the increase in incidents of hacking of opposition and dissident Web sites and blogs. Such incidents have been reported in Tunisia and Yemen. On the other hand, sectarian cyber war among different religious groups in the region, namely Shiite and Sunni groups, has occurred in the past few years. The cyber attacks managed to deface the Web sites of significant Shiite and Sunni organizations and individuals and in some cases the attackers managed to remove the content of some of these sites. Additionally, Israeli, Palestinian and Lebanese Web sites run by Hizbullah have been targets of attacks and hacking, especially during wars and conflicts.

CONCLUSION

Governments in the Middle East and North Africa continue to invest in media and IT projects, and at the same time are continuing to invest in censorship technologies to prevent their citizens from accessing a wide range of objectionable content. Also, while Western companies build ICT infrastructure necessary for development in the region, other Western companies provide the censors with technologies and data used to filter the Internet.

The censors in the region attempt to control political content using technical filtering, laws and regulations, surveillance and monitoring, physical restrictions, and extra-legal harassment and arrests. Filtering of content deemed offensive for religious, moral, and cultural reasons is pervasive in many countries and is growing.

Though many governments acknowledge social filtering, most continue to disguise their political filtering practices by attempting to confuse users with different error messages.
The absence of technical filtering in some countries in the region by no means indicates free online environments in those countries; surveillance and monitoring practices and extra-legal harassment from security agencies create a climate of fear used to silence online dissidents.
Many ISPs block popular politically neutral online services such as online translation services and privacy tools fearing that they can be used to bypass the filtering regimes. The censors also overblock Web sites and services such as social networking Web sites and photo and video sharing Web sites because of the potential for content considered objectionable.

More users in the Middle East and North Africa are using the Internet for political campaigning and social activism; however, states continue to introduce more restrictive legal, technical and monitoring measures, amid growing local and regional calls to ease restrictions and remove barriers to the free flow of information.

Author: Helmi Noman

1. Mohammad Ghazal, “Jordan, UAE firms in talks over free IT zone,” The National, May 16, 2009, http://www.jordantimes.com/?news=16742.
2. Keach Hagey, “Capital launches media zone to nurture young Arab talent,” The National, October 13, 2008, http://www.thenational.ae/article/20081012/BUSINESS/13341341/1119/NEWS.
3. Chris V. Panganiban, “Technology to promote Arabic online,” The Peninsula, April 19, 2009, http://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/Display_news.asp?section=local_news&mon....
4. “Has the age of fixed wireless broadband services arrived in the Arab World? By end of March 2009, six Arab countries had eleven commercially launched,” Arab Advisors Group, April 16, 2009, http://www.arabadvisors.com/Pressers/presser-160409.htm.
5. “2008 Africa - Telecoms, Mobile and Broadband in Northern Region,” ChinaCCM, December 2008, http://www.chinaccm.com/4S/4S16/4S1607/news/20081205/111435.asp.
6. PricewaterhouseCoopers, “Arab media outlook 2008-2012,” http://www.pwc.com/extweb/pwcpublications.nsf/docid/14D97CB491E2A59B8525....
7. “2008 Africa - Telecoms, Mobile and Broadband in Northern Region,” ChinaCCM, December 2008, http://www.chinaccm.com/4S/4S16/4S1607/news/20081205/111435.asp.
8. Dana Halawi, “MENA telecoms need liberalization – Hasbani,” The Daily Star, April 17, 2009, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=3&article_....
9. nternational Federation of Journalists, “IFJ Demands Overhaul of Repressive Media Laws in the Middle East,” April 29, 2009, http://www.ifj.org/en/articles/ifj-demands-overhaul-of-repressive-media-....
10. Committee to Protect Journalists, “10 Worst Countries to be a Blogger,” April 30, 2009
http://cpj.org/reports/2009/04/10-worst-countries-to-be-a-blogger.php.
11. “Egypt: new comic crimes written by the state security - Blogger in custody, on charges of exploitation of the democratic climate,” The Arabic Network for Human Rights Information, May 14, 2009, http://anhri.net/en/reports/2009/pr0514-2.shtml.
12. “A press row in Qatar -The limits to liberalization,” The Economist, May 14, 2009, http://www.economist.com/world/mideast-africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=....
13. “Users’ Initiative to Block Web Sites,” OpenNet Initiative Blog, October 24, 2008, http://opennet.net/blog/2008/10/users-initiatives-block-web-sites.
14. Bahrain Center for Human Rights, “Website accused of violating press code, BCHR concerned that move is aimed at silencing critical voices,” September 2008, http://www.bahrainrights.org/en/node/2446.
15. “Country Profile: Kuwait,” BBC News, March 11, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/791053.stm.
16. Reporters without Borders, “Kuwait— Annual Report 2007”, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=20767.
17. United Nations Development Programme, “Program on Governance in the Arab Region (UNDP-POGAR): Oman,” http://www.pogar.org/countries/civil.asp?cid=13.
18. Freedom House, “Map of Press Freedom 2008,” http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&year=2008.
19. Committee to Protect Journalists, “Tunisia Report: The Smiling Oppressor,” September 23, 2008, http://cpj.org/reports/2008/09/tunisia-oppression.php.
20. Yemen News Agency (Saba) Press and Publications Law, http://www.sabanews.net/en/news44000.htm.
21. Reporters Without Borders, “Appeal court overturns blogger’s conviction,” September 18, 2008, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=28603.
22. “Lawzi: Ma Yonshar fi Sahafat Al Internet Lan Yakon Ba'eedan A'n Al Mosa'ala bimojib Qanoon Al Oqobat” [Online journalism is subject to the penal code: Lawzi, Yemeni Minister of Information], Saba, February 3, 2008, http://www.yemenna.com/vb/showthread.php?t=9502.
23. Freedom House, “Map of Press Freedom 2008,” http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&year=2008.
24. International Federation of Journalists, “Despite advances, journalists still face possible jail terms under prevailing laws, warns IFJ,” June 12, 2008, http://www.ifex.org/en/content/view/full/94435/.
25. Sarah Carr, “Journalists Challenge Egypt’s Exceptional Laws at Seminar,” Daily News Egypt, August 1, 2008, http://dailystaregypt.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=15464.
26. Reporters Without Borders, “Syria - Annual Report 2007,” http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=20777.
27. Human Rights Watch, “Background: The State of Human Rights in Morocco,” November 2005, http://hrw.org/reports/2005/morocco1105/4.htm.
28. “UAE cyber crimes law,” Gulf News, November 2, 2007, http://archive.gulfnews.com/uae/uaessentials/more_stories/10018507.html.
29. David Westley, ”Saudi Tightens Grip on Internet Use,” Arabian Business, January 26, 2008, http://www.arabianbusiness.com/509226-saudi-tightens-grip-on-internet-us....
30. Omantel, “Omantel Terms & Conditions,” http://www.omantel.net.om/policy/terms.asp.
31. Y.Net, “Terms and conditions for Y.Net Service,” http://www.y.net.ye/support/rules.htm.
32. Reporters Without Borders, “Internet Under Surveillance 2004 - Algeria,” http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=10730.
33. Telecommunication Regulatory Authority (TRA) - Kingdom of Bahrain, “Legislative decree no. 48 of 2002 Promulgating the Telecommunications Law,” http://www.tra.org.bh/en/home.asp?dfltlng=1.
34. Reporters Without Borders, “A textbook case in press censorship for the past 20 years,” November 5, 2007, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=24264.
35. Reporters Without Borders, “Repression continues as Ben Ali marks 21st anniversary as president,” November 7, 2008, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=29208.
36. Fathiya Borowinah, “al-Jazaer: Ajhizat alamn tolin al-harb ala magahi alinternet liihbat masharee’ khalaya irhabiya naemah” (Arabic), Al-Riyadh, May 1, 2007, http://www.alriyadh.com/2007/05/01/article246175.html.
37. The Arabic Network for Human Rights Information, “Jordan: New Restrictions on Internet Cafes and Violating Privacy of Users,” March 11, 2008, http://anhri.net/en/reports/2008/pr0311.shtml.
38. OpenNet Initiative, “Restriction on Internet use in the Middle East on the rise: Internet cafés in Saudi must install hidden cameras,” April 16, 2009, http://opennet.net/blog/2009/04/restriction-internet-use-middle-east-ris....
39. U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—2007,” released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, March 11, 2008, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100599.htm.
40. “Baramij Malomatiya tadbut elaqat al-Jumhur bemaqahi al-Internet lima’ aljins waltajasos wasirqat albareed aleliqtoroni (Information software to control the relationship between the public and Internet cafés and to prevent access to sex, spying, and stealing emails)” (Arabic), Dar al-Hayat, June 24, 2007, http://www.daralhayat.com/science_tech/06-2007/Item-20070623-59a6944a-c0....
41. Khaled Yacoub Oweis, “Syria expands ‘iron censorship’ over Internet,” Reuters, March 13, 2008, http://uk.reuters.com/article/internetNews/idUKL138353620080313?sp=true.
42. “Internet cafes closed after midnight,” Mareb Press, February 20, 2008, http://marebpress.net/news_details.php?sid=10305.
43. Moneer Al-Omari , “Search for Pornographic Material on Rise; Children are most Vulnerable,” Yemen Post, January 12, 2009, http://www.yemenpost.net/63/Reports/20084.htm.
44. “Egypt demanding data from cyber cafés users: NGO,” AFP, August 9, 2008, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hN_tktRSmeojLOOn65lVULB4lj8A.
45. Moneer Al-Omari , “Search for Pornographic Material on Rise; Children are most Vulnerable,” Yemen Post, January 12, 2009, http://www.yemenpost.net/63/Reports/20084.htm.
46. Oman Telecommunications Company, “Procedures for Internet Cyber Café Pre-Approval,” http://www.omantel.net.om/services/business/internet/preapprovaleng.pdf.

Iraq

Mon, 10 Aug 2009 10:36:55 -0400

Background

The security situation in Iraq has been unstable since the beginning of the United States-led removal of President Saddam Hussein in 2003.1 Sectarian tensions and continued insurgency targeting both civilians and state security forces contribute to this volatility.2 The media scene has changed considerably since the ousting of Saddam Hussein, though many journalists have been killed by insurgents and coalition forces.3

A Human Rights Watch 2008 report described the human rights condition in Iraq as “extremely poor” and said there are reports of widespread torture of detainees in facilities run by the Iraqi authorities.4 The country is one of the world’s most dangerous places for journalists, and in 2008 Iraqi authorities established a special police unit to provide protection for journalists and to investigate murders of journalists.5

Internet in Iraq

The telecommunications industry boomed in 2003 when Iraqis first experienced unfettered accessed to the Internet and cell phones.6 In 2008, Iraq’s State Company for Internet Services (SCIS) said 250,000 Iraqis had subscribed to Internet services, though an American adviser to the Ministry of Communications estimated the number at 12 million, due to the reselling of service by private entrepreneurs.7 International Telecommunication Union (ITU) estimates put Iraq’s Internet penetration rate in 2008 at 0.9 percent.8

In April 2009, representatives of American technology companies, including Twitter, WordPress, YouTube, Google and AT&T, accompanied a U.S. State Department delegation to Baghdad to discuss how to build the country’s information infrastructure.9 According to the delegation, approximately 80 percent of the population own mobile phones, but only about 5 percent of homes have Internet access.10

Iraq’s Internet penetration rate is the lowest in the region.11 An official with an Iraqi mobile network operator attributed this to the lack of a high-speed Internet backbone connecting cities within the country to the outside world and the lack of a unified national telecommunications law and regulatory framework.12 Private telecommunication companies complain that telecom regulations are poor and that regulatory decisions have been made by the government’s Ministry of Communications, which lacks independence.13

Different groups in Iraq have used social networking Web sites in different ways and for different purposes. For example, some Iraqis upload to YouTube video clips about everyday life in their country during the United States-led occupation, while insurgent groups upload video clips that show assaults on American and Iraqi forces in addition to pro-terrorism propaganda.14 Militant groups also use the Internet to recruit new members. The U.S. military said in March 2008 that it had captured and killed al-Qaeda members in Iraq responsible for producing and disseminating propaganda videos and other materials to thousands of Web sites.15 As the Internet continues to be a battleground for coalition forces and insurgent groups, terrorists have reportedly developed online encryption tools which provide secure Internet communication for the Iraqi insurgent groups.16

Interestingly, British solders serving in Iraq and Afghanistan have used the social networking sites and video-sharing sites, such as YouTube, to publicize their own grievances on issues such as poor equipment, accommodation and pay.17

Internet services in Iraq are provided by the State Company for Internet Services (SCIS), an offshoot of the Ministry of Communications.18 Private telecommunications operators in Iraq include Asiacell,19 Etisaluna,20 and Zain.21

Legal and regulatory frameworks

The Iraqi constitution protects freedom of expression as long as the expression “does not violate public order and morality.”22 Material that labels anyone an apostate – an accusation often leveled against Shiites by Sunni extremists – is specifically forbidden.23 Though the U.S.-led invasion is credited with increasing freedoms of expression and the press, in July 2009 the government announced plans to begin restricting violent and sexually themed content, both online and off. The proposed reforms include banning Web sites that contain content relating to “drugs, terrorism, gambling, negative remarks about Islam and pornography.”24 Book publishers must sign agreements with the Ministry of Culture pledging not to publish offensive material, and Internet cafés must register with the authorities or face closure.25

These restrictions follow an April 2009 study by a committee established by the SCIS focused on blocking “immoral” Web content and how to prevent “abuse” of the Internet. Another committee, also established by SCIS, was given the task of regulating and licensing private Internet cafés and enforcing restrictions “to create a healthy and safe environment” for Internet users.26

The Commission of Media and Communications (CMC), which was established in June 2004, regulates media and telecommunications in Iraq and has exclusive powers, as a legal authority, to grant licenses and regulate communications, broadcasting and information services in the country.27 The CMC imposes a number of restrictions on media workers in Iraq. For example, it forced journalists to sign a “Code for Media during Elections” before they could be accredited to cover the January 2009 provisional elections. The Code prohibited journalists from criticizing candidates’ programs.28 Reporters Without Borders called this measure a “threat to the freedom to work of Iraqi and foreign journalists.”29

The media has also been targeted by legal offenses. In May 2009, Reporters Without Borders condemned what it described as “the Iraqi government’s continuing legal offensive against independent news media, which for the first time is also targeting Internet media.”30 The condemnation came after a Baghdad court ordered the German-based Web site Kitabat to pay NID1 billion (EUR630,000) in damages. The lawsuit was brought by Iraq’s Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki after the site published an article accusing his chief of staff of using his position to get jobs for his relatives.

The Prime Minister later withdrew his action against the Web site, but he brought a libel suit against the London-based Guardian newspaper, demanding a million dollars in damages from the paper for describing his government as “authoritarian.”31

In addition, even though a 2008 press law abolished prison sentences for press offenses, journalists face working restrictions, especially in the border region of Kurdistan, and there is pressure on local media to report positively about the country.32

In addition to laws regulating the media in Iraq, the country’s security situation is also a serious consideration for media workers. The conflict in Iraq has been the among the deadliest for the press, and about 90 percent of media workers killed in the country have been Iraqis, who continue to be targeted by various groups.33 According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, as of March 2009 at least 136 journalists have been killed in Iraq in work-related incidents since March 2003.34

Surveillance

Iraq’s Ministry of Communications said in February 2009 that it signed a deal with a French company to implement a security system on the Internet network in Iraq. The Minister of Communications explained that with the new system, it will be possible to monitor the Internet and to block access to specific online content, especially if there is a concern over national security information or information related to public morals.35

With respect to the U.S.-led occupation, the BBC reported that the “Pentagon is keeping a close eye on what its troops post online, with special attention being paid to videos that show the aftermath of combat.” The BBC added that, “[o]ne soldier who served in Iraq in 2005 told the BBC there was ‘a tight watch’ being kept on video and pictures posted to MySpace, with civilian contractors monitoring the internet on behalf of the Pentagon.” The BBC has not been able to confirm that contractors are scouring the Internet for inappropriate material from the military, but reported that “US Central Command—which is responsible for troops in Iraq and Afghanistan—does have a team reading blogs and responding to what they consider inaccuracies about the so-called war on terror.”36

ONI testing results

ONI conducted 2008-2009 in-country tests on two Iraqi ISPs, the State Company for Internet Services and Itisaluna.

Similar to 2007-2008 results, tests revealed no evidence of technical filtering for any of the categories tested.

In August 2008, Internet users reported that a mobile phone operator in the city of Basra started to block violent as well as pornographic content. The company confirmed that it implements a filtering regime but said the regime was not mandated by the state but rather by the company’s management.37

In January 2007, at the request of the British government, Google agreed to remove updated images that included British bases in Iraq from Google Earth after British divisional headquarters came under almost daily mortar barrages.38

Conclusion

Internet access in Iraq remains largely unfettered, but this is likely to change, as the authorities have initiated measures to censor Internet content and monitor online activities. In addition, the government has launched legal offensives against independent news media and Web sites.

Despite increase in media freedom since the fall of Saddam Hussein, the ongoing security condition has made the country one of the deadliest for the media and has made journalists and media professionals working in Iraq particularly vulnerable.

1. “Country profile: Iraq,” BBC News, July 1, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/791014.stm.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Human Rights Watch, “Iraq: Events of 2008,” http://www.hrw.org/en/node/79254.
5. Reporters Without Borders, “Annual Reports - Iraq,” http://www.rsf.org/en-rapport152-Iraq.html.
6. Tina Susman, “Iraqi software pirate likes it offshore, where his skills mean good business,” Los Angeles Times, May 25, 2008, http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2008/05/25/iraqi_so....
7. Ibid.
8. International Telecommunications Union, “ITU Internet Indicators 2008,” http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/icteye/Reporting/ShowReportFrame.aspx?ReportNam....
9. Gillian Reagan, “Twittering in Baghdad - Silicon Valley execs join State Department delegation to Iraq,” Metroactive, http://www.metroactive.com/metro/05.06.09/news-0918.html.
10. Ibid.
11. Tom Gara, “Iraq hopeful of high-speed Internet,” The National, June 1, 2009, http://www.thenational.ae/article/20090601/BUSINESS/906019995/1005.
12. Ibid.
13. “Iraq's regulatory woes,” ITP.net, November 5, 2008, http://www.itp.net/news/537239-iraqs-regulatory-woes.
14. “Iraqis use YouTube to send up life in war zone,” Telegraph, January 29, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1576948/Iraqis-use-YouTube-to-....
15. Randy Fabi, “U.S. military says hits al Qaeda propaganda units,” Reuters, March 22, 2008, http://in.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idINIndia-32630020080322.
16. Firouz Sedarat, “Jihadi software promises secure Web contacts,” Reuters, January 18, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/internetNews/idUSL1885793320080118.
17. “Freedom Of Information: Facebook – the new battleground in Iraq and Afghanistan,” The Independent, February 8, 2008, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/freedom-of-information-fa....
18. Iraq’s State Company for Internet Services, http://www.scis.gov.iq/.
19. Asiacell, http://www.asiacell.com/.
20. Etisaluna, http://www.etisaluna.com/.
21. Zain-Iraq, http://www.iq.zain.com/.
22. Timothy Williams, “Iraq Censorship Laws Move Ahead,” New York Times, August 3, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/04/world/middleeast/04censor.html?_r=2&hp....
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Suadad al-Salhy, “Iraq mulls website ban, fuels censorship fears,” Reuters, August 5, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/technologyNews/idUSTRE5744NS20090805?feed....
26. “Wizarat alittisalat tabhath hajb almawaqi’ almokhilah biladab ‘an moshtariki alinternet (Iraq’s Ministry of Communications Discusses Blocking of Immoral Web sites),” al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 23, 2009, http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=516278&issueno=11104.
27. The Commission of Media & Communications, About the Commission, http://www.cmc.iq/english/aboutus/aboutcmc/aboutcmc.htm.
28. Reporters Without Borders, “Annual Reports - Iraq,” http://www.rsf.org/en-rapport152-Iraq.html.
29. Ibid.
30. Reporters Without Borders, “News website latest target in government’s legal offensive against independent media,” May 20, 2009, http://arabia.reporters-sans-frontieres.org/article.php3?id_article=3140....
31. Reporters Without Borders, “A step forward and a step back in prime minister’s lawsuits against news media,” May 28, 2009, http://arabia.reporters-sans-frontieres.org/article.php3?id_article=3145....
32. Ibid.
33. Committee to Protect Journalists, “Iraqi Journalists Syndicate chief dies from wounds,” February 27, 2008, http://cpj.org/2008/02/iraqi-journalists-syndicate-chief-dies-from-wound....
34. International Freedom of Expression Exchange, “Two Journalists Killed in Suicide Bombing,” March 11, 2009, http://www.ifex.org/iraq/2009/03/11/two_journalists_killed_in_suicide/.
35. “Wizarat alittisalat towaqi’ ‘aqdan limo’alajat al’ikhtirakat alamniyah lishabakat alinternet fi al’eraq (Ministry of Communications Signs a Deal to Fix the Security Vulnerabilities in the Internet Network in Iraq),” Iraq al-Aan, http://iraqalaan.com/bm/Security/13235.shtml.
36. Richard Allen Greene, “Pentagon keeps eye on war videos,” BBC News, July 29, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/5226254.stm.
37. “Muwatinon fi albasrah ya’ataridon ‘ala hajb mawaq’e elictroniya wosifat bighair akhlaqiyyah (Citizens in Basrah Protest the blocking of Web Sites Described as Immoral),” Radio Sawa, August 21, 2008, http://www.radiosawa.com/arabic_news.aspx?id=1669413&cid=24.
38. Thomas Harding, “Google blots out Iraq bases on internet,” The Telegraph, January 20, 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1540039/Google-blots-out-Iraq-....

Yemen

Fri, 07 Aug 2009 14:33:19 -0400

Background

The modern Republic of Yemen was established in 1990 when traditionalist North Yemen and Marxist South Yemen merged. Although the country has been modernizing and opening up to the world, it still maintains much of its tribal character and many of its traditions.1 Yemeni political parties are prohibited to contradict Islam, endorse any former regime, or use mosques or educational and governmental facilities to promote or criticize any party or political organization. There are three government branches: the executive branch, the legislative branch, and the judiciary branch.2

Although Yemen’s constitution guarantees freedom of speech and of the press, journalists have been threatened, harassed, beaten, and detained; newspapers have been shut down; the issuing of certain newspapers has been prevented; and text message news services have been suspended.3 The year 2007 witnessed an increase in arbitrary arrests and detentions, as well as in restrictions on freedoms of speech, press, and peaceful assembly. In addition, citizens’ ability to change their government has been limited due to corruption, fraudulent voter registration, and administrative weakness.4 Still, despite the country’s conservative political practices, Yemen's press is considered among the freest in the Arab region.5

Internet in Yemen

Yemen was rated by the Arab Advisors Group’s 2008 annual report as one of the lowest adopters of telecommunication services in the Arab world.6 The country lacks a robust telecommunications and information and communications technology (ICT) sector. For example, by the end of 2007, fixed line broadband penetration in Yemen was as low as .05 percent.7 The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) estimates that only 1.4 percent of Yemen’s population uses the Internet and that the PC penetration rate is less than 3 percent.8 Many cannot afford—and are simply unfamiliar with—the equipment and services needed to access the Internet.9

Yemen is serviced by two ISPs: YemenNet, which is a service of the government's Public Telecommunication Corporation (PTC),10 and TeleYemen's Y.Net, which is part of the government's PTC but is managed by FranceTelecom.11

Businesses own 60 percent of Internet subscriber accounts, while government and educational institutions own only 3 percent of subscriber accounts.12 Far fewer women than men access the Internet, which may be because the primary Internet access locations are Internet cafés (61 percent) and work (24 percent), with home Internet availability considerably lower (13 percent). Only 2 percent access the Internet from schools.13 By September 2007, the number of Internet cafés in Yemen reached 886; they are frequented by users mainly for chatting, playing games, and visiting entertainment websites.14

Legal and regulatory framework

The Ministry of Telecommunication and Information Technology (MTIT) grants ISP licenses;15 PTC, a branch under the MTIT, is responsible for the management and growth of telecommunications in Yemen.16

ISPs impose restrictions on the use of Internet services, preventing subscribers from accessing or transmitting certain content. The terms and conditions set by TeleYemen (a.k.a. Y.Net) state: “Access to applications which transmit or receive live video or audio, or make similar demands on the capacity of the network, constitutes an unreasonable usage which may affect the performance of the network, and is not permitted.”17 Also covered are customer responsibilities, including prohibitions on “sending any message which is offensive on moral, religious, communal, or political grounds” (6.1.1).18 Additionally, TeleYemen reserves the right to control access “and data stored in the Y.Net system in any manner deemed appropriate by TeleYemen” (7.1).19 Finally, section 6.3.3 cautions subscribers that TeleYemen will report “Any use or attempted use of the Y.Net service which contravenes any applicable Law of the Republic of Yemen.”20

Yemen’s Press and Publications Law, passed in 1990, subjects publications and broadcast media to broad prohibitions and harsh penalties.21 This law theoretically establishes a press that “shall be independent and shall have full freedom to practice its vocation,” but it must operate “within the context of Islamic creed, within the basic principles of the Constitution, goals of the Yemeni Revolution, and the aim of solidifying national unity.”22

The Press and Publications Law further states that local journalists must be Yemeni citizens and must obtain Press Cards from the Ministry of Information. Foreign journalists must be accredited to receive Press Cards, and such cards can be revoked by the Ministry of Information at the Ministry’s discretion. This revocation requires the former journalist to leave Yemen unless they have an independent reason for residency.23

A new draft of the law, proposed in 2005, was denounced by the Yemen Journalists Syndicate (YJS) as being more repressive than the existing 1990 law.24 The draft law “ignored the question of electronic media freedom, putting an end to the state ownership and monopoly over broadcast media. Rather, it went on controlling the websites just like print media.”25 The YJS and civil society organizations have failed to reach a compromise with the Ministry of Information and the government over several controversial articles of the new law.26

This law has been used to prosecute journalists and to shutdown publications. For example, in April 2008, the Ministry of Information threatened to revoke the license of the independent newspaper Al-Wasat Weekly because it published an article which the ministry considered a violation of the press and publication law.27 However, a court overruled this decision and fined the Ministry of Information for violating the law.28

Yemeni journalists face major restrictions and prosecution, arrests, and physical attacks in the street. The authorities have blocked access to several Internet Web sites and banned mobile phone news services.29 In April 2008, the Ministry of Information declared that the penal code will be used to prosecute writers who publish on the Internet content that “incites hatred” or “harms national interests.”30

Surveillance

In addition to technical and legal restrictions, the Yemeni authorities impose physical restrictions on cyber cafés, the primary access location for many Yemenis, to enable café operators to monitor the Internet activities of the customers. The Ministry of Information has ordered the owners of internet cafés in Yemen to remove partitions placed between Internet workstations in cyber cafés, and to make computer screens visible to the café operator. Internet users in some cases are also required to submit to the café operator personal information before they can use the Internet.31 A police station in October 2007 ordered Internet cafés to close at midnight and demanded that users show their identification cards to the café operator. A local rights group described the action as “a clear restriction of liberties and rights of citizens and business.”32

Some Internet café owners use computer monitoring software to monitor the online activities of their customers. A café operator said, "Through a program I can closely find what my customers are browsing. When I find that a customer is navigating pornography website, I shut the customer's system automatically from my disk and I ask him to leave immediately."33

ONI testing results

ONI ran in-country tests on Yemen's two ISPs, YemenNet and TeleYemen/Y.Net, and found a significant increase in political filtering. Several political and Web sites run by opposition or independence groups were found blocked. Examples include the Web site of the Yemeni Socialist Party (www.aleshteraki.net) and the Web sites of the political groups al-Shora and al-Ommah (www.al-shora.net, www.newomma.net). Also blocked were opposition and independent news Web sites such as the news aggregator Yemen Portal (www.yemenportal.net), Shabwah Press (www.shabwahpress.net) and al-Hadath (www.alhadath-yemen.com). Some forums which contain political and social discussion were also blocked (www.al-yemen.org).

In March 2008, ONI verified reports that the Web site of Maktoob Blog (maktoobblog.com) was inaccessible in Yemen. By blocking the entire domain of Maktoob Blog, Internet users in Yemen were prevented from access one of the biggest blogging communities in the Middle East and North Africa. The blocking of Maktoob Blog lasted about a week.

Interestingly, political filtering in Yemen is not transparent; users who attempt to access banned political content receive error messages instead of the standard block page served when users attempt to access banned sex content.

The two ISPs were found to be using the filtering software from U.S.-based Websense to extensively block Web sites containing pornography. They have also added previously accessible forums which facilitate the exchange of Arabic-language explicit content to their block lists. Also blocked were Web sites that contain provocative attire, sex education materials, and anonymizing and privacy tools.

Search strings containing words such as “sex” and “porn" and other suggestive terms are blocked, as are some sites hosting gay and lesbian content, hacking information, dating and escort services, and non-erotic nudity. The ISPs also filter some religious conversion sites and a limited number of Voice-over Internet Protocol (VoIP) sites.

ONI monitored Web access in Yemen during Yemen's September 2006 presidential election and found that the government-owned YemenNet blocked access to several independent news and political opposition sites, including Nass Press (nasspress.com), Al-Mostakela Forum (www.mostakela.com), and the Yemeni Council (www.al-yemen.org).

The ISP YemenNet continues to have an issue with its filtering system; ONI investigation found that the ISP uses a Blue Coat integrated cache/filter appliance to run Websense but possesses a limited number of concurrent user licenses—not nearly enough to cover all of the Internet users in the country. Thus, when the number of subscribers accessing the Internet at a given time exceeds the limited number of user licenses, the requests of all users circumvent the filtering software.

Conclusion

Testing revealed evidence that the state is currently preventing citizens from accessing news and political content online, as well as filtering pornography, GLBT content and Web sites containing content deemed offensive to Islam. The authorities impose physical restrictions on cyber cafés so as to enable operators to monitor the Internet activities of the customers.

The failures of the filtering system installed on Yemen’s principal ISP hint at the state’s limited capacity to control content, rather than any willingness to allow information to flow freely. In essence, the breadth of content filtered should temper any optimism about the evident ineffectiveness of filtering in Yemen witnessed in this round of testing.

1. “Country Profile: Yemen,” BBC News, March 10, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/country_profiles/784383.stm.
2. United Nations Development Programme on Governance in the Arab Region, Democratic Governance, Civil Society, Yemen, http://www.undp-pogar.org/countries/country.asp?cid=22.
3. United States Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: 2008,” http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100610.htm.
4. Ibid.
5. United Nations Development Programme on Governance in the Arab Region, Democratic Governance, Civil Society, Yemen, http://www.undp-pogar.org/countries/country.asp?cid=22.
6. Arab Advisors Group, “UAE, Qatar and Bahrain are the Arab World’s highest adopters of telecommunication services,” June 4, 2007, http://www.arabadvisors.com/Pressers/presser-040607.htm.
7. “Increasing adoption of broadband internet in the Arab World is set to boost convergence-based service,” Arabian Business, May 14, 2008, http://www.arabianbusiness.com/press_releases/detail/18676?ln=en.
8. ITU Internet Indicators 2007, http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/icteye/DisplayCountry.aspx?countryId=255.
9. Adnan Hizam, “IT Market in Yemen Experiences Rapid Growth,” Yemen Observer, July 29, 2006, http://www.yobserver.com/business-and-economy/10010622.html.
10. YemenNet Web site, “Background Information,” http://www.yemen.net.ye/index.php?q=background [in Arabic].
11. TeleYemen, “Background Information,” http://www.teleyemen.com.ye/intro.htm.
12. Helmi Noman, “An Overview of the Demographics and Usage Patterns of Internet Users in Developing Countries: Yemeni Internet Population as a Case Study,” United Nations Development Programme, http://www.undp.org.ye/ict.php.
13. Ibid.
14. Hamed Thabet, “Increase in Internet users in Yemen, but mostly for entertainment,” Yemen Times, December 4, 2007, http://yementimes.com/article.shtml?i=1109&p=local&a=2.
15. Ministry of Telecommunication and Information Technology, http://www.mtit.gov.ye/ [in Arabic].
16. “Yemen’s Internet market registers high growth rates,” AME Info, March 14, 2006, http://www.ameinfo.com/80390.html.
17. Terms and conditions for Y.Net Service, http://www.y.net.ye/support/rules.htm.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Yemen News Agency (Saba) Press and Publications Law, http://www.sabanews.net/en/news44000.htm.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Mohammed Al-Qadhi, “Journalists reject draft press law,” Yemen Times, April 28, 2005, http://yementimes.com/article.shtml?i=837&p=front&a=2. See also IRIN, “Yemen: Journalists still targeted despite draft law,” April 30, 2006, http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=26327; and International Press Institute, “2005 World Press Freedom Review,” http://www.freemedia.at/cms/ipi/freedom_detail.html?country=/KW0001/KW00.
25. Mohammed Al-Qadhi, “Journalists reject draft press law,” Yemen Times, April 28, 2005, http://yementimes.com/article.shtml?i=837&p=front&a=2.
26. Mohammed al-Kibsi, “Freedom of Press worldwide and the Yemen case,” Yemen Observer, May 7, 2008, http://www.yobserver.com/reports/10014193.html.
27. Mohammed Bin Sallam, “Gov’t closes Al-Wasat newspaper amid cries of 'foul play,’” Yemen Times, April 6, 2008, http://yementimes.com/article.shtml?i=1144&p=local&a=2.
28. Mohammed al-Kibsi, “Freedom of Press worldwide and the Yemen case,” Yemen Observer, May 7, 2008, http://www.yobserver.com/reports/10014193.html.
29. Reporters Without Borders, “Yemen - Annual report 2008,” http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=25443&Valider=OK.
30. Yemen’s official news agency, Saba [in Arabic],
http://www.sabanews.net/ar/news150790.htm.
31. Moneer Al-Omari, “Search for Pornographic Material on Rise; Children are most Vulnerable,” Yemen Post, January 12, 2009, http://www.yemenpost.net/63/Reports/20084.htm.
32. “Internet cafes closed after midnight,” Mareb Press, February 20, 2008, http://marebpress.net/news_details.php?sid=10305.
33. Moneer Al-Omari, “Search for Pornographic Material on Rise; Children are most Vulnerable,” Yemen Post, January 12, 2009, http://www.yemenpost.net/63/Reports/20084.htm.

United Arab Emirates

Fri, 07 Aug 2009 14:06:56 -0400

Background

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a federation of seven emirates formed in 1971 after independence from Britain. Each emirate maintains a large degree of independence, and the UAE is governed by a Supreme Council of Rulers consisting of the seven emirs of the emirates. Though the UAE is one of the most liberal countries in the Gulf, it was until December 2006 the only state in the region not to have elected bodies.1

The UAE’s economy continues to grow, but civil society is stagnate and human rights progress has been slow. Authorities have exerted censorial pressure on a wide range of activists, impeding the kind of vigorous monitoring and reporting that can draw attention to and help curb human rights abuses.2 Although the Prime Minister decreed in 2007 that journalists should not face prison for “for reasons related to their work,” current media law allows imprisonment of journalists and suspension of publication for publishing “materials that cause confusion among the public.” The government monitors press content, and journalists routinely exercise self-censorship.3

Though the emirate of Dubai has established itself as a regional and international hub for media by creating a media zone authority that allows 100% foreign ownership and offers tax breaks. ONI test results show that Internet is filtered in this hub, and there are reports of other forms of censorship.4 For example, Dubai authorities interrupted the broadcast of two Pakistani TV stations, Geo News and Ary One World, in November 2007. Geo News said the decision resulted from constant pressure by then Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, who had at the time implemented a “state of emergency.”5 Dubai allowed the two stations to resume broadcasting later following negotiations with the Pakistani government and Dubai Media City.6

Internet in the United Arab Emirates

The UAE continues to lead the Arab world in adoption of information and communication technology, according to a World Economic Forum report,7 and is expected to spend about $3.3 billion on information technology and communications hardware for schools, hospitals and other civil projects between 2008 and 2011.8

According to the Internet Telecommunication Union, Internet penetration in the UAE has increased from 36 percent in 2006 to an estimated 64 percent in 2008.9 The Arab Advisors Group states account penetration to be at approximately 25 percent. ADSL/broadband accounts penetration of total population reached around 11 percent by end of 2008. By end of October 2008, Etisalat's ADSL accounts constituted around 36 percent of the operator's total fixed lines.10

Etisalat remains the dominant telecom provider, but in the interest of competition, the UAE's Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA) facilitated the launch of the Emirates Integrated Telecommunications Company, named Du. Established in 2007, Du is an integrated telecommunications provider formed by a paid-up capital of USD 1.1 billion which offers voice, data and entertainment on mobile networks and converged broadband, TV, and landline services.11

Competition in the broadband Internet market is limited because the two ISPs still do not share each other’s networks, and Du is still unable to offer broadband Internet or landline telephone services outside of a handful of property developments in Dubai where it owns the physical telephone network.12 Because Etisalat has been the sole telecom company for 30 years, it owns the national telephone network, based on both copper wire and new fiber-optic cables.13

In an effort to increase the number of visitors to Arabic Web sites and promote and strengthen the UAE's identity, in March 2009 the UAE’s Ministerial Council for Services approved a proposal by the TRA to put the UAE country code top-level domain in Arabic (Emarat). The proposal is part of the TRA’s efforts to create a national plan for operating the Internet in Arabic.14

Legal and regulatory frameworks

A new draft media law is expected to be issued in 2009. The highest media organization in the UAE, the National Media Council (NMC), says the draft law provides unprecedented provisions that protect and promote freedom of expression in the country. It also says the draft law “provides journalists freedom from coercion to reveal sources, reflecting the government's commitment to the journalistic right to protect sources; in this particular regard, the pending law's protection exceeds that of many advanced democracies, including the United States.”15

The pending law, passed by the Federal National Council in January 2009, was rejected by the UAE Journalists Association because, according to the association’s chairman, “It has nothing to do with the concept of media; it contains 45 articles which don't provide a proper description of the media's duties and rights. Similarly, there are 10 articles which talk about penalties and punishments.”16

International advocacy groups have also expressed concerns over the draft law. Human Rights Watch (HRW) says the pending draft law unlawfully restricts free expression and will unduly interfere with the media's ability to report on sensitive subjects, and that it includes provisions that would grant the government virtually complete control in deciding who is allowed to work as a journalist, as well as which media organizations are allowed to operate in the country. HRW also says that the new law contains some improvement over the draconian media law currently in effect, but will continue to punish journalists for such infractions as “disparaging” government officials or publishing “misleading” news that “harms the country's economy.”17

The Committee to Protect Journalists has also expressed concern over the draft law in a letter they sent to the President of the UAE urging him to reject the law in its current form because, if passed, “it will negatively impact the state of press freedom in the UAE.”18

The telecommunication services in the UAE are regulated by the TRA, which was established in 2003 by a Federal Law and is tasked with ensuring adequacy of telecommunications services throughout the country and establishing and implementing a regulatory and policy framework.19 The TRA is responsible for producing the Internet Access Management (IAM) policy, which outlines prohibited online content categories for ISPs. These categories include: Internet tools for bypassing blocked content; content for learning criminal skills and illegal drugs; content containing pornography and nudity; gambling sites; sites for hacking and malicious codes; content offensive to religions, phishing Internet sites; Internet content that downloads spyware; Web sites providing unlicensed voice over Internet protocol (VoIP) service; terrorism content; and prohibited top level domain,20 apparently a reference to the top level domain of Israel (.il), which is blocked in the UAE.

The UAE government has issued a federal law on combating cybercrimes. Cyber-Crime Law No. 2 of 2006 considers any intentional act that abolishes, destroys, or reveals secrets, or that results in the republishing of personal or official information to be a crime. Individuals may be imprisoned for using the Internet to defame Islamic places of worship and traditions, insult any recognized religion, or promote “sinful acts.” Anyone convicted of “transcending family principles and values” or setting up a Web site for groups “calling for, facilitating, and promoting ideas in breach of the general order and public decency” may be jailed.21

In August 2007, a court in the Emirate of Ras al-Khaimah sentenced the creator of Web site majan.net to one year in prison and a fine for defaming a local official. The court also ordered the site to be shut down. In September, the same individual received a five-month prison sentence and a fine in a second defamation case involving another local official but was released on bail at the end of September 2007. Two months later, his two prison sentences were overturned by an appeals court after defamation complaints were withdrawn by the officials. In the end, he received a one-year suspended prison sentence after being convicted in a third defamation case.22

In April 2009, the chief of Dubai’s police force denied allegations that the Dubai Police had asked UAE’s Telecommunication Regulatory Authority to censor Web sites which contain any of 500 objectionable keywords. Earlier reports said the head of the Doha Media Freedom Center claimed that the Dubai Police had developed a list of 500 keywords, by which access to certain Web sites would be blocked.23 The police chief stated that the government does not attempt to censor Web sites critical to the UAE and that the 500 search terms designed to shield UAE Internet users against pornographic content were proposed by the telecommunication regulators themselves, not the Dubai Police.24

This denial came shortly after Dubai’s police chief called for the blocking of video-sharing site YouTube because, he said, the site contains religiously inappropriate content. He also said that the site contains indecent material that influences the young people towards delinquency. He added that disseminating pornography and offensive content is not freedom and that content offered to users in the Arab and Muslim countries should be different from that offered to users in the West because they have different cultures. Hence, content should be filtered centrally because it is very difficult for families to monitor Internet use at home.25

YouTube and Google have denied that they are engaged in plans to censor online content in the UAE.26

Although Etisalat and Du conform to the TRA policies by automatically blocking Web sites which offer free Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) services, individuals - including Internet café owners - have found ways of getting around the ban by using the Internet to make cheap international calls. Violators have been prosecuted. For example, a police officer in the emirate of Ras Al Khaimah warned several Internet café owners against the use of “illegal calling cards” for making inexpensive international phone calls. Several violating cafés were referred to the public prosecution for investigation.27

Surveillance

The authorities have established committees and electronic surveillance departments to monitor objectionable Internet activities. For example, a government committee was established in March 2009 to monitor Internet cafés in order to ensure that Internet connections in these cafés do not bypass filtering regimes set up by the two national ISPs as per the regulations of the TRA. This move was in response to speculations that some Internet cafés provide unfiltered Internet connections using Virtual Private Networks.28

Also, an online surveillance team was set up by Dubai police to carry out around-the-clock checks on the Internet. The team, known as e-police, investigated a total of 222 cases in 2008. The cases include 87 involving fraud and other financial crimes, 38 cases of illegal hacking and 92 cases of defamation and extortion. The electronic patrol team has set up special forums and used assumed names in an attempt to collect information about potential criminal activity.29 This online surveillance department announced in April 2009 that it managed to track down and later arrest women who promote their sex services and publicize their Dubai phone numbers online. In addition, the surveillance team announced that it managed to track down individuals who offer inexpensive illegal VoIP services from their apartments.30

ONI testing results

ONI testing in 2008-2009 revealed that UAE censors have increased the scope and depth of Internet filtering since 2006-2007.

One of the significant policy shifts that happened during ONI testing is the implementation of TRA-mandated filtering by the ISP Du, which used to offer unfettered access to the Internet in the Dubai free zones including Dubai Media City, Dubai Internet City, and the residential areas affiliated with the free zones. Du began filtering on April 14, 2008; ONI test results show that its filtering is almost as extensive as that of the other national ISP Etisalat, which has the lion’s share of the Internet user market.

The two ISPs were found to block Web sites that express alternative political or religious views. For example, in addition to blocking UAEprison.com, a site hosting testimonials of former prisoners and critiques of the government’s human rights practices, and the site of the U.S.-based Arab Times (arabtimes.com), ONI found that the censors blocked the Web site called “Save Zack Shahin” (www.savezackshahin.com), an online campaign calling for the release of U.S. citizen Zack Shahin from a UAE prison. The site encourages Americans to send letters to members of Congress to help Shahin. Shahin is a former chief executive of a Dubai property developer and was charged, together with a former UAE minister, in April 2009 with seizing public money and harming state interest.31

Another example is the blocking of the site UAE Torture (uaetorture.com), which posted video clips of a UAE royal family member allegedly torturing an Afghan businessman. The story drew the attention of international media such as ABC,32 as well as human rights advocates such as Human Rights Watch.33 Blocking of this site has been inconsistent however, and it has been found to be accessible and inaccessible at different times.

The UAE censors are also apparently sensitive to content that is critical of the state of the local economy or the society. For example, the censors blocked access to the Arabic UAE blog Mujarad Ensan (Arabic for "Just a man") a few days after the anonymous blogger published a post sarcastically titled “Laugh with me and say: Our economy is in a good condition.” In the text of the blog post, he accused the UAE government of lacking transparency when dealing with the current US economic crisis, and the local papers of lying about the real status of the local economy. The writer also accused government-owned real estate companies of publishing exaggerated information about business deals to create the impression that the local economy has not been negatively effective by the US financial crisis.34 The blog became accessible a few days later for unknown reasons.

Another example is the blocking of the blog Secret Dubai Diary (secretdubai.blogspot.com), which was also found blocked in earlier testing. This blog is apparently blocked because it offers critical review of social life in UAE.

Similar to earlier testing results, several sites presenting unorthodox perspectives on Islam (thekoran.com, islamreview.com, secularislam.org) were blocked, along with a handful of sites promoting minority faiths (albrhan.org, ansarweb.net). Among the few sites considered “extremist” that are filtered in the UAE: hinduunity.org, a site advocating Hindu solidarity and resistance to Islam, and kahanetzadak.com, a site devoted to the founder of the militant Jewish Defense League.

ONI testing shows that the censors have expanded the filtering in these categories to include previously accessible Web sites such as the presumably UAE-based atheist blogs Ben Kerishan, (benkerishan.blogspot.com), The Land of Sand (thelandofsands.com), and Ben Short (benshort.blogspot.com). Also currently blocked are Wikipedia pages which contain information about religiously sensitive content such as the film Fitna, produced by Dutch politician Geert Wilders and considered offensive to Islam, and the Wikipedia page about the Islamic prophet Muhammad, possibly because the page displays drawings of the Prophet, considered offensive to most Muslims

In March 2009, the censors blocked access to the Web site Ahmed and Salim (ahmedandsalim.com), an Israeli Web site which posted video episodes considered offensive to Arabs and Muslims. The UAE has also blocked access to the YouTube pages where the video clips appear.

The UAE's TRA ordered the blocking of the Web site and the YouTube links only a few days after the content appeared online, apparently because, in addition to the content perceived offensive to Islam, one of the characters is dressed in traditional Gulf attire, and the UAE flag appears in several scenes.35

Interestingly, several Web sites that present information on Nazism, Holocaust deniers, and historical revisionists were found to be blocked during testing. These include the Web site hitler.org and that of the Institute for Historical Review's publishing arm (http://www.noontidepress.com). Also blocked was the Web site vdare.com, which is often described as anti-Semitic. Meanwhile, the state continues to block access to all sites on the Israeli country code top-level domain “.il.”

ONI testing reveals that the UAE filters still target social networking sites, video and photo sharing sites, bookmarking services, and blogging services. However, filtering of these sites has not been consistent. For example, Livejournal.com, a free service for journaling and blogging, was blocked in the UAE in June 2008, apparently because it was categorized as a dating site in the database of Secure Computing, a commercial filtering product. The UAE uses SmartFilter, a product of Secure Computing, to block access to various content categories including dating, porn, sex, and gambling.36 Secure Computing was acquired by McAfee in 2008.37 Access to the site was restored a few weeks later.

Similar to earlier testing results, recent ONI testing revealed pervasive filtering of pornographic and gay and lesbian sites. Results also reveal blocking of previously accessible Arabic forums, which are commonly used to facilitate the exchange of Arabic explicit content.

Compared to earlier testing, fewer Web pages relating to sexual health education were found to be blocked. For example, previously filtered sites such as circumcision.org and sexualhealth.com were found accessible, though other sites in the same categories are still blocked. Some Web sites containing provocative attire (lingerie.com) were still filtered. Sites promoting alcohol and drug use or facilitating online gambling or dating were also blocked in large numbers, and many Arabic-language dating sites or sites that target singles living the Middle East (www.arablounge.com, www.gaymiddleeast.com/country/uaemirates.htm) have been added to the blacklist. Nudity, even if in an artistic context and non-erotic, is censored (an example is the Arabic magazine http://www.jasadmag.com).

Internet tools, including those that facilitate hacking (thesecretlist.com), anonymizer (anonymizer.com) sites, translation (Google Web site translator, not the text translator) remain blocked. Similarly, numerous VoIP sites (Skype.com, pc2call.com) were still blocked in accordance with the national ban on such applications.

In October 2006, the UAE unblocked access to several social networking and multimedia sharing sites, including youtube.com, flickr.com, metacafé.com, and myspace.com. However, sections of these sites containing objectionable material remain unavailable. The photo-sharing site flickr.com was later blocked entirely.

Conclusion

The UAE continues to prevent its citizens from accessing a significant amount of Internet content spanning a variety of topics. Though the vast majority of sites filtered are those deemed obscene in some way, a select few political sites are blocked, as are some pertaining to Nazis, Holocaust denial and historical revision. The entire “.il” top-level domain continues to be blocked as well, which is more indicative of the UAE’s opposition to the state of Israel than to content contained therein.

Additionally, the state has extended its filtering scheme to the Dubai free zones, which previously enjoyed unfettered Internet access, and has increased the depth of technical filtering, blocking more sites across broader categories.

The UAE now employs SmartFilter software to block content related to nudity, sex, dating, gambling, cults/occult, religious conversion, and drugs. Sites pertaining to anonymizer tools, hacking, translation tools (as these have been used as proxies), and VoIP applications are also filtered in this manner.

Lastly, there are government efforts to monitor Internet activities in public Internet cafés to ensure connections provided there do not bypass national filtering. Electronic surveillance to monitor objectionable online activities is publicly acknowledged by the authorities.

1. “Country profile: United Arab Emirates,” BBC News, March 11, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/737620.stm.
2. Human Rights Watch, “United Arab Emirates Events of 2007,” http://hrw.org/englishwr2k8/docs/2008/01/31/uae17622.htm.
3. Human Rights Watch, “United Arab Emirates (UAE): Events of 2008,” http://www.hrw.org/en/world-report-2009/united-arab-emirates-uae.
4. “Country profile: United Arab Emirates,” BBC News, March 11, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/737620.stm.
5. Reporters Without Borders, “Dubai Urged to Reverse Decision, Taken Under Pressure from Musharraf, to Suspend Broadcasting by Two Pakistani TV Stations,” November 17, 2007, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=24415.
6. Lynne Roberts, “Pakistan TV to resume Dubai broadcasts,” Arabian Business, November 19, 2007, http://www.arabianbusiness.com/504302-pakistan-tv-to-resume-dubai-broadc....
7. Tom Gara, “UAE leads region in IT, says report,” The National, April 16, 2009, http://www.thenational.ae/article/20090416/BUSINESS/448045865/-1/ART.
8. “UAE will Spend $3.3b in IT and Communications,” Khaleej Times, March 19, 2009, http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?col=&section=business&....
9. ITU Internet Indicators 2008, http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/icteye/Reporting/ShowReportFrame.aspx?ReportNam....
10. Arab Advisors Group, “Cementing its stance as the Arab World's Internet leader, the UAE's ADSL penetration reached around 11% by end of 2008,” March 16, 2009, http://www.arabadvisors.com/Pressers/presser-160309.htm-1.
11. UAE Interact, “United Arab Emirates Yearbook 2007: Infrastructure,” http://www.uaeinteract.com/uaeint_misc/pdf_2008/English_2008/eyb6.pdf.
12. Tom Gara, “du relies on network sharing to compete,” The National, April 24, 2009, http://www.thenational.ae/article/20090425/BUSINESS/704249787/1005.
13. Ibid.
14. “Ministerial Council passes UAE domain in Arabic,” WAM, March 1, 2009, http://www.wam.org.ae/servlet/Satellite?c=WamLocEnews&cid=1235660774085&....
15. “UAE National Media Council welcomes all debates on draft media law,” Gulf News, April 13, 2009, http://www.gulfnews.com/nation/Media/10303708.html.
16. Alia Al Theeb, “Draft media law: Journalists ‘will insist on changes,’” Gulf News, April 28, 2009, http://www.gulfnews.com/nation/Media/10308566.html.
17. Human Rights Watch, “UAE: Media Law Undermines Free Expression,” April 13, 2009, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/04/13/uae-media-law-undermines-free-expr....
18. Committee to Protect Journalists, “CPJ concerned about UAE draft media law,” March 9, 2009, http://cpj.org/2009/03/cpj-concerned-about-uae-draft-media-law.php.
19. Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA), http://www.tra.org.ae.
20. Internet Access Management (IAM) policy, http://www.etisalat.ae/assets/document/blockcontent.pdf.
21. “UAE cyber crimes law,” Gulf News, November 2, 2007, http://archive.gulfnews.com/uae/uaessentials/more_stories/10018507.html.
22. Amnesty International Report 2008: UAE, http://thereport.amnesty.org/eng/regions/middle-east-and-north-africa/ua....
23. “Dahi dismisses web policing allegations,” Gulf News, April 23, 2009
http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/09/04/24/10307260.html.
24. Ahmed Shaaban, “Police ‘Play No Role’ in Censorship: Tamim,” Khaleej Times, 25 April 2009, http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticle08.asp?xfile=/data/theuae/2009....
25. “Call to Blank Out YouTube in Emirates Too,” Khaleej Times, March 10, 2009, http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?col=&section=theuae&xf....
26. Ahmed Shaaban, “Police ‘Play No Role’ in Censorship: Tamim,” Khaleej Times, April 25, 2009, http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticle08.asp?xfile=/data/theuae/2009....
27. Asma Ali Zain and Sebugwaawo Ismail, “Cyber cafes work around the ban to provide VoIP services,” Khaleej Times, April 2, 2008, http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=data/theuae/2008....
28. “Shisha and internet cafes scrutinised,” The National, March 08, 2009 http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20090308/NATIONAL/1....
29. Andy Sambidge, “Dubai's e-police probe 222 internet crime cases,” Arabian Business, October 30, 2008, http://www.arabianbusiness.com/536556-dubais-e-police-probe-222-internet....
30. “Esabah takhtalis almukalamat aldawliyah wa fatayat yorawijna lilda’ara [Internet gangs steal international calls, girls market their sex services online],” Emaratalyoum, April 15, 2009, http://www.emaratalyoum.com/articles/2009/4/pages/14042009/04152009_4a6c....
31. “Dubai Attorney General refers suspects in Deyaar case to courts,” WAM, April 8, 2009, http://www.wam.org.ae/servlet/Satellite?c=WamLocEnews&cid=1238851046552&....
32. Vic Walter et al., “ABC News Exclusive: Torture Tape Implicates UAE Royal Sheikh,” ABC News, April 22, 2009, http://www.abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id=7402099&page=1.
33. Human Rights Watch, “UAE: Prosecute Torture by Royal Family Member,” April 28, 2009, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/04/28/uae-prosecute-torture-royal-family....
34. Reporters Without Borders, “Popular blog accessible again,” October 22, 2008, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=29017.
35. Dominic von Riedemann, “UAE Blocks Ahmed and Salim Cartoon,” Suite 101, http://online-animated-films.suite101.com/article.cfm/uae_blocks_ahmed_a....
36. OpenNet Initiative Blog, “A Blind-date with the Censors in UAE,” June 20, 2008, http://opennet.net/blog/2008/06/a-blind-date-with-censors-uae.
37. “McAfee, Inc. Completes Acquisition of Secure Computing,” November 18, 2008, http://www.mcafee.com/us/about/press/corporate/2008/20081118_120000_j.ht....

Tunisia

Fri, 07 Aug 2009 11:27:55 -0400

Background

The Tunisian constitution guarantees freedom of the press under “conditions laid down by law,” but the government closely controls the media. Additionally, the Press Law criminalizes defamation, and those who violate it can be imprisoned and fined.1 Tunisia is considered by media watchdog Reporters Without Borders to be “the region’s most authoritarian regime” in regard to civil liberties. Journalists and human rights activists have been banned from leaving the country, and subject to arrest and imprisonment. Most of the country’s newspapers are supportive of the government, and opposition newspapers have been seized.2 The Internet is also heavily regulated and perceived as a potential threat to stability and security of the country.3 There are also instances of banning foreign publications for publishing content that is deemed prejudicial to Islam.4

Internet in Tunisia

Tunisia has one of the most developed telecommunications infrastructures in North Africa with high mobile penetration rate and one of the lowest broadband prices in Africa.5 As of October 2008, the number of GSM subscribers had reached 9 million, while the number of Internet users was 1.7 million, 114,000 of whom have broadband subscriptions.6 Out of a population of 10.2 million inhabitants, nine out of ten Tunisians own a cell phone. 84% of these users access the Internet at home, 75.8% use Internet at work, and 24% use public Internet cafés.7

The Tunisian Ministry of Communications established the Tunisian Internet Agency (ATI) to regulate the country’s Internet and domain name system (DNS) services, which had formerly fallen under the Regional Institute for Computer Sciences and Telecommunications (IRSIT)’s purview.8 The ATI is also the gateway from which all of Tunisia’s eleven Internet service providers (ISPs) lease their bandwidth.9 Six of these ISPs are public (ATI, INBMI, CCK, CIMSP, IRESA and Defense's ISP); the other five — Planet Tunisie, 3S Global Net, HEXABYTE, TopNet, and TUNET — are private.10

The government has energetically sought to spread Internet access. The ATI reports connectivity of 100 percent for the education section (universities, research laboratories, secondary schools, and primary schools).11 Government-brokered “free Internet” programs that provide Web access for the price of a local telephone call and increased competition among ISPs have significantly reduced the economic barriers to Internet access. Those Tunisians for whom personal computers remain prohibitively expensive may also access the Internet from more than 300 cybercafés set up by the authorities.12

Legal and regulatory frameworks

In addition to filtering Web content, the government of Tunisia utilizes laws, regulations, and surveillance to achieve strict control over the Internet. For example, journalists have been prosecuted by Tunisia’s press code, which bans offending the president, disturbing order, and publishing what the government perceives as false news.13 The government also restricts the media by controlling the registration of print media and licensing of broadcasters, refusing permission to critical outlets, and controlling the distribution public sector advertisement.14 Journalists are also charged in courts with vague violations of the penal code.15

Online dissidents face severe punishment. For example, human rights lawyer Mohamed Abbou was sentenced to three and a half years in prison in 2005 publishing on a banned Web site a report in which he accusing the government of torturing Tunisian prisoners.16

In a landmark legal case that challenged the Web filtering regime in the country, journalist and blogger Ziad El Hendi filed a legal suit against the Tunisian Internet Agency (ATI) for censoring social networking site Facebook.17 The Tunisian Union of Free Radio Stations and the Unionist Freedoms and Rights Observatory joined El Heni in the lawsuit and called Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali to testify.18 Facebook was blocked on August 18, 2008, then unblocked on September 2 at the Tunisian President’s request.19 The Third District Court of Tunisia, however, dismissed the case, in November 2008 without providing any explanation.20

In addition to being blocked in Tunisia, many opposition and dissident Web sites and blogs have been victims of hacking attempts and in some cases, successful content removal and shutting down of servers.21 Even though it is not clear who is behind these cyber attacks, many Tunisian opposition leaders believe it to be the government.22 For example, the independent news sites Kalima was hacked into and shut down in October 2008. The eight-year Arabic and French archives were completely destroyed. The site has been blocked since it was launched in 2000. The administrator of the site accused the government of being under the attack because, as she told the Committee to Protect Journalists, "The only ones who benefit from this attack are the authorities."23 She also said, “I would not rule out the possibility that this act was committed by the secret services, with the aid of hackers or pirates based in Tunisia or abroad." The Web-based newsletter Tunis News (http://www.tunisnews.net) and a blog run by a judge (http://tunisiawatch.rsfblog.org) have been subject to similar attacks.24

Tunisia does not have specific laws that regulate online broadcasting. As a result, a group of journalists exploited the lack of legal obstacles to broadcast on the Internet and launched in 2007 Tunisia’s first Internet radio station, Radio 6, which was launch in December 10th to mark the 59th anniversary of the World Declaration of Human Rights. The radio exploited the lack of legal obstacles to broadcasting on the Internet.25

Web filtering in Tunisia is achieved through the use of a commercial software program, SmartFilter, sold by U.S.-based company Secure Computing. Because all fixed-line Internet traffic passes through facilities controlled by ATI, the government is able to load the software onto its servers and filter content consistently across Tunisia’s eleven ISPs. Tunisia purposefully hides its filtering from Internet users. SmartFilter is designed to display a 403 “Forbidden” error message when a user attempts to access a blocked site; the Tunisian government has replaced this message with a standard 404 “File Not Found” error message, which gives no hint that the requested site is actively blocked.26

Surveillance

The Tunisian authorities practice different sorts of Internet surveillance and request that service providers such as Internet cafés be partners in controlling Internet use. For example, the authorities monitor Internet cafés, request that Internet users show ID before they can use the Internet in some regions, and hold Internet cafés operators responsible by law for their clients’ online activities.

There is also technical surveillance whereby downloading or adding attachment to an email must go through a central server. Under the pretext of protecting public order and national security, a 1998 post and telecommunications law enables the authorities to intercept and check the content of email messages27 and in fact electronic surveillance such as filtering of email messages of government opponents have been reported.28 Global Voices Advocacy Director and Tunisia Activist Sami Ben Gharbia conducted a test from the Netherlands with two Tunisia-based activists and confirmed by logging to their email accounts from the Netherland that what he sees is not what they receive when they login from Tunisia, and that they cannot access some of the messages they receive.29

ONI testing results

ONI carried out tests in Tunisia using the ISPs Planet Tunisie and TopNet. Similar to 2006-2007 test results, 2008-2009 testing revealed pervasive filtering of Web sites of political opposition groups such as the Democratic Forum for Labor and Liberty (http://www.fdtl.org), Al-Nadha Movement (www.nahdha.info) and Tunisian Workers' Communist Party (www.albadil.org), and the Democratic Progressive Party (pdpinfo.org).

Also blocked were Web sites run by opposition figures such as activist Moncef Marzouki (http://www.moncefmarzouki.net) and Web sites that contain oppositional news and politics such as www.nawaat.org, www.perspectivestunisiennes.net, www.tunisnews.com, and www.tunezine.com.

Web sites that publish oppositional articles by Tunisian journalists were also blocked. For example, ONI verified the blocking of the French daily Libération Web site in February 2007 because articles by Tunisian journalist Taoufik Ben Brik critical of President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali appeared on the site.30

Also blocked are Web sites that criticize Tunisia's human rights records. These include the Web sites of Amnesty International (www.amnesty.org), Freedom House (www.freedomhouse.org), Reporters Without Borders (www.rsf.org and www.rsf.fr), the International Freedom of Expression eXchange (www.ifex.org), the Islamic Human Rights Commission (http://www.ihrc.org/), and the Arabic Network for Human Rights Information (www.hrinfo.org). Although the home page of Human Rights Watch (HRW) was accessible, the Arabic and French-language versions of an HRW report on Internet repression in Tunisia were blocked.

The prominent video sharing Web sites youtube.com and www.dailymotion.com were found blocked, apparently because Tunisian activists used them to disseminate content critical of the regime’s human rights practices. Interestingly, the Web site of the OpenNet Initiative (opennet.net), which researches and documents state filtering and censorship practices, was blocked. Also blocked was the Web site of Global Voices (www.globalvoicesonline.org), a non-profit global citizens’ media project. Most of the tested sites in the anonymizers and circumvention tools category were blocked. These include Psiphon (http://psiphon.civisec.org), TOR (tor.eff.org) Anonymizer (www.anonymizer.com), email privacy service provider Steal the Message (www.stealthmessage.com), Guardster (www.guardster.com/), and JAP (anon.inf.tu-dresden.de).

The filtering regime pervasively filters pornographic content, several gay and lesbian information or dating pages, provocative attire, and several online translation services. Also blocked were a few Web sites that criticize the Quran (http://www.thequran.com) and Islam (http://www.islameyat.com), though their small number points to limited filtering of religious content in Tunisia.

Conclusion

Tunisia’s government continues to suppress critical speech and oppositional activity, both in real space and in cyberspace. Unlike other states that employ filtering software, Tunisia endeavors to conceal instances of filtering by supplying a fake error page when a blocked site is requested. This makes filtering more opaque and clouds users’ understanding of the boundaries of permissible content. Tunisia maintains a focused, effective system of Internet control that blends content filtering with harsh laws to censor objectionable and politically threatening information.

1. Freedom House, “Map of Press Freedom 2007,” http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&country=7290&year=2007.
2. “Repression continues as Ben Ali marks 21st anniversary as president,” Reporters Without Borders, November 7, 2008, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=29208.
3. Ibid.
4. “Morocco: French Magazine L’Express Banned Over Religious Issue,” Menassat, November 3, 2008, http://www.menassat.com/?q=en/alerts/5053-morocco-french-magazine-lexpre....
5. “Tunisia - Telecoms Market Overview & Statistics,” Paul Budde Communication Pty Ltd., March 2009, http://www.researchandmarkets.com/research/b46cf3/tunisia%5ftelecoms.
6. “Tunisia has 9 million GSM subscribers, and 1.7 million internet users,” Tunisia Online News, October 2008, http://www.tunisiaonlinenews.com/2008/10/03/tunisia-has-9-million-gsm-su....
7. “Tunisia’s Internet users spent over US$ 132.7 million in B2C e-commerce during the past 12 months,” Arab Advisors Group, August 27, 2008, http://www.arabadvisors.com/Pressers/presser-082708.htm.
8. “Internet in Tunisia: History,” Tunisia Online, June 25, 2002, http://www.tunisiaonline.com/internet/history.html.
9. Tunisian Internet Agency: The National Internet Service Provider in Tunisia, http://www.ati.tn/.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Reporters Without Borders, “Tunisia: Annual Report 2008,” http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=25442&Valider=OK.
13. Committee to Protect Journalists, Tunisia Report: The Smiling Oppressor, September 2008, http://cpj.org/reports/2008/09/tunisia-oppression.php.
14. Ibid.
15. Freedom House, “Freedom in the World - Tunisia (2008),” http://www.freedomhouse.org/inc/content/pubs/fiw/inc_country_detail.cfm?....
16. Freedom House, “Map of Press Freedom 2007,” http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&country=7290&year=2007.
17. “Surprises force delay in lawsuit against Tunisian Internet,” Magharebia, November 5, 2008, http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/features/....
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Lina Ben Mhenni, “Tunisia: Facebook Case Thrown Out of Court,” Global Voices Online, November 29, 2008, http://globalvoicesonline.org/2008/11/29/as-usual-the-tunisian-legal-sys....
21. Sami Ben Gharbia, “Silencing online speech in Tunisia,” Global Voices Advocacy, August 20, 2008, http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2008/08/20/silencing-online-speec....
22. Ibid.
23. “Independent news site destroyed,” Committee to Protect Journalists, October 14, 2008, http://cpj.org/2008/10/independent-news-site-destroyed.php.
24. “IFEX Member Websites in Tunisia and Burma under attack,” IFEX, October 15, 2008. http://www.ifex.org/en/content/view/full/97628/.
25. “Tunisia welcomes first internet radio station,” Magharebia, December 17, 2007, http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/features/....
26. “Tunisia: Internet filtering,” Internet Censorship Explorer, June 2005, http://ice.citizenlab.org/?p=115.
27. “A textbook case in press censorship for the past 20 years,” Reporters Without Borders, November 5, 2007, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=24264.
28. “Repression continues as Ben Ali marks 21st anniversary as president,” Reporters Without Borders, November 7, 2008, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=29208.
29. Sami Ben Gharbia, “Silencing online speech in Tunisia,” Global Voices Advocacy, August 20, 2008, http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2008/08/20/silencing-online-speec....
30. “Internet Enemies 2008: Tunisia," Reporters Without Borders, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=26158.

Syria

Fri, 07 Aug 2009 10:58:04 -0400

Background

In Syria, the media is primarily owned and controlled by the government and the ruling Baath party. Criticism of the president and his family is not allowed, journalists practice self-censorship, and foreign reporters rarely get accreditation.1 Though there have been improvements in Syrian press freedom since President Bashar al-Assad became president in 2000,2 the state continues to use the ongoing state of emergency to arrest media workers.3 Journalists and political activists risk arrest at any time for virtually any reason and are “up against a whimsical and vengeful state apparatus which continually adds to the list of things banned or forbidden to be mentioned.”4 Syrian journalists have been arrested for interviewing exiled regime opponents, participating in conferences abroad and for criticizing government policies.5

In 2006, Reporters Without Borders ranked Syria among the thirteen “enemies of the Internet,”6 and in 2007 it described Syria as the biggest prison for cyber-dissidents in the Middle East because of the number of arrests and mistreatments of online activists.7 In 2009, the Committee to Protect Journalists named Syria number three in a list of the ten worst countries in which to be a blogger, given the arrests, harassments and restrictions which online writers in Syria have faced.8

The government admits to censoring “pro-Israel and hyper-Islamist” Web sites, such as those run by the illegal Muslim Brotherhood, and those calling for autonomy for Syrian Kurds.9 In defense of these practices, former Minister of Technology and Communications Amr Salem has said that “Syria is currently under attack … and if somebody writes, or publishes or whatever, something that supports the attack, they will be tried.”10

Internet in Syria

The telecommunications market is Syria is the most regulated in the Middle East and is among the least developed. State-owned Syrian Telecom (STE) owns all telecommunications infrastructure and has made some substantial investment to bring services to rural areas, but limited competition exists with private ISPs competing with STE in the Internet provision market.11

STE, a government body that is part of the Ministry of Telecommunications and Technology, is also the regulator of telecommunications in Syria, and in addition to being an ISP, it enjoys a monopoly over wired and wireless services provided anywhere in Syria.12 Telecom providers in Syria include Syriatel,13 MTN,14 Aya,15 and SCS-net, which is the ISP arm of the Syrian Computer Society.16 Additionally, MTN and Syriatel now offer 3G mobile broadband in four major cities, as well as EDGE and GPRS connectivity (WAP) across the country.17 3G, however, is prohibitively expensive for most Syrians at nearly USD 50 per month.

The Internet was introduced to the general public in Syria in 2000 as part of the modernizing reforms of President Bashar al-Assad. In the subsequent seven years, Internet use soared by 4,900 percent, far exceeding the global growth rate of 249 percent. The Internet penetration rate as of 2008 was 16.8 percent.18 The vast majority of Syrian users get online at Syria’s ubiquitous Internet cafés, and from houses using dial-up connections via landlines.19 Syrian users continue to access blocked Web sites using proxies and circumvention tools, and prefer to use Internet cafés to browse banned content because, they believe, government can monitor Web surfing through home Internet connections.20

Legal and regulatory frameworks

The constitution of Syria provides for freedom of speech and of the press, but the Syrian government restricts press freedom with repressive laws such as the Emergency Law which was put in place December 1962 and broadly mandates the censorship of various forms of communication; the 2001 Press Law which sets out sweeping controls over publications printed in Syria; articles 286 and 287 of the penal code which criminalize spreading news abroad; and Decree No. 6 of 1965 criminalizes “publishing news aimed at shaking the people’s confidence in the revolution.”21

The Syrian authorities extended their censorship of Internet activities and monitoring of Internet users in March 2008 by ordering Internet café users to provide their names, identification cards, and the times they use the Internet café to Internet café owners, who will subsequently present them to the authorities.22 The head of the Syrian Media Center told Reuters, “These steps are designed to terrorize Internet users and spread fear and self-censorship in violation of the right to privacy and free expression.”23 Government officials said these measures were necessary to guard against what they described as attempts to spread sectarian divisions and "penetration by Israel."24

On the other hand, an increasing number of Syrians have faced trials or have been jailed for their online writings, and the Syrian authorities continue judicial persecution of cyber-dissidents. For example, Habib Saleh was tried in December 2008 for publishing articles calling for democracy in Syria on the Web site Elaph.com, a Web site that is censored in Syria, and was given a three-year prison sentence in March 2009. Saleh was convicted under article 285 of the criminal code of “weakening national sentiment,” a charge that is applicable only in wartime, said his lawyer.25 In the same vein, blogger Tariq Biasi received a three-year sentence for "weakening national sentiment" as well as "publishing false information” on his blog.26

In addition, owners of opposition Web sites face harassment by the authorities. For example, lawyer and Web site editor Abdallah Souleiman Ali was detained for 12 days for “persisting in publishing legal and political articles criticizing the role of the government” in his Web site Al Nazaha (alnazaha.org) in July 2008.27

Access to the social networking Web site Facebook was blocked in November 2007 as part of a crackdown on political activism on the Internet because, as a women’s rights advocate believes, it helped Syrian civil society form civic groups outside government control.28 The government however, said Facebook was blocked because it could become a conduit for Israeli penetration of Syrian youth.29 According to advocacy group the Syrian Media Center, at least 153 Internet sites have been blocked, among which are Blogger (owned by Google), the Arabic blogging host service Maktoob, YouTube, and Web sites of opposition parties, Lebanese newspapers and Lebanese groups opposed to “Syrian interference in Lebanon.”30 In September 2008, the Public Institution for Telecommunication ordered the blocking of the entire Web site of the Cairo-based Arabic Network for Human Rights Information (ANHRI) as well as their blogs (www.katib.org). Prior to that, only a page on ANHRI’s site containing information about human rights violations in Syria was blocked. ANHRI believes this blocking was ordered by the security forces, “which have a louder voice than the law and the Constitution in Syria.”31

Internet cafés in Syria are subject to tough measures which make opening one very difficult. To start an Internet café, one needs to get a license from the Syrian Telecommunications Institution and a security license from the Interior Ministry that sets security instructions, including requiring each café visitor to provide his/her name, ID, and the names of his or her mother and father.32 The café owner must show visitors which religious and political websites they are banned from using.33 Failure to follow the rules can result in closure of the café, large fines, and in extreme cases, jail time.34

Surveillance

STE states on its Web site that the telecommunications it provides remain private and shall not be shared except by law and regulations at an official request.35 However, café operators have reported that the authorities ask them to spy on the customers and that they believe everything is monitored.36 A young cyber-dissident who was arrested at an Internet café in Damascus in late 2006 for his critical online writings said security services often ask café owners to spy on clients, providing them with software programs for the task.37 And, as mentioned above, Internet café operators must keep a record of their clients’ names and IDs as well as when they use the Internet, to present to the authorities on request. Furthermore, Syria-based Web sites were ordered by the government in 2007 to reveal the identity and name of those behind any article or comment they publish.38

The Interior Ministry and the Syrian Telecommunications Institution have banned the sale of mobile phones that have global positioning systems (GPS) and have wireless application protocol (WAP) services that are not being properly monitored by the service providers.39

Technical censorship in Syria is implemented using software from a Canadian company called Platinum Inc.40 The company uses ThunderCache solution for URL filtering and, as the product’s Web page suggests, the system is capable of monitoring and controlling a user’s dynamic Web-based activities as well as conducting deep packet inspection.41

ONI testing results

Testing was conducted on two ISPs in Syria, SCS-Net (also known as Aloola) and Aya. ONI testing results indicate that Syria’s Internet filtering regime has increased the scope and depth of targeted content. Censorship has been extended to include high profile sites such as the video sharing Web site YouTube, the social networking Web site Facebook, and the online shop Amazon.com.

Political filtering continues to be pervasive. For example, Web sites of the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood such as ikhwansyria.com and jimsyr.com (now defunct) were blocked. Unlike results from 2006-2007, more Web sites affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, including that of the Egyptian branch, were blocked. Examples include www.ikhwanonline.com, www.ikhwanweb.com, and www.ikhwan.net.

Results from 2006-2007 testing indicated that only two Kurdish Web sites were blocked, but results from 2008-2009 testing show that several Kurdish Web sites have been added to the blocked sites. These include www.kurdnas.com, amude.net, www.kurdistanabinxete.com, www.pajk-online.com, www.kurdmedya.com, and www.kurdax.net.

Also blocked were the Web site of the United States Committee for a Free Lebanon (freelebanon.org), which campaigns for an end to Syrian influence in Lebanese politics, the Web site of the Lebanese Forces (www.lebanese-forces.org), and some Lebanese newspapers such as www.annahar.com.

Several political Web sites were also filtered. Among them are the Web site of the Reform Party of Syria (www.reformsyria.org), a Web site of a communist party in Syria (www.syriaalaan.com), the Web site of the Hizb al-Tahrir or Liberation Party (www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org) —an Islamist group that seeks to restore the Caliphate, and various news and oppositional Web sites such as www.thisissyria.net, www.free-syria.com, and www.syriatruth.org.

ONI testing found that a number of Syrian blogs hosted on Google’s popular blogging engine, Blogger (blogspot.com), continue to be blocked, strongly suggesting that ISPs have blocked access to all blogs hosted on this service, including many apolitical blogs. Interestingly enough, Blogger.com (the site from which users of the service write posts) is not blocked, meaning Syrian users can blog, but cannot read blogs (including their own).

Freesyria.wordpress.com, a blog created to campaign for the release of Michel Kilo, a prominent Syrian journalist imprisoned for his writings, was also blocked.

ONI results confirmed that Syria has unblocked access to the popular e-mail site www.hotmail.com as well as the small Web-based e-mail sites address.com and netaddress.com. All three sites were found to be blocked in previous rounds of testing. None of the Arabic-language e-mail sites ONI tested were blocked, though the Arabic-language hosting site www.khayma.com was. Among the few Web sites found unblocked since 2006-2007 testing were the localized Arabic version of Wikipedia and the Web site of the Lebanese Free Patriotic Movement (http://www.tayyar.org).

Though most foreign news sites were accessible, Web sites of some prominent Arabic newspapers and news portals were found to be blocked. Examples include the pan Arab, London-based, Arabic-language newspapers, Al-Quds al-Arabi (www.al-quds.co.uk) and Al-Sharq al-Awsat, (www.asharqalawsat.com), the news portal elaph.com, the Kuwaiti newspaper Al Seyassah (www.alseyassah.com), the U.S.-based Web site of the Arab Times (www.arabtimes.com), and the Islamically oriented news and information portal Islam Online (islamonline.net). These publications frequently run articles critical of the Syrian government.
Web sites of human rights organizations were generally available. Sites associated with the London-based Syrian Human Rights Committee (SHRC) and the Web site of the Syrian Observatory of Human Rights (www.syriahr.com) were notable exceptions. As indicated above, some blogs that criticize the human rights record of Syria were also blocked.

Several Israeli Web sites were tested to confirm whether or not Syria blocks the entire “.il” domain. All tested Web sites within the domain were blocked, suggesting that the entire domain is indeed blocked. URLs containing the keyword “Israel” were also found to be blocked.

Nearly one-third of the anonymizer sites tested were blocked, indicating some measure of effort to preempt circumvention. None of the sites containing pornographic content were found to be blocked, including the select few found blocked in 2006-2007 testing. Additionally, as in 2006-2007 rounds of testing, Web sites that focus on lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered issues were generally available.

The ISPs in Syria offer an optional filtering system to block content deemed immoral, violent, and chatting Web sites. ONI did not test the scope and depth of these optional systems.
Filtering continues to lack transparency; there is no explicit block page and the ISPs and telecom regulators do not publish clear information about what they filter.

Conclusion

In addition to high profile Web sites such as YouTube, Amazon.com, and Facebook, the Web sites blocked in Syria span a range of categories, with the most substantial filtering being of sites that criticize government policies and actions or espouse oppositional political views. Repressive legislation and the imprisonment of journalists and bloggers for their activities online have led many Syrians to engage in self-censorship. Meanwhile, the government continues to promote the growth of the Internet throughout the country.

1. “Country Profile: Syria,” BBC News, March 10, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/country_profiles/801669.stm.
2. Ibid.
3. Reporters Without Borders, “Syria - Annual Report 2007,” http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=20777.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Reporters Without Borders, “List of the 13 Internet enemies,” November 7, 2006, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3id_article=19603.
7. Reporters Without Borders, “Syria - Annual Report 2007,” http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=20777.
8. Committee to Protect Journalists, “10 Worst Countries to be a Blogger,” April 30, 2009, http://www.cpj.org/reports/2009/04/10-worst-countries-to-be-a-blogger.ph....
9. Guy Taylor, “After the Damascus spring: Syrians search for freedom online,” Reason Online: Free Minds and Free Markets, February 2007, http://www.reason.com/news/show/118380.html.
10. Ibid.
11. Paul Budde Communication, Syria – “Telecoms, Mobile & Broadband,” http://www.budde.com.au/buddereports/1168/Syria_-_Telecoms_Market_Overvi....
12. Syrian Telecom, http://www.ste.gov.sy.
13. Syriatel, http://www.syriatel.sy.
14. MTN, http://www.mtnsyria.com.
15. Aya, http://aya.sy/.
16. SCS-net/Aloola Web site, http://www.scs-net.org/.
17. “Syria: MTN and Syriatel Both Launch 3G Services,” Zawya.com, January 21, 2009, http://ae.zawya.com/countries/sy/macrowatch.cfm?eiusection=MTN%20AND%20S....
18. International Telecommunications Union, “ITU Internet Indicators 2008,” http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/icteye/Reporting/ShowReportFrame.aspx?ReportNam....
19. Phil Sands, “Syria tightens control over internet,” The National, September 30, 2008, http://www.thenational.ae/article/20080930/FOREIGN/664681062/1135.
20. “Syrian youth break through internet blocks,” International Relations And Security Network, June 3, 2008, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?ots591....
21. Freedom House, “Map of Press Freedom 2008,” http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&year=2008.
22. Khaled Yacoub Oweis, “Syria expands ‘iron censorship’ over Internet,” Reuters, March 13, 2008, http://uk.reuters.com/article/internetNews/idUKL138353620080313?sp=true.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Reporters Without Borders, “Cyber-dissident Habib Saleh sentenced to three years in jail,” March 16, 2009, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=30591.
26. Gideon Spitzer, “Dissident Watch: Tariq Biasi,” The Middle East Quarterly XVI (2009): 96, http://www.meforum.org/2098/dissident-watch-tariq-biasi#_ftn2.
27. Reporters Without Borders, “Lawyer held for 12 days is latest victim of government harassment of opposition websites,” August 18, 2008, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=28190.
28. Khaled Yacoub Oweis, “Syria blocks Facebook in Internet crackdown,” Reuters, November, 23, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSOWE37285020071123.
29. Ibid.
30. Khaled Yacoub Oweis, “Syria expands ‘iron censorship’ over Internet,” Reuters, March 13, 2008, http://uk.reuters.com/article/internetNews/idUKL138353620080313?sp=true.
31. Arabic Network for Human Rights Information, “Arabic Network for Human Rights Information’s Website is Entirely Blocked in Syria,” September 29, 2008, http://www.anhri.net/en/reports/2008/pr0929.shtml.
32. Omar Abdelatif, “Opening up an Internet café in Syria? Good luck,” Menassat, June 13, 2008, http://www.menassat.com/?q=en/news-articles/3943-opening-internet-caf-sy....
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Syrian Telecom, http://www.ste.gov.sy.
36. Omar Abdelatif, “Opening up an Internet café in Syria? Good luck,” Menassat, June 13, 2008, http://www.menassat.com/?q=en/news-articles/3943-opening-internet-caf-sy....
37. Zeina Karam, “Syria tightens controls on Internet users,” The New York Times, March 25, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/25/technology/25iht-media.4.11415911.html....
38. Khaled Yacoub Oweis, “Syria expands ‘iron censorship’ over Internet,” Reuters, March 13, 2008, http://uk.reuters.com/article/internetNews/idUKL138353620080313?sp=true.
39. Omar Abdelatif, “Opening up an Internet café in Syria? Good luck,” Menassat, June 13, 2008, http://www.menassat.com/?q=en/news-articles/3943-opening-internet-caf-sy....
40. Syrian Observatory Human Rights, Taqrir al-Markez al-Suri lile’lam wahuriyat altabir ‘an halat ‘a’elam walhuriyat alsahafiyah [Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression’s Report on Media and Press Freedom in Syria], May 3, 2009, http://www.syriahr.com/3-5-2009-syrian%20observatory6.htm.
41. Platinum Inc., http://platinum.sy/index.php?m=90; ThunderCache, http://www.thundercache.com/pages/filtering.html.

Sudan

Fri, 07 Aug 2009 09:39:19 -0400

Background

Though a two-decade civil war between the north and the south ended in January 2005 when the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement signed a comprehensive peace deal with the Sudanese government, extended fighting began in 2003 in the western region of Darfur. According to the UN, more than two million people have fled their homes and more than 200,000 have been killed in the Darfur conflict, in which pro-government Arab militias are accused of carrying out a campaign of ethnic cleansing against non-Arab groups.1

The government secretly decided in February 2008 to restore censorship, which was officially lifted in July 2005 after the signing of the peace accord.2 Since the decision, privately-owned media in Khartoum have been threatened by security agents, raids, confiscation of issues, closures, and coercive measures by state agencies, and security agencies have censored news, interrogated editors, and made nightly visits to printing presses to remove articles.3 In September 2008, the National Press and Publications Council (NPPC) closed two southern dailies for nearly a month for allegedly violating their publishing licenses, which require their headquarters to be based in Khartoum, and for “obstructing the 2005 peace agreement.” Both papers were allowed to reopen several weeks later after complying with all administrative requirements.4

Internet in Sudan

The number of Sudanese Internet users has increased from approximately 9000 in 20005 to approximately 3.8 million in 20086 (from 0.03 to 9.4 percent of the population). In January 2009 the mobile phone penetration rate was estimated to be 23 percent, with a 3.7 percent fixed-line penetration rate.7

Sudan’s existing telecommunications infrastructure covers approximately 80 percent of the country. The telecoms market is served mainly by Zain Sudan, government-backed Sudatel/Sudani, MTN, and Canar, a fixed-line operator with a focus on next generation networks and wireless loop that accounts for 43 percent of the industry. Publicly accessible Internet is available in only 46 percent of the country’s cities and towns, something operators attribute to low demand. Only two ISPs, Sudatel and Canar, have direct connectivity to the global Internet, though this is expected to change by the end of 2009. Sudan is connected to Saudi Arabia through an underwater fiber optic cable; the domestic fiber optic cable network extends over 11,000 kilometers throughout the country.8

The number of home Internet subscriptions increased by a factor of ten between 2001 and 2005, rising from 50,000 to 500,000. During the same period, the number of Internet cafés more than doubled. However, Internet usage remains concentrated in Khartoum, accounting for 95 percent of Internet users. The majority of Internet users in Sudan rely on dialup connections (59 percent), and very few have high-speed Internet (19 percent). While 81 percent of universities in Sudan are Internet-equipped, most (65 percent) still use dialup connections.9

The information and telecommunications sector in Sudan is regulated by the National Telecommunication Corporation (NTC), which was established in 1996.10 In 1993, the state-owned Public Telecommunication Corporation was transformed into the Sudan Telecommunication Company (Sudatel), allowing private investors to purchase a share in the enterprise. As of 2008, the government retained approximately 20 percent of Sudatel’s shares.11

In 2001, the Sudanese government adopted the National Strategy for Building the Information Industry, with the goal of enabling “all sectors of society to access information media in a way leading to the widest dissemination and utilization of information, all of which shall contribute to achieve an appreciated economic growth, wealth development, job opportunities, enhancement of all-sector production rates and eradication of poverty."12 As a result of the Strategy, Sudatel's monopoly over mobile telephony ended in 2002, and competitive operators—including several ISPs—in telecommunications were licensed.13

Sudatel was blacklisted by Washington and barred from doing business with American firms in May 2007, as part of US pressure on Khartoum to halt violence in the troubled Western Darfur region. Sudatel, however, has pursued to expand in a number of African countries.14

Due to the growth of the Internet services in Sudan, Sudan Internet Society, a non-governmental, technical and professional organization, has been established to serve the Sudanese community and to provide leadership in addressing key issues about the roles and uses of the Internet.15 SIS also manages the domain name registration under Sudan Top Level Domain ".sd."16

Legal and regulatory frameworks

Article 39 of the 2005 interim national constitution of the Republic of Sudan states that "[e]very citizen shall have an unrestricted right to the freedom of expression, reception and dissemination of information, publication, and access to the press without prejudice to order, safety or public morals as determined by law."17 The same article also states that the "state shall guarantee the freedom of the press and other media as shall be regulated by law in a democratic society.”18

In July 2008, international human rights organization Article 19 welcomed the draft Media Bills proposed for Southern Sudan, which “largely conform to the international standards,” but recommended further changes, including the amendment of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Organization Bill to remove its right to exercise regulatory powers over broadcasting.19

Censorship, which was officially lifted in July 2005 and secretly reinstated in February 2008, returned to the country publicly in April 2008 because “a number of newspapers had referred to the support Khartoum had provided to a failed coup attempt against the president of neighboring Chad.” The crackdown focused on privately-owned newspapers and those affiliated with parties other than the ruling National Congress Party. As a result, many newspapers were subject to pre-publication censorship and one opposition newspaper was banned from publishing entirely on February 14.20 The regime uses a number of methods to intimidate the press, “going from direct censorship over lawsuits under the Press and Publication Law to withdrawing much-needed government advertisements from critical newspapers.”21 This new wave of censorship did not affect Web sites as much, but low penetration rates mean the impact of the Internet in Sudan is low compared to more traditional media.22

The 2001 National Strategy for Building the Information Industry called for filtering Internet content that is “morally offensive and in violation of public ethics and order, [and] that may promote corruption and deface traditional identity.”23 The NTC declares that, although it targets several categories, “most important are the pornographic sites which constitute more than 95% of the blocked sites. Other sites include those related to narcotics, bombs, alcoholics, gambling and blasphemous sites normally offensive to Islam.”24 Interestingly, the NTC uses Western peer-reviewed research to support its decision to block these materials in defense of the public good. The NTC admits that “some translation sites are blocked as they are exploited to transcend the filtering process.”25

The NTC has set up a special filtering unit to screen Internet media before it reaches users in Sudan. The NTC asserts that sites are filtered based on their contents rather than their names, and that filtering is needed “to conserve the ethics and moral values and forestall evil in the society.”26 According to the NTC, the Internet Service Control Unit receives daily requests to add Web sites to, or remove them from, the blacklist. The NTC makes available on its Web site an e-mail address for such requests.

In August 2008, Reporters Without Borders protested the blocking of the video sharing Web site youtube.com and expressed concern over free expression online in Sudan.27 Sudan's National Telecommunication Corporation also reportedly blocked e-mail access for United Nations staff of the UN Mission in Sudan in February 2008.28

In April 2007, Google confirmed that it does not permit the download of Google Earth in Sudan because of restrictions imposed by the United States in accordance with US export controls and economic sanctions regulations.29 Users who attempt to download Google Earth get the message, “This product is not available in your country.”30

Surveillance

According to a 2008 US State Department human rights report, the government of Sudan monitors Internet communications, and the National Intelligence and Security Service reads e-mail messages between private citizens.31 Media reports reveal that Sudan’s police have a special unit that monitors Internet cafés to stop them from providing access to sexual content. The unit has reportedly filed claims against Internet cafés for hosting “obscene and immortal practices.”32

Because of security concerns, Sudan’s regulatory requirements order telecom networks to disconnect mobile prepaid subscribers if they have no personal information about the customer on record. Because of this, telecom operator MTN alone lost 1.1 million subscribers during the beginning of the second quarter of 2008.33

ONI testing results

Testing was conducted on two ISPs in Sudan, Sudanet and Zina Net. Their blocking behavior was identical. Results from 2008-2009 testing indicate changes in the filtering policy since 2006-2007 testing. The filtering regime still targets mainly pornography, but it has now been extended to include previously accessible online discussion groups that facilitate the exchange of Arabic sex materials. Interestingly, filtering of gay and lesbian, dating, and provocative-attire Web sites is now more limited compared to earlier results, as previously inaccessible content in these categories was found to be accessible (www.lesbians-against-violence.com and the search portal www.bglad.com are two examples of accessible sites that were previously blocked). The dating Web sites that were blocked were those likely to host sexually explicit (for example, adultfriendfinder.com) or gay and lesbian (gayromeo.com) content.

Another change in recent years is the unblocking of health-related sites pertaining to the alteration of body parts, such as www.circumcision.org and www.breastenlargementmagazine.com. Similarly, most of the miscellaneous sites that were found blocked earlier, such as www.collegehumor.com and www.metacafe.com, were found unblocked in recent testing.

Several of the tested sites that facilitate anonymous Web surfing or circumvention of Internet filters remain blocked. Additionally, some Web sites with hacking, cracking, or warez content were blocked, though these sites could have been blocked because they also contain sexually explicit content.

A small number of translation Web sites—which the NTC argues are used to circumvent filtering —were blocked.34

Though none of the tested blogs were found to be blocked, blogging is subject to scrutiny and can incur serious consequences. In October 2006, Sudan expelled Jan Pronk, a top U.N. official, from the country after he posted on his blog (www.janpronk.nl) sensitive statements relating to the conflict in Darfur.35 ONI has monitored and verified the blog’s accessibility from Sudan.

The Arab Network for Human Rights Information (HRinfo.org) reported that the NTC blocked access to the Web site www.sudaneseonline.com in 2004.36 This site was not found to be blocked during ONI testing.

Conclusion

Online pornography is the main target of the censors in Sudan, as the government openly acknowledges. Many anonymizer and proxy Web sites are blocked, as are some sites related to provocative attire, dating, and gay and lesbian interests. Sudan is relatively transparent in its filtering of the Internet compared with other Arab states, and even provides an appellate process for challenging the blocking of a site. Even though 2008-2009 test results found the country’s technical filtering to be less aggressive compared to earlier results, the return of media censorship in 2008 could result in stricter regulations of Internet activities.

1. BBC, “Country profile: Sudan,” January 6, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/country_profiles/820864.stm.
2. Reporters Without Borders, “For the good of the country, stop censoring,” November 25, 2008, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=29416.
3. Ibid.
4. Reporters Without Borders, “English-language daily allowed to resume publication,” October 1, 2008, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=28396.
5. International Telecommunications Union, “ITU Internet Indicators 2000,” http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/icteye/Reporting/ShowReportFrame.aspx?ReportNam....
6. International Telecommunications Union, “ITU Internet Indicators 2008,” http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/icteye/Reporting/ShowReportFrame.aspx?ReportNam....
7. George Bevir, “Connecting Sudan,” ITP, January 22, 2009, http://www.itp.net/news/544237-connecting-sudan.
8. African Economic Outlook, “Sudan: Innovation and ICT,” May 27, 2009, http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/countries/east-africa/sudan/.
9. Ronald Diebert, et al., Access Denied: The Practice and Policy of Global Internet Filtering (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008), 376.
10. African Economic Outlook, “Sudan: Innovation and ICT,” May 27, 2009, http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/countries/east-africa/sudan/.
11. Ibid.
12. National Telecommunication Corporation, “Information Society in Sudan: National Strategy for Building the Information Industry,” http://www.ntc.gov.sd/en/index.php?view=article&catid=3%3Anewsflash&id=4....
13. Ibid.
14. “Sudatel to expand in Africa despite US sanctions,” Telegeography, November 19, 2007, http://www.telegeography.com/cu/article.php?article_id=20593&email=html.
15. Sudan Internet Society, http://www.isoc.sd/.
16. Ibid.
17. The National Assembly of the Republic of Sudan, Sudan Interim Constitution, 2005, http://parliament.gov.sd/en/2_1.php.
18. Ibid.
19. “ARTICLE 19 recommends changes to South Sudan draft media legislation,” Menassat, July 5, 2008, http://www.menassat.com/?q=alerts/4077-article-19-recommends-changes-sou....
20. “Censorship returns to Sudan,” Menassat, April 10, 2008, http://www.menassat.com/?q=en/news-articles/3463-censorship-returns-suda....
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. National Telecommunication Corporation, “Information Society in Sudan: National Strategy for Building the Information Industry,” http://www.ntc.gov.sd/en/index.php?view=article&catid=3%3Anewsflash&id=4....
24. National Telecommunication Corporation, “Types of blocked Internet contents,” http://www.ntc.gov.sd/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=16....
25. National Telecommunication Corporation, “Frequently Asked Questions,” http://www.ntc.gov.sd/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=15....
26. National Telecommunication Corporation, “Internet Information Filtering (Blocking Unit),” http://www.ntc.gov.sd/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=15....
27. Reporters Without Borders, “Letter to National Telecommunication Corporation about YouTube’s inaccessibility,” August 7, 2008, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=28091.
28. “Sudan Blocks UN Peacekeeping Mission's E-mail Access, UN Remains Silent,” Inner City Press, February 8, 2008, http://www.innercitypress.com/un1unmis020808.html.
29. “Oh the irony: Google Earth ban in Sudan is due to US export restrictions,” Ogle Earth, April 20, 2007, http://www.ogleearth.com/2007/04/oh_the_irony_go.html.
30. Ibid.
31. US State Department Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sudan,” March 11, 2008, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100506.htm.
32. The Initiative for an Open Arab Internet, “Implacable Adversaries: Arab Governments and the Internet,” http://www.openarab.net/en/node/354.
33. George Bevir, “Connecting Sudan,” ITP, January 22, 2009, http://www.itp.net/news/544237-connecting-sudan.
34. National Telecommunication Corporation, “Filtering of Information and Blocking of Offensive Sites on the Internet,” http://www.ntc.org.sd/english/filtering/filtering.htm.
35. Jonathan Steele, “Sudan expels UN official for blog revealing Darfur military defeats,” October 23, 2006, The Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/sudan/story/0,,1929019,00.html.
36. Arab Network for Human Rights Information, “Sudan: Banning SudaneseOnline, A violation of freedom of expression,” July 10, 2004, http://anhri.net/en/reports/2004/pr040710.shtml.

Saudi Arabia

Thu, 06 Aug 2009 16:27:09 -0400

Background

Saudi Arabia is the birthplace of the Prophet Muhammad and the cradle of Islam. It embraces a strict interpretation of Sunni Islam and has a strong religious self-identity. Political parties are banned and activists who publicly call for reform risk being jailed.1 Journalism is strictly controlled, and journalists must exercise self-censorship in order to avoid government scrutiny and dismissal.2

Despite substantial Saudi investment in pan-Arab satellite television such as the Dubai-based MBC channels and the Bahrain-based Orbit Satellite Network, the media environment within Saudi Arabia is likely the most tightly-controlled in the region. The kingdom's four TV networks, including news channel Al-Ikhbaria, and its radio stations are operated by the state-owned Broadcasting Service of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (BSKSA), which is chaired by the Minister of Culture and Information.3 Private television and radio stations are prohibited on Saudi soil.4 However, the Saudi Minister of Culture and Information said in May 2009 an official committee was formed to study the draft privatization project of Saudi television and the Saudi News Agency, and that the Ministry was considering granting a number of radio licenses.5

Blogging has grown as a medium for expression in Saudi Arabia, with the number of bloggers reached an estimated 2,000 in 2006.6 Half of these bloggers are women.7 In 2005 the government tried to ban the country’s primary blogging tool, blogger.com.8 However, after a few days the ban was lifted, with the censors choosing to block specific content on the blogging Web site instead.9

The Committee to Protect Journalists ranked Saudi Arabia among the 10 worse countries to be a blogger, citing the widespread self-censorship and local calls by influential clerics for harsh punishment for online writers who post content deemed heretical.10

In November 2008, Saudi activists launched an online campaign to support human rights and called for a two-day public hunger strike to protest the detention without charges of human rights activists. The campaigned was highly publicized and received coverage from international media such as CNN, Washington Post and France24.11

Internet in Saudi Arabia

Since its creation in 1998, the state-run Saudi Telecom Company (STC) had been the sole provider of telecom services. However, in an effort to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), the government opened the telecommunication sector to competition in 2002.12 To enhance the ICT infrastructure in Kingdom, STC began the installation of IP-VPN service at various speeds of up to 2.5 gigabytes.13

The telecom sector continues to grow with relative consistency. Service revenues have climbed steadily at an annual average rate of nearly 15 percent since 2001. Despite high mobile revenues, the kingdom’s broadband penetration rate of about one percent remains well below the world average of five percent and the twenty percent benchmark of developed countries.14 This is likely to change, however, as advance ICT projects are introduced. These projects include STC’s launch of a home fiber- optic service providing fast Internet speed reaching 100MB per second for its clients in the Kingdom.15

The government’s Internet Services Unit (ISU), a department of the King Abdulaziz City for Science & Technology (KACST), has been responsible for overseeing Internet services in Saudi Arabia and for implementing government censorship.16 As its Web site explains, twenty-five licensed Internet service providers (ISPs) connect users to the national network.17 In accordance with a Council of Ministers decision, the Saudi Communications Commission was renamed the Communications and Information Technology Commission (CTIC) and took charge of licensing and filtering processes previously managed by KACST.18

Due to numerous restrictions on the public interaction of unrelated men and women and the limited roles of women in open society, the Internet has not only emerged as a popular means of socialization but also one that is dominated by women. A local company estimated that two thirds of Saudi Internet users are women. Some Saudis believe that cyberspace has encouraged people to lead “double lives,” conducting themselves in a more conservative manner in the public eye while engaging in far more liberal behavior online.19

Legal and regulatory framework

Saudi newspapers are established by decree. Although pan-Arab newspapers are available, they are subject to censorship and tend to conform to the state's standards regarding the publication of sensitive content.20 Public criticism of the Saudi leadership and the questioning of Islamic beliefs are not generally tolerated, but in the post 9/11 era and amidst instances of internal militancy, a bolder and more candid approach has brought about at least some press and TV coverage of more controversial topics.21 This approach remains to be limited, though. For example, the Ministry of Culture and Information imposed in January 2008 a nationwide ban on all live broadcasts on Saudi public television just two days after disgruntled viewers called Al-Ikhbariya news channel and made critical remarks targeting senior Saudi officials. The ban prompted Reporters Without Borders to call for a reversal of the government's action and the reinstatement of the network's director, who had been fired after the incident.22

The Saudi government makes no secret of its filtering, which is explained on a section of the ISU Web site.23 According to this Web site, KACST is directly responsible for filtering pornographic content, while other sites are blocked upon request from “government security bodies.” The Web site also has forms by which Internet users can request that certain sites be blocked or unblocked. A KACST official said that, “the majority of blocked Web sites contain pornographic content, and over 90 percent of Internet users have tried to access a blocked Web site.”24 The censors rely on citizens who send in roughly 1,200 requests a day to have sites blocked.25

In January 2008, Saudi Arabia implemented 16 articles of new law on the use of technology. These laws include penalties of ten years in prison and a fine for Web site operators that advocate or support terrorism; three years and fine for financial fraud or invasion of privacy; and five years and fine for those guilty of distributing pornography or other materials that violate public law, religious values and social standards of the kingdom. Accomplices of the guilty parties and even those who are proven to have only intended to engage in unlawful IT acts can receive up to half of maximum punishments.26

Providers and distributors of Internet equipment can also be held liable under the new law, including internet café managers whose facilities are used to post content that infringes upon the “values” of the kingdom.27

The new law was implemented amidst global scrutiny of the landmark imprisonment of Saudi blogger Ahmad Fouad Al-Farhan, who was arrested by the Saudi government for violating “non-security regulations.” Al-Farhan is reported to have stated that he was arrested because he “wrote about political prisoners in Saudi Arabia.”28 Al-Farhan was freed after more than four months in prison.29

The new law has also been applied in nonpolitical cases. For example, a court fined a young man 50,000 Saudi Riyal (approximately USD 13,000) and sentenced him to 22 months in jail and 200 lashes after he was found guilty of breaking into a woman’s email account and stealing photos of her. The man threatened to post the photos online if the woman did not agree to have an affair with him.30

In July 2008, the Saudi authorities reportedly refused to renew the residence permit of an Egyptian national who had lived in Saudi Arabia for 44 years for writing in newspapers and on the Internet articles that are critical of the Egyptian regime.31 The Arabic Network for Human Rights Information said the writer’s activities “only amount to writings about his concerns and opinions about Egypt and do not include any Saudi related matters.”32

In an unprecedented move, Saudi Arabia's National Human Rights Society announced attempts to have Web sites of Arab and international human rights organizations unblocked by the Saudi authorities.33 The chairman of the society said that they are aware of the blocking of Web sites of Human Rights Watch, Reporters Without Borders and the Arabic Network for Human Rights Information inside Saudi Arabia. He added that, “blocking these sites is tantamount to depriving Saudi Arabia of its rights as a member of the UN Human Rights Council” and that “blocking those websites violates clause 19 of the International Human Rights Declaration, which deals with freedom of expression and clause 23 of the Arab Human Rights Charter.”34

In May 2009, thirteen Saudi women journalists filed complaints with the Ministry of Interior accusing the local online newspaper Kul Al-Watan (All of the Homeland) of “defaming and distorting the image of the Saudi media.” The Saudi women journalists said the online newspaper published an offensive report entitled “Saudi Women in Red Nights” in which it alleged that prostitution, alcohol and drugs have become widespread in Saudi society, and that women journalists rely on illicit relationships with newspaper bosses to get support and fame. One of the women journalists accused the writer of taking advantage of an absence of censorship on online publishing in Saudi Arabia.35

Just few days later the Minster of Culture and Information said Saudi Arabia intends to enact laws, regulation, and legislation for newspapers and Internet Web sites. This regulation will require Saudi based Web sites to get official licenses from a special agency under the purview of his Ministry. The Minister said the proposed regulation aims to deter “dangerous” writing in the newspapers and the Web sites.36

Surveillance

Like many countries in the Middle East, the Saudi authorities monitor Internet activities. In March 2009 the Ministry of Internet orders Internet cafés to install hidden cameras and provide a record of names and identities of their customers.37

The Saudi religious police have also expressed interest in practicing online surveillance. Members of the religious police (the Commission for Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice) asked the Chairman of the Saudi Shura (Consultative) Council to enable them to have access to blocked Web sites, “to monitor immoral practices by visitors of these sites.”38 The religious police argued that some male and female youngsters “get involved in negative practices away from the eyes of the Saudi authorities” on these blocked Web sites, so they want to put an end to the “immoral practices” online.39

The Chairman of the Saudi Shura Council however, questioned the legitimacy of the request and said, "These justifications must be supported by clear evidence, otherwise there is no need for it".40

ONI testing results

ONI conducted in-country testing on three ISPs: STC, National Engineering Services & Marketing (Nesma) and Arabian Internet and Communications Services (Awalnet). The three providers blocked the same Web sites, as expected given the centrally administered filtering system.

Using Secure Computing’s “SmartFilter” software for technical implementation and to identify sites for blocking, the Saudi censors have increased the number of targeted Saudi political reformists and opposition groups. In addition to the previously blocked sites such as the Web sites of the Islah movement (www.islah.tv and islah.info) and the Tajdeed movement (tagdeed.net), the authorities have added more opposition sites to the blocked sites. Examples include www.alumah.com and www.alhijazonline.com.

Phase 2 testing also revealed that the censors now target user-generated oppositional content such as the forum New Arabia (www.newarabia.org).

ONI monitored in-country access to the blog of Saudi blogger Ahmad Fouad Al-Farhan, who was jailed for more than four months. His blog was found to be blocked during his arrest and continued to be blocked even after he was released from prison.

Also, ONI verified that the Web site of the Voice of Saudi Women (www.saudiwomen.net) was blocked in October 2008. The Web site, according to Reporters Without Borders, published a number of analytical reports about the status of women in Saudi society, and it denounced impediments to women becoming effective actors in Saudi society.41

In keeping with the Saudi government’s emphasis on protecting the “sanctity of Islam” and the legitimacy of the regime, several religious sites are also blocked. These include sites relating to minority Shia groups (www.yahosein.com), the Bahai faith (www.bahai.com) and sites that espouse alternative views of Islam such as the Web site of the Institute for the Secularization of the Islamic Society (www.secularislam.org). Sites that present critical reviews of the religion of Islam and/or try to convert Muslims to other religions are also censored (answering-islam.org, www.islamreview.com).

The Web pages of a few global free speech advocates, such as Article19 (www.article19.org) and the Free Speech Coalition (www.freespeechcoalition.com), are blocked. However, filtering of human rights content primarily targets Saudi or regional organizations. All Web pages of the Saudi Human Rights Center (www.saudihr.org) are blocked.

The entire human rights Web site www.humum.net was found blocked in phase 2 results. Phase 1 results showed that only the Saudi page on the site was blocked. The site receives complains on human rights violations from Arab citizens and is run by the Cairo-based Arab Human Rights Information Network.

Most global media sites tested, including Israel-based news outlets such as the daily Haaretz (www.haaretz.com), were accessible. However, sites of few prominent Arabic newspapers and news portals were blocked. These include the Arab-language newspaper Al-Quds Al Arabi (www.alquds.co.uk) and the news portal Elaph (www.elaph.com). ONI found that access to Elaph was allowed few months after testing.

“Immoral” social content continues to be a priority target for Saudi censors. The vast majority of pornographic Web sites and most sites featuring provocative attire or gambling that were tested were blocked. Phase 2 testing showed that the censors have added forums which facilitate the exchange of Arabic explicit content.

Also blocked were numerous sites relating to alcohol and drugs, gays and lesbians, and sex-education and family planning. A substantial number of Internet tools, including anonymizers and translators, were filtered.

Conclusion

Saudi Arabia publically acknowledges censoring morally inappropriate and religiously sensitive material, but the authorities also filter oppositional political sites and sites focused on human rights issues. In addition, the state has introduced new surveillance measures at Internet cafés and has announced plans to start a system that will require local sites to register with the authorities.

Saudi citizens have started to use the Internet for online activism, but the authorities have arrested several online writers and blocked their content. A local human rights group expressed interest in legally challenging the government’s censorship of human rights sites.

Generally, Internet filtering in Saudi Arabia mirrors broader attempts by the state to repress opposition and promote a single religious creed.

1. “Country profile: Saudi Arabia,” BBC News, October 1, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/country_profiles/791936.stm.
2. Reporters Without Borders, “Saudi Arabia: Annual Report 2007,” http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=20775&Valider=OK.
3. “Country profile: Saudi Arabia,” BBC News, October 1, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/country_profiles/791936.stm.
4. Reporters Without Borders, “Saudi Arabia: Annual Report 2006,” http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=17185.
5. Khaled al Oweigan, “Saudi Arabia to Regulate Kingdom-Based Websites,” Assarq Alawsat, May 13, 2009, http://aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=5&id=16714.
6. Faiza Saleh Ambah, “New Clicks in the Arab World,” The Washington Post, November 12, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/11/AR200611....
7. Ibid.
8. Reporters Without Borders, “Saudi Arabia: Annual Report 2007,” http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=20775&Valider=OK.
9. Ibid.
10. Committee to Protect Journalists, “10 Worst Countries to be a Blogger,” April 30, 2009, http://www.cpj.org/reports/2009/04/10-worst-countries-to-be-a-blogger.ph....
11. Internet & Democracy Blog at Harvard University’s Berkman Center for Internet and Society, “Saudi activists launch a daring and bold move to support human rights,” November 3, 2008, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/idblog/2008/11/03/saudi-activists-launch-a-....
12. “Saudi Arabia’s Telecom Sector Growing Rapidly,” Khaleej Times Online, March 24, 2008, http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=data/business/20....
13. “STC to Continue Free Installation of IP-VPN Service,” Arab News, June 1, 2008, http://www.arabnews.com/?page=6&section=0&article=110452&d=1&m=6&y=2008.
14. “Saudi Arabia’s Telecom Sector Growing Rapidly,” Khaleej Times Online, March 24, 2008, http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=data/business/20....
15. “STC starts fiber optic network for homes,” Saudi Gazette, http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentID=20....
16. Internet Services Unit, King Abdul Aziz City for Science & Technology, http://www.isu.net.sa/.
17. Ibid.
18. The Communication and Information Technology Commission, http://www.citc.gov.sa/.
19. “Online Campaigns to Protect Girls from Scandals,” Arab News, April 4, 2008, http://www.arabnews.com/?page=1&section=0&article=108566&d=4&m=4&y=2008&....
20. “Country profile: Saudi Arabia,” BBC News, October 1, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/country_profiles/791936.stm.
21. Ibid.
22. Reporters Without Borders, “Information Minister Bans Live Programmes on State Television,” February 1, 2008, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=25340.
23. Internet Services Unit, “Introduction to Content Filtering,” http://www.isu.net.sa/saudi-internet/contenet-filtring/filtring.htm.
24. “Most of Kingdom’s Internet users aim for the forbidden,” Arab News, October 2, 2005, http://www.arabnews.com/?page=1&section=0&article=71012&d=2&m=10&y=2005.
25. Peter Burrows, “Internet Censorship, Saudi Style,” Business Week, November 13, 2008, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_47/b4109068380136.htm?ch....
26. David Westley, ”Saudi Tightens Grip on Internet Use,” Arabian Business, January 26, 2008, http://www.arabianbusiness.com/509226-saudi-tightens-grip-on-internet-us....
27. Reporter Without Borders, “Blogger Fouad al Farhan Freed After More than Four Months in Prison,” April 28, 2008, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=26746.
28. David Westley, ”Saudi Tightens Grip on Internet Use,” Arabian Business, January 26, 2008, http://www.arabianbusiness.com/509226-saudi-tightens-grip-on-internet-us....
29. Reporter Without Borders, “Blogger Fouad al Farhan Freed After More than Four Months in Prison,” April 28, 2008, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=26746.
30. “Ahsa youth sentenced under cyber crime law,” Arab News, December 3, 2008, http://www.arabnews.com/?page=1&section=0&article=116942&d=3&m=12&y=2008....
31. The Arabic Network for Human Rights Information, “The Arabic Network Calls on the Saudi Authorities to Annul the Decision to Expel Egyptian Resident Abdullah Al Khyat,” July 26, 2008, http://anhri.net/en/reports/2008/pr0726.shtml.
32. Ibid.
33. Mariam Al Hakeem, “Rights group seeks to unblock access to websites,” Gulf News, April 1, 2008, http://www.gulfnews.com/News/Gulf/saudi_arabia/10202016.html.
34. Ibid.
35. Najah Alosaimi, “Web newspaper charged with defamation,” Arab News, May 2, 2009, http://www.arabnews.com/?page=1&section=0&article=122106&d=2&m=5&y=2009&....
36. Khaled al Oweigan, “Saudi Arabia to Regulate Kingdom-Based Websites,” Assarq Alawsat, May 13, 2009, http://aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=5&id=16714.
37. OpenNet Initiative, “Restriction on Internet use in the Middle East on the rise: Internet cafés in Saudi must install hidden cameras,” April 16, 2009, http://opennet.net/blog/2009/04/restriction-internet-use-middle-east-ris....
38. Mariam Al Hakeem, “Religious police demand access to blocked websites,” Gulf News, August 28, 2008, http://archive.gulfnews.com/news/gulf/saudi_arabia/10240886.html.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Reporters Without Borders, “Saudi Arabia: authorities block women’s rights website,” http://www.rsf.org/fil_en.php3?id_rubrique=682&mois=10.

Oman

Thu, 06 Aug 2009 15:47:06 -0400

Background

One of the more traditional countries in the Middle East, Oman is a monarchy under the rule of Sultan Qaboos bin Said, who took on the role of prime minister and heads the foreign, defense and finance ministries,1 while the Consultative Council serves mainly as an advisory body.2 Since Said attained power in 1970, he has embraced economic reforms and boosted spending on health, education and welfare.3

Oman’s government has been progressively modernized and liberalized, allowing for the nomination of female candidates to join the Council.4 Although citizens have the freedom to form associations on a national basis within the limits of the Basic Law, Oman has no legalized political parties.5

Like many of its neighbors – including the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen - Oman censors publications for political or cultural reasons, and self-censorship is prevalent among journalists who wish to avoid harassment.6

Internet in Oman

Over the past three decades, Oman’s telecom sector has been developed almost entirely by the state-controlled Oman Telecommunications Company, which began providing Internet services in early 1997.7 Omantel, previously known as the General Telecommunications Organization, is the official ISP, supplying the country with both telephone services and international networks. Omantel and another national company, Oman Mobile Telecommunications Company or Oman Mobile, provide a wide range of telecom services.8

Even though mobile and fixed line services cover around 95 percent of the country,9 Internet penetration rates remain low, at about 16.8 percent in 2008.10 As of May 2008, the number of Internet subscribers in Oman reached 115,506, with dial-up customers totaling 52,351, ADSL subscribers 23,969, leased Internet lines 319, pre-paid Internet subscribers 37,600, and other Internet connections 1,267. Mobile phone subscribers reached 2.7 million.11

Although the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA) has attempted to create competition in the ISP market, most Internet services are still provided by Omantel alone. In March 2008, in response to a lack of infrastructure support for potential ISPs, the TRA published a Public Consultation Paper seeking written comments from parties interested in establishing new ISPs, especially operators and investors, on a license to establish and operate an Internet Exchange.12

Oman’s low Internet penetration rate is largely a result of the limited number of computers in the country and its horizontal urban expansion, which makes delivering connectivity to dispersed neighborhoods difficult.13 Another challenge is that all IP addresses have been entirely used up, limiting the capacity of the Internet network. To solve this issue, an Omantel official recommended establishing a plan to move to IPv6, the next generation protocol.14

In May 2003, the government agency of the Information Technology Authority (ITA) began to implement the Digital Oman Strategy.15 Also known as the eOman Initiative, this strategy aims to transform the country into a sustainable knowledge-based society by leveraging ICTs to enhance government services, enrich businesses and empower individuals, and in 2007 the ITA began developing a web portal to make an integrated service delivery platform for government e-services.16 The Ubar Portal serves as a gateway to a range of electronic government services such as e-tendering, e-taxation, and services of municipalities.17 In April 2008, a group composed of students, academics, IT professionals, and business and members of various government institutions launched Oman's first IT knowledge Internet platform, a project which aims to bridge the information technology knowledge gap between students, professionals, and the industry sector.18

Legal and regulatory framework

Article 29 of Oman’s constitution, often referred to as “The White Book,” guarantees “freedom of opinion and expression … within the limits of the Law.”19 “Material that leads to public discord, violates the security of the State or abuses a person’s dignity and his rights” may not be printed or published.20 As in many other Gulf States, law in Oman prohibits criticisms of key figures, such as the Sultan, by the media or individuals. In addition, the 1984 Press and Publication Law authorizes the government to censor publications deemed politically, culturally, or sexually offensive.21

Internet use in Oman is regulated by Omantel’s Terms & Conditions, which mandate that users “not carry out any unlawful activities which contradict the social, cultural, political, religious or economical values of the Sultanate of Oman or could cause harm to any third party.” Any abuse or misuse of the Internet Services will “result in the termination of the subscription and/or in the proceedings of Criminal or Civil lawsuits against the Customer.”22

To use the Internet, individuals, companies, and institutions are asked to sign an agreement not to publish anything that destabilizes the state; insults or criticizes the head of state or the royal family; questions trust in the justice of the government; creates hatred toward the government or any ethnicity or religion; promotes religious extremism, pornography, or violence; promotes any religious or political system that contradicts the state's system; or insults other states. Users must also agree not to promote illegal goods or prescription drugs over the Internet.23

In March 2007 Oman's TRA openly banned the use of Internet telephony at Internet cafés and warned Internet café operators against providing basic voice service. The TRA also warned that violators face punishments that include imprisonment and financial fines.24

Surveillance

According to the US State Department Human Rights Report, the government monitors private communications, including mobile phones, e-mail, and Internet chat room exchanges, and interrogates chat room users who are critical of government officials or policies by tracking them through their ISP addresses.25 In November 2006, the Omani authorities briefly detained the administrator and a number of moderators of Oman's most popular online discussion forum (omania.net) after an article about corruption in the country was posted in the forum.26 The administrator and moderators were banned from traveling outside the country, awaiting charges of defamation under the publication law, telecommunications law, and penal code.27 ONI monitored the site and found that in February 2007 a note in Arabic was posted on the Web site saying that the administrator was found innocent. No other details were mentioned.

To enforce surveillance, Omantel imposes physical restrictions on Internet access in Internet cafés.28 Individuals or companies wishing to open an Internet café must submit a floor plan for the proposed site. The plan must be designed so that the computer screens are visible to the floor supervisor. No closed rooms or curtains are allowed that might obstruct view of the monitors.29 Moreover, Internet café operators are asked to install proxy servers to monitor and log user activity.30

Article 37 of Oman’s Telecommunications Regulatory Act & Amendments states that ISPs “shall maintain the confidentiality of the services provided to the beneficiaries, and shall not compromise or uncover it or uncover any of the beneficiary's data unless based on an order from a competent court.”31

ONI test results

ONI conducted testing on Oman's exclusive ISP, Omantel, using dialup, "Log ‘N’ Surf" service, and ADSL connections. Results indicate that the filtering regime in Oman is now more extensive and covers content that was not previous targeted during previous testing.

The filtering regime extensively targets pornographic Web sites. Results show that forums that facilitate the exchange of Arabic-language explicit content have been blocked. Similar to earlier test results, some Web sites featuring provocative attire were blocked as well.

Two content categories have been added to the blocked content: content that is critical of Islam (www.answering-islam.org, www.prophetofdoom.net, www.freemuslim.org) and Web sites about illegal drugs (www.marijuana.com, www.marijuana.nl, www.amphetamines.com, www.heroin.org).

Blocking of gay and lesbian sites remains extensive, though sites relating to gay civil rights and equality issues (www.gayscape.com and www.gaywired.com) were largely accessible. Omantel also blocked some dating Web sites—probably because they contained either sexually explicit images (www.adultfriendfinder.com) or gay and lesbian content (gayromeo.com). Anonymizing and proxy circumvention tools, such as Anonymizer and Proxify, were heavily blocked and, previously accessible tools such as Psiphon (psiphon.civisec.org) and TOR (tor.eff.org) were also blocked. Additionally, some Web sites dealing with hacking and cracking, such as www.passwordhq.com and www.crackspider.net, were blocked.

Even though the use of VoIP has been officially banned in Oman as mentioned above, the Web site skype.com was the only VoIP site found to be blocked. The video sharing Web site metacafe.com and the humor site collegehumor.com were found blocked, probably because they include nudity. Also blocked was the Web site Jihad Watch (www.jihadwatch.org).

Omantel uses the American-made commercial filtering software SmartFilter. Omantel's blockpage states that the blocking of banned sites is not a unilateral decision taken by the ISP, but rather that “[a]n overwhelming number of requests from the subscribers made [Omantel] rethink [its] strategy and conform to the popular demand to block pornographic and certain hacking sites that encourage hacking.”32 The blockpage also suggests that users submit an e-mail link to a site if they feel it has been blocked unfairly, and that such a page could be re-categorized and unblocked.

Conclusion

Filtering of pornography, gay and lesbian content, and circumvention tools is pervasive in Oman. The authorities have extended the filtering regime to include more explicit content in Arabic and Web sites that are critical of Islam as well as sites about illegal drugs. In addition to the technical filtering, the authorities impose legal and physical controls to ensure that the Internet community does not access or publish objectionable or unlawful material. These laws and regulations give rise to self-censorship among writers and publishers, both off- and online.

1. “Country profile: Oman,” BBC News, October 1, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/country_profiles/791892.stm.
2. United States Department of State, “Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007: Oman,” March 11, 2008, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100603.htm.
3. “Country profile: Oman,” BBC News, October 1, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/country_profiles/791892.stm.
4. United Nations Development Programme, “Oman: Women in Public Life,” http://gender.pogar.org/countries/country.asp?cid=13.
5. United Nations Development Programme, “Democratic Governance, Civil Society, Oman,” http://www.pogar.org/countries/civil.asp?cid=13.
6. “Country profile: Oman,” BBC News, October 1, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/country_profiles/791892.stm.
7. Omantel, http://www.omantel.net.om/about_us/default.asp.
8. “Oman: Telecom Sector Keeping Pace with Progress in Information Technology,” Zawya, July 23, 2007, http://www.zawya.com/story.cfm/sidZAWYA20070723054248.
9. Ibid.
10. International Telecommunications Union, “ITU Internet Indicators 2008,” http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/icteye/Reporting/ShowReportFrame.aspx?ReportNam....
11. “Cell Phone Subscribers Base Grows by 9.2pc,” Khaleej Times, May 30, 2008, http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=data/middleeast/....
12. “License to Establish and Operate an Internet Exchange in the Sultanate of Oman,” Telecommunications Regulatory Authority Consultation Paper, March 3, 2008, http://www.tra.gov.om/new/english_tra/pdf/Public_Consultation_Internet_E....
13. “E-Government Network Making Good Progress: Wohaibi,” Zawya, June 16, 2008, http://www.zawya.com/Story.cfm/sidZAWYA20080617055512/SecMain/pagHomepag....
14. “Digital Strategy Transforms Oman to Knowledge Environment,” Oman Observer, June 17, 2008, http://insidethegulf.com/central.php?o=1&s=680&d=3&i=557.
15. Sultanate of Oman Information Technology Authority, “Digital Oman Strategy,” http://www.ita.gov.om/ITAPortal/eServices/eoman_strategy.aspx.
16. “RO3.5m Web Portal to Pave Way for E-Government in Oman,” Khaleej Times Online, June 6, 2007, http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=data/middleeast/....
17. Ibid.
18. Ravindra Nath, “New ‘Knowledge Platform’ Aims to Bridge Digital Gap,” Khaleej Times Online, April 13, 2008, http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=data/middleeast/....
19. The White Book: The Basic Law of the Sultanate of Oman, Article 29, http://www.omanet.om/english/government/basiclaw/overview.asp?cat=gov&su....
20. The White Book: The Basic Law of the Sultanate of Oman, Article 31, http://www.omanet.om/english/government/basiclaw/overview.asp?cat=gov&su....
21. United Nations Development Programme, Program on Governance in the Arab Region (UNDP-POGAR), “Oman,” http://www.pogar.org/countries/civil.asp?cid=13.
22. Omantel, “Omantel Terms & Conditions,” http://www.omantel.net.om/policy/terms.asp.
23. Omantel, “Omantel Terms & Conditions for Internet Cafes,” http://www.omantel.net.om/services/business/internet/Terms_and_condtions....
24. “TRA bans popular cyber cafe internet telephony,” Times of Oman, March 11, 2007, http://www.timesofoman.com/echoice.asp?detail=4227&rand=jx1GaXvoqloVJK99....
25. United States Department of State, “Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007: Oman,” March 11, 2008, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100603.htm.
26. “Al-Internet wu Huria Al-Tabir fi Sultanat Oman” [Internet and Freedom of Expression in the Sultanate of Oman], Arabic Network for Human Rights Information, February 1, 2007, http://www.hrinfo.net/mena/achr/2007/pr0120.shtml.
27. Ibid.
28. Oman Telecommunications Company, “Procedures for Internet Cyber Café Pre-Approval,” http://www.omantel.net.om/services/business/internet/preapprovaleng.pdf.
29. Ibid.
30. Oman Telecommunications Company, “Policy for Using Internet Cafés,” http://www.omantel.net.om/services/business/internet/policy_using_intern....
31. Oman Telecommunications Regulatory Act & Amendments, http://www.tra.gov.om/newsite1/Portal/Upload/Documents/1_Telecom%20Act.p....
32. See Omantel's blockpage at http://www.omantel.net.om/new1.html.

Morocco

Thu, 06 Aug 2009 15:18:11 -0400

Background

The ascension of King Mohammed VI to the throne in 1999 marked the end of the “Years of Lead,” a period of state repression under his father, King Hassan II.1 Despite the taboos broken and journalistic hopes raised since then, the nation’s media continues to face harassment, censorship, prosecution, hefty fines and jail time for “offending” the king, the monarchy, the nation, territorial integrity (particularly in respect to the Western Sahara), God, or Islam.2 Examples include the shutting down of a weekly Arabic newspaper, prohibiting media coverage of trials and demonstrations, restricting the movement of the press and blocking certain websites.3 Reporters Without Borders ranked Morocco 122nd out of 173 countries in their 2008 press freedom index.4

Morocco faces two major issues that inform its actions regarding the press and human rights in general: the status of Western Sahara and terrorism. As to the first issue, Morocco has vied with the Polisario Front for control of Western Sahara ever since Spain pulled out of the region in 1976.5 Morocco asserts a historical claim on the region,6 while the Polisario Front asserts the right of self-determination.7 After decades of fighting, both sides agreed to a UN-sponsored ceasefire in 1991 that required an eventual referendum on independence in the region.8 As of yet, this referendum has not been held.9 Despite the ceasefire, reports of overzealous suppression of peaceful resistance to Moroccan rule persist.10 Journalism on the subject has been restricted as well.11

As to the second issue, terrorism, Casablanca was the site of a major terrorist attack in May 2003 when suicide bombers detonated five bombs targeting a Jewish community center, a Spanish restaurant and social club, a hotel, and the Belgian consulate.12 An anti-terrorism law which was passed soon after the attacks placed further restrictions on the press.13

Internet in Morocco

Even though the Internet was first introduced in Morocco in 1995,14 the Moroccan Ministry of Industry, Trade and New Technologies stated in April 2008 that as few as 3.4 percent of the population had a computer, only 2,000 Moroccan schools were equipped with ICT, and only 10 companies engaged in e-commerce.15 The Ministry, describing these numbers as “alarming,” announced that it had devised a short-term priority plan of action to promote competition in the ICT field.16 The International Telecommunication Union estimated the 2008 Internet penetration rate at 32 percent,17 and an October 2007 UNDP survey indicated that Internet usage in the region as a whole has remained low due to low incomes, high costs, and a lack of interesting content.18

Statistics from the National Telecoms Regulation Agency (ANRT) in 2007 reflected the impact of deregulation of the telecom market with double-digit growth for the information and communications technology (ICT) segments on the whole. High-speed (ADSL) Internet services alone sparked unprecedented growth in Morocco’s Internet market, which grew from 168,000 subscribers in June 2005 to 480,000 in June 2007 – an increase of 220 percent. The country’s three providers – Maroc Télécom, Méditel and Wana – also launched 3G Internet services with speeds of over 3 MB in the country’s major cities for USD73 per month.19

Maroc Télécom, the largest Internet service provider (ISP) in Morocco, offers wholesale services to other ISPs, following the Reference Access Offer approved by the Morocco’s telecom regulatory body, the National Telecommunications Regulatory Agency (ANRT), in October 2006.20 Maroc Télécom is a 53 percent subsidiary of European telecom giant Vivendi International and owns 51 percent of the historical telecommunications operators of Mauritania, Burkina Faso, and Gabon.21

ICT growth was largely dominated by a 553 percent increase in 3G Internet services provided between June 2007 and June 2008. In fact, 3G Internet services accounted for 24 percent of the total market share, compared with 74 percent for ADSL broadband Internet. Maroc Télécom held a 76 percent market share in 3G Internet services, relative newcomer Wana with 18 percent, and Méditel with 4 percent. With regard to Internet use overall, the number of subscribers exceeded 650,000 – a 37 percent increase from June 2007.22

The ANRT expects that the telecoms industry’s share of the country's gross domestic product will grow from the current 7 percent to 10 percent in 2010.23 The kingdom also set up its first fund to promote innovation in IT as part of a larger plan to create more than 30,000 new direct job opportunities in ICT industries.24

In 2006, Morocco’s existing blogosphere grew exponentially due to cheaper Internet access, ADSL availability, and the greater availability of Arabic-language blogging platforms such as Maktoob and Jeeran. In 2006, a local platform called Blogs Jahiz was created,25 adding to popular existing platforms such as Blogger, Wordpress, Skyblogs, and those previously mentioned. As of 2008, the local blogosphere was estimated to contain around 30,000 blogs.26

Though in Morocco the Internet is largely free of filtering, bloggers and forum participants generally avoid “red line” topics such as the Western Sahara, defamation of the royal authority, and defamation of Islam.27 Still, bloggers in the kingdom state that they are free to discuss almost anything.28

Legal and regulatory frameworks

Current laws criminalize criticizing the monarchy or Morocco’s claim to Western Sahara.29 The anti-terrorism bill that was passed following suicide bombings in Casablanca in 2003 grants the government sweeping legal power to arrest journalists or to filter Web sites that are deemed to “disrupt public order by intimidation, force, violence, fear or terror.”30 In recent years, the Moroccan government appears have grown increasingly proactive about shutting down newspapers and imprisoning reporters; in January 2007, Morocco’s only monthly magazine written in local dialect was ordered shut down for two months after publishing jokes about Islam and a reporter and editor were given three-year suspended prison sentences.31 Also in 2007, a journalist was forced to resign as managing editor of a weekly newspaper to prevent the newspaper being forced to pay an impossibly large amount in damages in a libel suit.32

In 2007, authorities stated they would seek to reform the press law, but they have continued to imprison journalists, seize newspapers and block Web site access.33 Though the king has sought to improve his image abroad, he has continued to curb the country’s independent media. Under strong regime pressure, judges have regularly convicted a steady stream of dissidents under the press law for reporting on taboo topics such as the monarchy, the army, Islam and independence for the Western Sahara.34 For this reason, an increasing number of journalists have thought it best to self-censor to avoid any problems.35 Government authorities have worked with journalists and editors’ unions to redraft the press law, but were not inclined to decriminalize many of the chief press offenses that authorized imprisonment of journalists, so efforts failed and no revised draft was submitted to parliament.36

The current press law has been used to suppress outspoken online writers. For example, in September 2008, Moroccan blogger and journalist Mohamed Erraji was convicted under article 41 of the Moroccan press law of “disrespect for the king” in an article for Moroccan Arabic-language news website Hespress (http://hespress.com) and was sentenced to pay a fine of approximately USD630 and serve two years in prison.37 Later in the month, however, an appeals court overturned the blogger’s conviction on the grounds of procedural irregularities, citing that the initial hearing took place only twelve days after charges were filed, when the law calls for a minimum of fifteen days.38

Information related to the independence movement in the Western Sahara continues to be a sensitive issue. When the video sharing Web site YouTube became inaccessible in May 2007 via the state-controlled Maroc Telecom, some Internet users believed the site was blocked because video clips that were critical of Morocco’s actions in Western Sahara were posted to the site. Maroc Telecom, however, said a technical glitch was responsible for the site’s inaccessibility.39

Political decisions are also believed to have been behind clampdowns on media coverage. For example, in May 2008, the ANRT advised the Rabat bureau of Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel that the frequency it used for broadcasting a daily news program that had been covering events in the Maghreb for over eighteen months was being withdrawn because of “technical and legal problems.”40 The sudden and vague nature of the decision, however, suggested that the decision had political motivations.41

Surveillance

A February 2008 arrest of an Internet user led many to believe that Moroccan authorities do practice Internet surveillance. The Moroccan user, Fouad Mourtada, was arrested by plain-clothes police and sentenced to three years in prison for creating a false profile of the King’s brother on the social networking Web site Facebook.42 This case marked the first conviction in the country for an online offense and shocked the blogging community. It also raised questions as to how the police identified the Internet user and whether his IP addressed was tracked.43 Mourtada was released 43 days later as the result of a royal pardon issued on the occasion of the Prophet Mohammed’s birthday.44

ONI testing results

Restrictions on freedom of expression have extended to the Internet in recent years. The government has blocked access to Web sites run by Islamist opposition groups and a few Web-based anonymizers, but it has lifted the ban on a few previously blocked Web sites that advocate for the independence of Western Sahara.

ONI carried out testing of Moroccan Internet service on the principal Internet provider, Maroc Telecom, and the ISP Morocco Trade and Development Services (MTDS). Test results in 2008-2009 found that sites that promote the independence of Western Sahara that were previously blocked have been unblocked. These include the Web site Sahara Occidental (http://www.sahara-occidental.com) and the Web sites for the Union of Sahrawi Journalists and Writers (www.upes.org) and the Association of Families of Sahrawi Prisoners and Disappeared (www.afapredesa.org).

Previous ONI tests found the same trend; more pro-independence Western Sahara Web sites are becoming accessible. Similarly, the Web site of an Islamist opposition movement, Justice and Spirituality, (http://www.aljamaa.info) was found accessible.

Blogging platform LiveJournal (www.livejournal.com), however, continues to be blocked. Also blocked are the Web-based anonymizers www.anonymizer.com and the circumvention tool www.multiproxy.org.

Of all of the Web sites tested containing GLBT-related content, only one was found to be blocked (http://www.kelma.org), apparently because the site has a special section for the Maghreb region at http://www.kelma.org/kelmaghreb.htm.

ONI confirmed through technical tests that access to the Web site of Sheikh Mohamed Ben Abderrahman Al-Maghraoui (Maghrawi.net) was blocked on September 30, 2008, just a few days after the Moroccan authorities announced plans to shut down his Qur’anic schools and close down a Web site on which the Sheikh decreed that the marriage of nine-year-old girls is allowed by Islam, a decree that was considered in Morocco to legitimize pedophilia.45

Conclusion

Morocco’s Internet filtration regime is relatively light and focuses on a few blog sites, a few highly visible anonymizers, and for a brief period, the video sharing Web site YouTube. Sites advocating for the independence of the Western Saharan are no longer inaccessible. The issues Morocco faces in Western Sahara’s push for independence, the specter of terrorism, and the protection of the royal family and Islam from defamation have led Morocco to crack down on free speech and the press, but have not led it to significantly censor the Internet. As Internet users can access blocked material on other accessible sites, it is clear that Morocco’s filtration regime is not comprehensive. Relative to the region, Moroccan Internet access is relatively free, but the fact that the authorities have started to prosecute online writers indicates limited tolerance to users’ online activities.

1. UNHCR, “Freedom in the World - Morocco (2007),” http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,FREEHOU,,MAR,473c55e339,0.html.
2. Reporters Without Borders, “Morocco - Annual Report 2007,” http://www.rsf.org/country-43.php3?id_mot=147.
3. Ibid.
4. Reporters Without Borders, “Astronomic damages award against leading Arabic-language daily upheld on appeal,” October 30, 2008, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=29152.
5. “Regions and territories: Western Sahara,” BBC News, May 12, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/3466917.stm.
6. United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, “Western Sahara: MINURSO – Background,” 2005, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minurso/background.html.
7. Western Sahara Online, “History,” http://www.wsahara.net/history.html.
8. United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, “Western Sahara: MINURSO – Background,” 2005, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minurso/background.html.
9. Human Rights Watch, “Morocco/Western Sahara: World Report 2007, January 2007,” http://hrw.org/englishwr2k7/docs/2007/01/11/morocc14714.htm.
10. Ibid.
11. Reporters Without Borders, “Morocco: Annual Report 2007,” February 2007, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=20772.
12. “Terror blasts rock Casablanca,” BBC News, May 17, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3035803.stm.
13. Privacy International and the GreenNet Educational Trust, “Silenced: An International Report on Censorship and Control of the Internet,” September 2003, http://www.privacyinternational.org/survey/censorship.
14. United Nations Economic Committee for Africa, “Morocco: Internet Connectivity,” http://www.uneca.org/aisi/nici/country_profiles/Morocco/morocinter.htm.
15. “Less than 23% Internet users in Morocco, minister,” Maghreb Arabe Presse, April 15, 2008
http://www.map.ma/eng/sections/imp_social/less_than_23__inter/view.
16. Ibid.
17. International Telecommunications Union, “ITU Internet Indicators 2008,” http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/icteye/Reporting/ShowReportFrame.aspx?ReportNam....
18. “Low income, dull content hinder Maghreb internet growth,” Magharebia, October 25, 2007, http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/newsbrief....
19. “Internet subscriptions rise by 220% in Morocco,” Magharabia, August 2007, http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/features/....
20. Topic, “Operator Source: Maroc Telecom,” http://point-topic.com/content/operatorSource/profiles2/menara.htm.
21. Vivendi, “Maroc Telecom: About,” http://www.vivendi.com/vivendi/Maroc-Telecom,953.
22. Point Topic, “Operator Source: Maroc Telecom,” http://point-topic.com/content/operatorSource/profiles2/menara.htm.
23. “Morocco to offer third mobile phone license,” Reuters, October 30, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/rbssTechMediaTelecomNews/idUSLU7169512008....
24. “Morocco creates new fund to promote technological innovation,” Magharebia, October 26, 2008, http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/features/....
25. “Blogs becoming increasingly popular in Morocco,” Magharebia, September 11, 2006, http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/features/....
26. “Morocco, where bloggers can write about anything...almost,” AFP, January 6, 2008, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hf-2c91SkV1ytdQ6fYZq43eAcX7Q.
27. Reporters Without Borders, “Morocco,” February 7, 2008, http://www.rsf.org/Morocco.html.
28. “Morocco, where bloggers can write about anything...almost,” AFP, January 6, 2008, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hf-2c91SkV1ytdQ6fYZq43eAcX7Q.
29. Committee to Protect Journalists, “Attacks on the Press in 2006: Morocco,” http://www.cpj.org/attacks06/mideast06/mor06.html.
30. Human Rights Watch, “Background: The State of Human Rights in Morocco,” November 2005, http://hrw.org/reports/2005/morocco1105/4.htm ; Mohammad Ibahrine, “Morocco: Internet making censorship obsolete,” Arab Reform Bulletin 3 (7): September 2005, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/ibrahine1.pdf.
31. Richard Hamilton, “Laughter, freedom, and religion in Morocco,” BBC News, January 13, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/6256131....
32. Reporters Without Borders, “Managing editor resigns to spare his newspaper impossible damages payment,” January 18, 2007, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=20473.
33. Reporters Without Borders, “Morocco,” February 7, 2008, http://www.rsf.org/Morocco.html.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Reporters Without Borders, “Appeal court overturns blogger’s conviction,” September 18, 2008, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=28603.
38. Ibid.
39. “YouTube site ‘blocked’ in Morocco,” BBC News, May 29, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6702973.stm.
40. Reporters Without Borders, “Al-Jazeera bureau forced to stop broadcasting Maghreb news programme from Rabat,” May 7, 2008, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=26924.
41. Ibid.
42. Reporters Without Borders, “Royal pardon for Internet user, condemned to three years of jail for creating spoof Facebook profile for prince,” March 19, 2008, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=25900.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. “Schools advocating child marriage shut down,” The Sydney Morning Herald, September 26, 2008, http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2008/09/26/1222217468223.html.